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Abstract 
 
This thesis presents improvised practice with accompanying 
contextualisation alongside a discussion of the broader issues involved in 
improvising music in contemporary Western culture. 
 
The first chapter explores aesthetic and philosophical issues relating to 
improvisation in general while also establishing a context for the practice 
that follows. Starting by examining the role of a musical instrument in an 
improvising situation, this chapter goes on to discuss how improvisation 
challenges distinctions such as art and craft or subject and object. The issues 
of risk, vulnerability, dialogue and collaboration are then considered leading 
to an exploration of the role that memory, the familiar and habit play in 
improvisation. The chapter finishes with an investigation into the 
relationship between ethics and improvisation. 
 
The second chapter consists of improvised practice presented as four 
separate projects: The Quartet, Spock, CCCU Scratch Orchestra and a duo 
with Matthew Wright. Each of these projects consists of a commentary 
discussing particular issues raised through this research followed by the 
presentation of the relevant improvised practice. This practice is 
documented through and presented in the form of audio recordings. 
 
A concluding section reprises and identifies the overall themes of the thesis 
and provides contextualisation for the final live performance that forms an 
important practical component of this research. 
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A Practice-led Investigation into Improvising Music in 
Contemporary Western Culture 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This thesis consists of a mixture of improvised practice and philosophical 
discussion. The theory and the practice both share the same concerns. These 
concerns are, broadly speaking, related to the role of the familiar in 
improvised music, the connection between aesthetic and ethics and how the 
practice of improvisation extends beyond the cultural realm. 
 
Chapter one (section 1.1) starts by considering how musical instruments are 
always already saturated with human intention prior to a musicians 
encounter with them. In section 1.2 the gap between a musician and their 
instrument is used as a metaphor to explore how improvisation takes places 
in the gaps or spaces between established codes, between dichotomies such 
as art and craft, subject and object, selfless and self-full. Section 1.3 looks at 
the role of risk in improvisation: how it can provide glimpses of ways 
forward that were previously inaccessible, how it can create uncertain, 
emergent and emergency situations that demand a specific dynamic of 
engagement and how it is a symptom of the more fundamental 
improvisational condition of vulnerability. Section 1.4 focuses on how 
improvised collaboration can range from sensitive support to the creative 
exploitation and manipulation of power relations. The important subject of 
memory, the familiar and habit is discussed in section 1.5. How can a 
practice that depends on formulae and habits continue to provide fresh 
insights into the same material? The final section (1.6) considers the 
relationship between aesthetics and ethics in improvised music.  
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The second chapter consists of improvised practice presented as four 
separate projects: The Quartet, a contemporary jazz group; Spock, a free 
improvisation quartet; CCCU Scratch Orchestra, an undergraduate student 
ensemble; and a duo with electronic musician and composer Matthew 
Wright. Each of these projects reprises and extends themes from the first 
chapter through both the practice itself and a written commentary. The 
audio examples that are used to illustrate points throughout the text should 
be considered complementary to the main body of practice that is presented 
at the end of each commentary. 
 
A final section summarises the overall themes of the thesis and suggests that 
for many improvisers their practice is not solely an end in itself but also a 
means of opening up and exploring aesthetic, ethical and political 
alternatives. The thesis ends with a contextualisation of the final live 
performance that will form an important practical component of my 
research. 
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1.1 The Instrument 
 
"The instrument - that's the matter - the stuff - your subject" (Lacy in 
Bailey, 1993, p.99) 
 
Every musician has an instrument. An instrument contains in its design 
certain structures of possibility and expectation that shape and condition the 
kind of music played upon it. An instrument is an object saturated with 
human intention. To play an instrument is to engage in a dialogue with the 
individual instrument maker(s), the tradition and history of the makers, 
players and composers of and for that particular instrument and the whole 
range of musical, cultural, technological and physical expectations and 
aspirations that are encoded in these objects. The multi-disciplinary artist 
and musician Ansuman Biswas emphasises the social and physical aspects 
of engaging with an instrument: 
Instruments are bequeathed to us socially. Every given instrument 
has been shaped by other bodies before ours … the structure of 
human societies are too written into instruments … by engaging with 
a given instrument I accept the proclivities and decisions of all those 
generations who have contributed to its design. The shapes and 
balances of their bodies are figured into its size and materials. I echo 
those bodies and enter a larger social body when I pick up or sit at 
this trace of them. I become the reification of a social idea (Biswas, 
2011, p.101) 
 
The reification involved in playing an instrument is what Derrida is 
referring to when he says that, “the already-there-ness of instruments and 
concepts cannot be undone or reinvented” (Derrida in Corbett, 1994, p.217). 
Like a well-trodden path, an instrument has a coercive power that tells of 
the past, conditions the present and leads into the future. 
 
It is this coercive power that the composer and improviser Cornelius 
Cardew is referring to when he describes how the ‘openness’ and 
‘informality’ of the improvising ensemble AMM was compromised by the 
instruments they were using. 
 AMM music is supposed to admit all sounds but the members of 
AMM have marked preferences. An openness to the totality of 
10 
 
sounds implies a tendency away from traditional musical structures 
towards informality. Governing this tendency – reining it in – are 
various thoroughly traditional musical structures such as saxophone, 
piano, violin, guitar, etc., in each of which reposes a portion of the 
history of music.  
(Cardew, 1971, p.18). 
 
I would argue that such 'thoroughly traditional musical structures' do more 
than 'rein in' or 'govern' sound making. One of the claims this thesis makes 
is that an instrument is one of the primary sources of improvisation. As well 
as containing a ‘portion of the history of music’ an improviser’s instrument 
comes to contain, shape and articulate the personal history of the player. 
The instrument is both the means and the end of an improviser’s physical, 
aesthetic and spiritual development. Improvisation is an archaeological 
process that involves sorting through and working with the accumulated 
layers of habit, memory, intention and meaning that ‘repose’ in the 
instrument. As Hogg observes, this dense web of personal and historical 
resonances is central to our conception of an instrument: 
My use of the violin qua violin passes through and is formed by 
personally internalized cultural filters of sonority, history, learning, 
expectation, listening, watching and acting … [my violin is] 
something that is only fully constituted as a violin in its relationship 
to my embodied and enculturated consciousness (Hogg, 2011, p.88-
89) 
 
The embodiment and enculturation involved in playing an instrument 
diffuses any Cartesian separation of mind and body. This is what I believe 
the improvising guitarist Derek Bailey meant when he said that “there is a 
kind of creativity which is attached to playing an instrument ... which is not 
available in any other way” (‘A Liberating Thing’, 1992). Of course 
composers also engage creatively with instruments but their musical 
imagination is not bound to them, derived from them, or fed by them to the 
same degree. Charles Rosen speaks of a pianist’s "inexplicable and almost 
fetishistic need for physical contact with the combination of metal, wood, 
and ivory” (Rosen, 2003, p.10). It is this on-going physical interaction with 
an instrument that can make the difference between a composer’s and an 
improviser’s relationship to instruments. 
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The function of instruments, for improvisers who spend so many hours of 
their lives in dialogue with these inanimate collaborators, ranges beyond the 
aesthetic. In Jacques Attali’s envisaged utopian future, improvisation 
heralds “the emergence of the free act, self transcendence, pleasure in being 
instead of having” where “instruments no longer serve to produce the 
desired sound forms, conceived in thought before written down, but to 
monitor unexpected forms” (Attali, 1985, p.115-134). Attali’s suggestion 
that an instrument is a form of antennae, or divining rod, that can sensitise 
the improviser reinforces Evan Parker’s observation that an instrument 
“teaches you as much as you tell it what to do” (Parker in Fischlin, 2009, 
p.1). Like meditation practice the hours spent with an instrument extend into 
and shape everyday reality. The instrumental relationship is both one of the 
themes of this thesis and the primary method of research. 
The musical instrument, like the scientific instrument, is not an end 
in itself but a means … the most appropriate appreciation of a 
musical instrument is to use it to sensitise the mind to the music of 
what happens (Biswas, 2011, p.101) 
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1.2 The Musician 
 
Free improvisation is a strange place, strange because it is not really 
a place but more of an edge between spaces, between times (Peters, 
2009, p.44) 
 
Improvisation happens in the gaps. This elusive and transient activity shows 
up most clearly in-between things, states, cultures, places and people. Some 
critics have argued that jazz started life as a short improvised solo break in-
between ensemble passages. The cadenza in a concerto happens in a ‘gap’ 
before the coda that grew from a brief elaboration of a cadence into a 
substantial structural element. Improvisation grows in the cracks between 
established orders. It is a parasitic activity, it needs something upon which 
to ‘improve’, it relies on there being something to subvert. Cobussen, 
paraphrasing Attali, talks about improvisation as a form of ‘noise’; as “an 
aggression against all sorts of code, against all kinds of order … which 
compels recognition of something new” (Cobussen, 2005, p.30). Mackey 
sees improvisation as a form of ‘discrepant engagement’ whose focus is 
“opening presumably closed orders of identity and signification, accent, 
fissure, fracture, incongruity” (Mackey, 2004, p.371). This is why the 
concerto cadenza grew so unwieldy and why Louis Armstrong’s melodic 
embellishments sowed the seeds of free jazz: a practice that feeds on 
dismantling established codes will eventually devour the context of its birth. 
This discussion will be continued later (in section 1.6). 
 
The relevance of introducing these ideas at this point is to provide a context 
for a discussion of the most fundamental ‘gap’ in improvisation: the gap 
between an improviser and their instrument. Why is this an appropriate way 
of examining the relationship between musician and instrument? In recent 
Western culture at least, it is difficult to experience, talk about or practice 
improvisation without encountering some trace of the notion of a composer 
or performer, an artist or a craftsperson, art or entertainment, discipline or 
freedom, innovation or tradition. Improvisation takes place somewhere in-
between each of these (and many other) dichotomies, in the gaps or cracks 
between clusters of oppositions. 
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The first of these oppositions is the distinction between the art and craft of 
improvisation. 
 
Art/craft 
The craftsperson aims to overcome the technical challenges of playing an 
instrument so that their intentions can be articulated clearly. The instrument 
is a tool, a means to an end, and it is the craftsperson’s job to minimise any 
friction between their intentions and the implementation of those intentions. 
Jazz saxophonist Ronnie Scott summarises this position: 
I practice to become as close to the instrument, as familiar with it, as 
possible. The ideal thing would be to be able to play the instrument 
as one would a kazoo (Scott in Bailey, 1993, p.101) 
 
The notion of a musician spending years practicing to achieve fluency on 
their instrument is a familiar one. The reason it is not superfluous to 
mention it here is because writing about improvisation often de-emphasises 
the craft element of the activity. There are several interrelated layers of craft 
in improvisation. Firstly, as mentioned above, there is the craft of 
instrumental ability. Secondly there is the craft of a specific improvising 
tradition such as the Persian Radif, bebop jazz vocabulary or French organ 
improvisation. Thirdly, there are aspects of improvisation that go beyond, or 
come before, specific traditions that are concerned with group dynamics and 
how ones-self is engaged in the process of improvising. Whilst the concept 
of craft is perhaps not fully adequate here, these aspects of improvisation 
that touch upon character and social interaction require a kind of ethical 
discipline that shares something with the objective system of values and 
standards within which a craftsperson works (MacIntyre, 1985). 
 
One of the defining features of the craft of improvisation is automaticity. 
The basis of improvised activity, like a kind of Maslow’s triangle of mental 
processing, is thoughtless, automatic. Conscious choice and explicit 
awareness occur only at the tip of the triangle and are made possible by this 
‘lower-level’ processing. Later we will see how the automaticity and 
physical habit of craft sit uncomfortably with what some theories demand of 
artistic production. From the craftsperson’s perspective the automatic nature 
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of what they are doing grants them greater freedom. This is the freedom-to 
do, and respond, rapidly and intuitively. Pressing summarises this view: 
The change from controlled processing to automatic motor 
processing as a result of extensive skill rehearsal is an idea of long 
standing (James 1980, Schiffrin and Scheider 1977), and it 
undoubtedly improves movement quality and integration (Eccles 
1972). The accompanying feeling of automaticity, about which 
much metaphysical speculation exists in the improvisation literature, 
can be simply viewed as the natural result of considerable practice, a 
stage at which it has become possible to completely dispense with 
conscious monitoring of motor programs, so that the hands appear to 
have a life of their own, driven by the musical constraints of the 
situation (Bartlett 1947, Welford 1976, Pressing 1984a). In a sense, 
the performer is played by the music (Pressing, 1984, p.139) 
 
It is possible to imagine, on the other hand, an improviser of a more artistic 
bent for whom the instrumental embodiment of their idea involves a 
compromise. They are suspicious of the storehouse of automatic motor 
patterns and the aesthetic and physical habits that constitute instrumental 
ability; what Nachmanovitch calls “the danger that inheres in the very 
competence that we acquire in practice” (Nachmanovitch, 1990, p.67). They 
believe that the original character or force of their idea, or even their ability 
to conceive of ideas, is diluted and distorted through this prior conditioning. 
Peters makes this point forcefully:  
Just think of the smug confidence of the virtuoso with a technique 
that glitters on the surface of aesthetic forms that are assumed, 
resumed and consumed as prefabricated chunks of performative 
cultural capital, forever ready-to-hand to be repeatedly mastered by 
the master. Or think of the dubious automatism that is too easily and 
too often promoted as a quasi-spiritual force surging through the 
veins of the improviser without regard for the manner in which the 
automatic is, in truth, the product of training, rote learning, and an 
absolute embeddedness in the given to the point of forgetfulness 
(Peters, 2009, p.118) 
 
This touches on the question of whether (an) improvisation is an act or an 
object. Peters’ ‘smug virtuoso’ is clearly a manipulator of musical objects 
(‘prefabricated chunks of performative cultural capital’). This notion of 
virtuosity seems antithetical to the risk-taking uncertainty of ‘true’ artistic 
production: how can such ‘embeddedness’ play a part in genuine aesthetic 
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discovery? Cardew highlights the Modernist aesthetic/ethic subtext of 
Peters’ polemic when he pits the subjectivity of the improvisers in the 
ensemble AMM against the objectivity of a professional musician. In his 
definition of the improvisational virtue of integrity he makes a distinction 
between ‘making the sound and being the sound”: 
The professional musician makes the sounds (in full knowledge of 
them as they are external to him); AMM is their sounds (as ignorant 
of them as one is about one’s own nature) (Cardew, 1971, p.20). 
 
For Cardew the professional musician is alienated from their labour. Their 
craftsmanship leads them to deploy sounds with the strategic distance of a 
general or a politician. Cardew, like the experimental theatre director Jerzy 
Grotowski, believed that artist-improvisers “are not after recipes, the 
stereotypes which are the prerogative of professionals” (Grotowski in Hogg, 
2011, p.80). Where the ‘professional’ sees their instrument as a means to an 
end, the artist-improviser sees it as an end in itself.  
 
To summarise, whereas the improvising craftsperson aspires towards a 
positive freedom-to respond automatically and thoughtlessly the 
improvising artist prefers a negative freedom-from “the endless 
regurgitation of a stockpile of clichés and standardised formulas” (Peters, 
2009, p.84). For Collingwood craft in general involves “a distinction 
between planning and execution” where “the result to be obtained is 
preconceived or thought out before being arrived at” whereas a work of art 
is “not made … by carrying out a preconceived plan, nor by way of 
realising the means to a preconceived end” (Collingwood in Sawyer, 2003, 
p.105). The creativity scholar Keith Sawyer makes a connection between 
Collingwood’s distinction and “the modern psychological distinction 
between problem finding and problem solving”: 
A craftsman is problem solving, whereas an artist is problem finding 
(Sawyer, 2003 p.105) 
 
The truth is, of course, that an improviser must be both an artist and a 
craftsperson. Improvisation is simultaneously problem solving and problem 
finding, objective and subjective, led by neither the instrument nor the 
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musician but by the friction of their engagement. The improvising flautist 
John Denley, in the course of making a distinction that echoes those made 
above, cautions against thinking of these aspects as separate from each 
other:   
For the improviser the physicality of producing sound (the 
hardware) is not a separate activity to the thoughts and ideas in 
music (software) … [although] as soon as I try and define these 
separately I run into problems. It is a meaningless enterprise for it is 
the very entanglement of levels of perception, awareness and 
physicality that makes improvisation (Denley in Bailey, 1993, 
p.108) 
 
This entanglement can be understood as a form of interaction between 
feedback and feedforward loops (Pressing, 1984) where the possible scope 
of a performer’s intentions is derived from the instrument at the same time 
as the scope of what is possible on an instrument is derived from the 
performer. This can take place on a micro level, on a moment-by-moment 
basis in the course of a particular improvisation, and a macro level, as an 
improviser’s relationship to their instrument gradually changes and 
develops. Saxophonist Evan Parker describes it in this way: 
“You couple yourself to that instrument and it teaches you as much 
as you tell it what to do. So you’re sensitive to . . . how it’s 
responding to your efforts to control it. By hearing it, the way it’s 
feeding back to you, you learn to control it better, so it’s a very 
dynamic and very sensitive process . . . [But] the instrument at the 
same time seems to be giving you additional information so that 
there are things you have under your control, but every so often 
something will go wrong. You’ll lose control. [And] in that moment 
you are given an opportunity to learn something else that the 
instrument can do . . . the nature of the instrument and its will in 
relation to its destiny . . . [its] set of intentions in its relationship with 
you, and you start to find it difficult to distinguish yourself and your 
intentions from the instrument’s intentions” (Parker in Fischlin, 
2009, p.1) 
 
Improvisation always involves a dialogic friction between the intentions of 
the musician and the intentions of the instrument. This friction/dialogue is a 
form of thinking through doing, thinking through physical interaction with 
an instrument. This is what Iyer calls ‘embodied cognition’. For Iyer 
perception and cognition are “structured by the body” (Monson, 2009, 
17 
 
p.27), meaning that sensory processes and motor processes are 
“fundamentally inseparable, mutually informative, and structured so as to 
ground our conceptual systems” (Iyer in Monson, 2009, p.27). In other 
words in improvisation there is no ‘gap’ or spilt between mind and body, art 
and craft or thinking and doing. 
 
Subject/object 
The art/craft distinction comes from the same cluster of dichotomies as the 
distinction between subject and object. An important manifestation of this 
relates to the presence or absence of human agency in improvised music. In 
other words: what are we listening to in improvisation, the musician or the 
music?  
 
Pianist, composer and improviser Misha Mengelberg refers to improvisation 
as ‘instant composition’ (Corbett, 2004, p.390) and Arnold Schoenberg once 
likened composing to a “slowed down improvisation” (Schoenberg in 
Nachmanovitch, 1990, p.6). Some musicians certainly consider 
improvisation as a means to an end, a method of generating a musical object 
– an improvisation – that bears some similarity with a composition (it is 
interesting that both words can refer to both an activity and an object). The 
Oxford Music Online entry for Improvisation reinforces this view by 
defining improvisation in relation to a musical object: 
[Improvisation is] the creation of a musical work, or the final form 
of a musical work, as it is being performed” (Oxford Music Online, 
2012) 
 
While there is some currency in this idea that improvisation is a means of 
constructing a musical object - it was useful, for example, to those writers 
who aimed to legitmise jazz through comparisons with Western art music - 
it is a distorted view that ignores precisely what distinguishes improvisation 
from other forms of artistic activity. 
 
A second view, that is more alive to the unique subjective character of 
improvisation, is that improvisation is the subject made audible. That what 
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we hear in improvisation is a person doing, acting and reacting, making 
choices. This is what the music therapist Kenneth Bruscia asserts when he 
reflects, after a stream-of-conscious account of himself improvising, that “in 
these few, simple moments of improvising, I have encountered the 
conditions of being human, the very sound essence of who I am” (Bruscia in 
Wigram, 2004, p.18). Nachmanovitch describes how, for him, 
“improvisation extended the scope and relevance of music making until the 
artificial boundary between life and art disintegrated” (Nachmanovitch, 
1990, p.6) and jazz drummer Art Blakey describes how a musician’s 
personality is communicated, unedited, when they are improvising on stage: 
“You’re in the nude, you’re in your birthday suit and people can see 
clean through you. And your music, your actions and your vibes, 
that you bring forth to the audience, come out and you cannot hide 
that” (Blakey, 1985) 
 
If you believe, like Bruscia, Nachmanovitch and Blakey, that an 
improviser’s intentions are projected, relatively undiluted, through the 
instrument then this sense of agency should be central to the way we listen 
to improvised music. The music is heard as the embodiment, in sound, of 
the improviser’s personality or character; human agency is foregrounded 
and provides an important aesthetic focus for the listener. The composer and 
improviser Gavin Bryars observed that: 
In any improvising position the person creating the music is 
identified with the music. The two things are seen to be 
synonymous. The creator is there making the music and is identified 
with the music and the music with the person. It’s like standing a 
painter next to his picture so that every time you see the painting you 
see the painter as well” (Bryars in Bailey, 1993, p.115) 
This close proximity between person and music is a defining feature of 
musical improvisation. It changes the way the music is heard. It is difficult 
not to hear a dramatic, biographical dimension to the music when listening 
to a live improviser. As saxophonist Yusef Lateef observes, it is difficult not 
to hear the music telling you something about the improviser’s character: 
The sound of the improvisation seems to tell us what kind of person 
is improvising. We feel that we can hear character or personality in 
the way the musician improvises (Lateef in Lewis, 2004, p.156) 
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However, as with the art/craft distinction, it should be obvious that both the 
perception of human agency and the sense that the act aspires to something 
beyond the individual are fundamental to our experience of improvisation. 
The view that a musician’s intentions, character and personality are 
expressed directly through improvisation is flawed. Improvisation is, as I 
mentioned above, always a dialogue. Even solo free-improvisation is a 
dialogue with the instrument, the instrumental tradition, one’s personal 
vocabulary, the audience and/or the performing space. It is impossible to 
imagine improvisation that does not interact with some external source. 
There is no improvisational equivalent to silently reading a score. Of course 
sounds can be spontaneously conjured up in one’s inner ear but I would 
contend that the friction involved in realising those sounds in physical 
reality is an important defining feature of improvisation. An improviser’s 
intentions or personality are never heard in a direct, transparent way. 
Improvisational agency always shows itself as the product of an engagement 
or dialogue with an 'other'. Bryars’ painting analogy is misleading in two 
respects. Improvisation is not an object separate from its creator like a 
painting and neither is it simply a subjective projection of the improviser’s 
personality. Improvisation is always a reaction-to or a dialogue-with and 
human agency is revealed as a by-product of this engagement. 
 
Also, as Bailey (1993) observes, most improvising is 'idiomatic'. Most 
improvisers work within a specific tradition and with a specific vocabulary. 
Each performance subtly adds to, 'signifies' on or interrogates this 
vocabulary. Like language, an improvisational vocabulary changes slowly 
over time as the result of many individual instances of use. To suggest that 
human agency provides the main aesthetic focus for the listener is to ignore 
the fact that for many improvisers and listeners the vocabulary and the 
tradition is centre stage. People go to Jazz festivals, Indian classical music 
concerts or Flamenco nights as much for the idiom as for the individual 
performers. The use of the idiom’s name in identifying and advertising the 
event underlines its cultural significance. Human agency may be an 
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important part of the experience in most improvised music but, once again, 
this is revealed obliquely through the patterning of language, through the 
unique friction between the individual and the idiom.  
 
Selfless/self-full 
A different way of thinking about the role of human agency in 
improvisation is to consider the presence or absence of a sense of self for 
the improviser. This change of emphasis opens the discussion up to the area 
of consciousness studies and raises the issue of improvisation inducing a 
state of consciousness in which a sense of self is dissipated. Saxophonist 
Ronnie Scott gives a typical account of this phenomenon: 
[W]hat seems to happen is that one becomes unconscious of playing, 
you know, it becomes as if something else has taken over and you’re 
just an intermediary between whatever else and the instrument (Scott 
in Bailey, 1993, p.52) 
 
The notion of self-awareness receding through the act of improvising 
connects both the art and craft perspectives discussed earlier. The 
craftsperson practices for many years so that a significant proportion of the 
processing required for the task becomes automatic. The artist develops 
strategies that help them to avoid the staleness of habitual formulae; 
strategies of awareness that “sling you forcibly into a new phase” (Cardew, 
1971, p.17) and allow fresh insights into familiar material. The ideals of the 
craftsperson and the artist converge in the notion of an improviser losing 
their sense of self through absorption in the activity. Freedom-from and 
freedom-to can both find fruition in the selfless present. In these moments 
the simultaneous freedom-to make use of the storehouse of instrumental 
ability and freedom-from the habits of everyday consciousness is made 
possible through a state of heightened awareness. How this happens and 
what exactly constitutes heightened awareness in the context of 
improvisation is covered in more detail in section1.5 through a discussion of 
Sarath’s theory of ‘cognitive event cycles’ (1996).  
 
What is relevant here is to get a clearer understanding of how the presence 
or absence of a sense of self affects improvisation. The state of absorption 
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mentioned above is described by Csikszentmihalyi as ‘flow’ (2002). Flow 
describes a state of optimal experience where the self is forgotten 
temporarily whilst deeply engaged in an activity, a “state in which people 
are so involved in an activity that nothing else seems to matter” 
(Csikszentmihalyi, 2002, p.4). Seen in this way selflessness is a form of 
being present in the moment with attention focused in such a way that 
normal regulatory systems, behaviors or habits (such that help to constitute 
a sense of self) are not triggered. There are two relevant aspects of this 
theory. One is that improvisation is a particularly flow-inducing activity and 
the other is that perceptions and ability are enhanced through flow. 
 
Improvisation is particularly likely to induce flow because of what was 
described above as ‘embodied cognition’; in other words it simultaneously 
engages both body and mind. 
Flow always involves the use of muscle and nerve, on the one hand, 
and will, thought, and feelings on the other (Csikszentmihalyi, 2002, 
p.118) 
 
One of the consequences of the conflation of oppositions (mind/body, 
art/craft, subject/object) that characterises improvisation is that it is a unique 
and intensely involving activity. According to Csikszentmihalyi this full 
engagement of the faculties and unselfconscious absorption in an activity 
has implications for ethics and the development of the self: 
It is when we act freely, for the sake of the action itself rather than 
for ulterior motives, that we learn to become more than what we 
were” (p.41-42) 
 
Csikszentmihalyi observes that during such experiences of total absorption, 
physical and mental processes appear to ‘flow’, unimpeded by conscious 
awareness. This observation is borne out by research in consciousness 
studies. The neuroscientist Dehaene found that “a stream of perceptual, 
semantic, and motor processes can ... occur without awareness” (Dehaene et 
al in Blackmore, 2003, p.278) and Claxton claims that “many tasks are best 
done without the interference of consciousness, or deliberation-mode” 
(Claxton in Blackmore, 2003, p.283). 
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 Whilst it is obvious that a large proportion of motor processing occurs most 
effectively without conscious intervention (a point made earlier in this 
section) the claim here is that there are certain states where higher level 
processing not only occurs without conscious awareness but also produces 
results that would be unobtainable in a state of normal consciousness. What 
is interesting is how Csikszentmihalyi, a social psychologist with a 
quantitative bent, describes how this occurs: 
What slips below the threshold of awareness is the concept of self, 
the information we use to represent to ourselves who we are. Loss of 
self-consciousness can lead to self-transcendence, to a feeling that 
the boundaries of our being have been pushed forward. This feeling 
is not just a fancy of the imagination, but is based on a concrete 
experience of close interaction with some Other, an interaction that 
produces a rare sense of unity (Csikszentmihalyi, 2002, p.64) 
 
It is important to note that a loss of self-consciousness or self-transcendence 
is not normally the motivation behind flow experiences. These phenomena 
are by-products of a ‘close interaction with some Other’. This echoes my 
earlier observation that human agency in improvisation is never heard in a 
direct, transparent way but is always revealed through an engagement or 
dialogue with some ‘other’. There is a sense in which the selflessness of 
improvisation can leave space for otherness and difference; it is 
characteristic of the activity that otherness is sought out. This is perhaps 
what Cardew means in his definition of the virtue of selflessness when he 
says “to do something constructive you have to look beyond yourself” 
(Cardew, 1971, p.20). Ramshaw makes the ethical implications of this, in 
relation to jazz improvisation, more explicit: 
This openness of improvisation towards the other, ‘towards the 
unknown’ (Bailey 54), not only sustains jazz as a creative art form, it 
also nurtures the possibility of ‘improvised musicking’ … as that 
which links jazz to ethics, resistance and democracy (Ramshaw, 
2006, p.9) 
 
The ‘discrepant engagement’ of improvisation seeks out, interacts with, 
resists and acknowledges otherness. The political and ethical implications of 
this will be discussed later in the thesis (in section 1.6 and the conclusion). 
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I want to finish this section with a brief investigation of the role of self/other 
in two contrasting group improvisation situations: the ensemble AMM and 
John Zorn’s game piece Cobra.  
 
The musicians in AMM, at least in their early stages of development, 
aspired towards selflessness. Eddie Prevost mentions that the players in 
AMM were “content for [their] individual contributions not to be 
identifiable ... early AMM performances were often made in total darkness 
... listeners were not aware where a particular sound came from” (Prevost, 
1990). This notion of the ego of individual performers being subsumed into 
a group identity is made explicit in an aphorism that appeared on the sleeve 
of their first commercial recording: 
Does group direction, or authority, depend on the strength of a 
leading personality, whose rise or fall is reflected in the projected 
image, or does the collation of a set of minds mean the development 
of another authority independent of all of the members but 
consisting of all of them? (Prevost, 1990) 
 
This is more than just a reformulation of the truism ‘the whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts’. The implication here is that giving yourself up to 
the ‘authority’ of the group identity grants access to creative realms that 
were not previously accessible. I believe that AMM were, as Maggie Nicols 
describes the work of John Stevens, “practicing an alternative society” 
(Nicols in Stevens, 2007, memoir two). 
“For AMM it was by virtue of collectivism, not in spite of it, that 
one’s individuality could thrive and blossom ... AMM had learnt that 
the virtue of selflessness could lead, propitiously, to individual 
discovery and self-realisation” (Tilbury, 2008, p.293-307) 
 
Cobra (1984) is a game piece by John Zorn consisting of an elaborate 
system of hand signals that the players use to cue a variety of musical 
events. There is no indication of what to play, only when to start and stop or 
who to play with and in what way. Zorn describes his game pieces as “a 
complex set of rules that, in a sense, turned the players on and off like 
toggle switches to such a complicated degree that it didn’t really matter 
what the content was” (Zorn, 2008, p.200). At the time Zorn was interested 
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compositionally in “changing blocks of sound” ” (‘Passing it on’, 1992). 
One such block was a genre of music or, by extension, the improvising style 
of a particular player. As in AMM an ‘alternative society’ is being created 
in Cobra. The difference is that the rules of this society are clear, complex 
and rigid; group authority here is very much dictated by a ‘leading 
personality’ (in the recorded and videoed performances of Cobra that I have 
seen Zorn is always standing in front of the band giving/receiving the cues 
from the players): 
What I’ve basically created is a small society and everyone kind of 
finds their own position in that society. It really becomes like a 
psychodrama … People are given power and it’s very interesting to 
see which people like to run with that power, which people run away 
from it, who are very docile and just do what they’re told, and who 
try very hard to get more control and more power … So it becomes 
kind of a scary, frightening thing to be in front of that band, to see 
these people blossom and become the assholes that they really are” 
(‘Passing it on’, 1992) 
 
Whilst Zorn is undoubtedly being arch and humourous here, there is 
definitely a sense in Cobra (I have organized and participated in several 
performances of the piece) that improvisers are treated like stylistic ciphers, 
to be turned on and off at will, as if all an improviser did was regurgitate “a 
stockpile of clichés and standardised formulas” (Peters, 2009, p.84). 
The distinction between group improvisation in AMM and in Cobra 
summarises some of the distinctions covered in this section. Whilst AMM’s 
music making retains the hope that the individual self can be positively 
transformed or developed through collective improvisation Cobra sees the 
improviser as a source of stylistic tropes and derives much of its interest and 
success (as a form of group improvisation) from exposing and exploiting the 
power relationships that exist between the musicians. 
 
 
 
1.3 Musician and Instrument 
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Oxford Music Online states that “one of the typical components of 
improvisation is that of risk” (2012), the ethnomusicologist Bruno Nettl 
acknowledges the presence of a “risk factor” in all improvisation (1998, 
p.16) and improvisers from The Grateful Dead (Garcia in Bailey, 1993, 
p.42) to Earl Hines (Hines in Taylor, 1998, p.8) emphasise the importance 
of risk in their performances. For something to be risky there must be 
something at stake. This section looks at what is at stake for an improvising 
musician and the related phenomena of mistakes, accidents, otherness, 
uncertainty and vulnerability. 
 
For improvisers, like many artists, value judgments are an important means 
of navigating a course through their field of aesthetic practice; without them 
conscious artistic choices could not be made. But black and white 
distinctions such as good/bad or right/wrong do not account for the complex 
interactions between perceptions, intentions and actions that characterise 
improvisation. The pianist Herbie Hancock helps to clarify what is meant by 
this: 
The music was building, the audience was right there with us, and at 
the peak of Miles' solo on “So What” I played a really wrong chord. 
Miles took a breath and played a phrase that made my chord right. 
Miles didn't hear it as wrong, but instead as something that 
happened. (Hancock in Eskow in Klemp, et al., 2008) 
 
Hancock notes that Davis was not hearing the music as either right or 
wrong. The notion of a mistake was not in his conceptual field of vision. 
This is an example of Cardew’s improvisational virtue of “preparedness for 
no matter what eventuality” (1971, p.20); a flexible acceptance of, or 
readiness for, whatever happens that is often cultivated by experienced 
improvisers. The way an improviser is orientated towards, or relates to, the 
events that come their way determines the identity and significance of those 
events. This is not simply an assertion of a relativistic aesthetic. The 
perceived character and import of a musical event in an improvisation is 
what causes the next link in the chain. How an improviser perceives or hears 
an event determines how the music progresses; subjectivity becomes 
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structure. This creatively productive openness to otherness can be likened to 
an oyster’s creation of a pearl: 
 “The oyster thereby transforms both the grit and itself into 
something new, transforming the intrusion of error or otherness into 
its system” (Nachmanovitch, 1990, p.88) 
 
It is possible however that Davis did hear Hancock’s chord as a mistake 
and, through deft invention, redeemed the situation (this is a subtle but 
important difference). Paul Berliner calls such moments ‘musical saves’. 
Berliner and the many jazz musicians he interviewed for his huge study 
Thinking in Jazz: The Infinite Art of Improvisation (1994) emphasise the 
craft involved in “taking an idea that doesn’t work and turning it into 
something that does” (Barron in Berliner, 1994, p.210). Stanley Turrentine 
describes how fellow tenor saxophonist Cannonball Adderley would react to 
mistakes: 
He’d be going fast, man, and a chord would sneak up on him and 
bam, hit him upside the head. He’d just go ‘Oh, oh!’ and get right 
out of it. Yes, sir. That’s just knowing your horn and knowing your 
scales, being in command of your instrument (Turrentine in Berliner, 
1994, p.211) 
 
Turrentine’s focus on instrumental ability and automatic motor patterns 
demonstrates a perceived connection between technical competence and 
creatively agility: being prepared for unforeseen musical ‘emergencies’. In 
contrast to this approach is the pianist Earl Hines for whom risk taking 
became something of a trademark. Taylor describes Hines as a “musical 
tightrope walker” whose improvisations “seemed at times to skirt the edges 
of musical disaster” (Taylor, 1998, p.8). Hines himself agrees: 
I was always exploring and trying to find something else . . . 
Sometimes I was lost and didn't know where I was but I'd always 
keep going around till I caught up ... I'd do it purposely. The rhythm 
section never did know what I was doing! (Hines in Taylor, 1998, 
p.8). 
 
In contrast to Berliner's concept of 'musical saves', Hines clearly states that 
he would get lost on purpose. Why would an improviser do this? To answer 
this question fully I need to look at two more examples. 
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The composer Christian Wolff was asked, in the course of a public 
discussion, about his indeterminate scores: 
Q: “in these indeterminate pieces that come out differently each time 
you do them, what is the connection between the idea, or the score, 
or the conception”? 
 
A: “I’m interested in the outcome and nothing else … some of these 
indeterminate situations are a technical means of producing and 
giving the sounds a particular quality.” (Lukoszevieze, Ryan & 
Wolff, 2007, p.13) 
 
 
Edges (1968) by Christian Wolff 
 
For Wolff the ambiguity of the notation created a specific dynamic of 
engagement that affected not only what but also how the performers played. 
An example of a similarly indeterminate situation is the process used by 
Miles Davis to generate the music on his album Bitches Brew (1970): 
I brought in these musical sketches that nobody had seen, just like I 
did on Kind of Blue and In a Silent Way … I had told Teo Macero, 
who was producing the record, to just let the tapes run and get 
everything that we played … So I would direct, like a conductor, 
once we started to play, and I would either write down some music 
for somebody or I would tell him to play different things I was 
hearing, as the music was growing, coming together. It was loose 
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and tight at the same time. It was casual but alert, everybody was 
alert to the different possibilities that were coming up in the music 
… that recording was a development of the creative process, a living 
composition … what we did on Bitches Brew you couldn’t ever 
write down for an orchestra to play. That’s why I didn’t write it out, 
not because I didn’t know what I wanted; I knew that what I wanted 
would come out of a process and not some prearranged shit” (Davis 
& Troupe, 1990, p.289-290) 
 
Davis’ account of this recording session reveals a deliberate compositional 
methodology that exploited the character of semi-improvised musical 
responses in an uncertain and emergent situation. Like Wolff, Davis 
cultivated “a unique capacity for attention” (Smith, 1998, p.285) by 
underdetermining the performance situation. The risk in these instances is 
that the musician will be inhibited or confused by such uncertainty but it is 
precisely because of these stakes that such incompleteness can draw out a 
unique form of agency from a musician: 
[Such an] experience of inconclusiveness and imbalance gives 
people little choice but to make their own moves of creative 
imagination if they are to make sense of the performance and arrive 
at a meaningful account of what is happening. In so doing ... they 
complete the construction of its reality. (Schieffelin in Smith, 1998, 
p.263)  
 
The uncertainty in such a situation confronts a musician (and a listener) and 
demands their creative participation; the way in which they listen to and 
take part in the music changes with the sense of responsibility and 
ownership that this brings. 
 
To return to the question of why did Earl Hines would deliberately lose his 
place in the music: it was partly, judging from accounts of his character 
(Taylor, 1998), a form of showing off; the bravado of the tightrope walker. 
But Hines’ willful flirtation with musical disaster was also a deliberate 
strategy or methodology for creating situations that demanded a genuinely 
spontaneous response. The risk was failure - appearing incompetent to other 
musicians, tripping up the rhythm section, losing his place in the form - but 
the rewards included personal exhilaration, humour, respect from fellow 
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musicians and access to a level and type of creativity that could only be 
brought about by an emergency. 
 
In 1980 an earthquake in the mountains near Naples killed four thousand 
people and left 250,000 homeless. Torrential rain and mudslides made 
rescue efforts extremely difficult. A slow official response and sheer 
necessity led to an improvised rescue operation involving almost six 
thousand volunteers. This was highly successful for a few days until the 
army arrived and took over. Despite their advanced training and resources 
the army were initially less effective than the improvised operation because 
they needed time to adapt their established procedures to the specific 
situation. 
 
This account is one of many documented by creative collaboration scholar 
Keith Sawyer, who concludes that: 
Most of us tend to believe that planning in advance makes groups 
more effective and that centralised control is especially important in 
a disaster. But studies repeatedly show the importance of these 
emergent groups … After decades of disaster research, we know that 
improvisational groups are often the fastest and most effective in the 
uncertain and rapidly changing conditions caused by a natural 
disaster … when people improvise together, they develop innovative 
responses to unexpected events even though no one is consciously 
aware of exactly what the group is doing or why it works (Sawyer, 
2007, p.23-28) 
 
Sawyer is a well-established expert on group creativity whose research into 
improvisation ranges from experimental theatre to disaster studies to 
organisational management. His book Group Genius (2007) presents many 
examples in which improvisation is a necessary prerequisite of innovation. 
 
The musical disasters invited by Earl Hines are not only the catalyst for 
individual creative problem finding/solving. As with Wolff and Davis’ 
underdetermined situations, Hines’ musical emergencies demand creative 
participation from the other members of the band and the immediacy of the 
situation unites the group with an intuitive sense of purpose that is rarely 
accessible through other means. 
30 
 
 
Hines is certainly not alone in exploiting the creative possibilities of losing 
control. In the previous section Evan Parker mentioned how, when 
improvising “every so often something will go wrong. You’ll lose control. 
[and] in that moment you are given an opportunity to learn something else 
that the instrument can do” (Parker in Fischlin, 2009, p.1). For Parker a loss 
of control opens up the possibility of a new discovery about his instrument. 
However, it may not specifically be the mistake that exposes such new 
information but rather the sudden and unexpected intrusion into a field 
defined by conscious selection and control. The creative possibilities of this 
idea were utilised by the educator and musician Emile Jacques-Dalcroze in 
his 'interrupt technique'. This is an improvisation exercise where the student 
must change the course of their improvisation (the nature of the change is 
decided beforehand and might consist of a change of key or tempo) when 
the teacher says 'hopp' (Jacques-Dalcroze, 1931, p.121-130). This is 
intended to “provoke personal responses” (Doerschuk in Pressing, 1984, 
p.143) in the student, forcing them to invent an immediate solution to a 
problem they could not be fully prepared for, a little like the volunteers who 
improvised the rescue operation in the wake of the Naples earthquake. The 
point is that unpredictable events can provide a 'jolt' out of the habitual 
course, “sling[ing] you forcibly into a new phase” (Cardew, 1971, p.17). 
Jazz drummer E.W. Wainwright describes such unpredictable events as “the 
only way you can get to some place you’ve never been before” (Wainwright 
in Klemp et al., 2008, p.3). The loss of control experienced in such a 
situation can cause the sudden realisation that there are ways of proceeding 
that were previously inaccessible to you.  
 
So it is not the nature of the unpredictable occurrence – accident, mistake, 
loss of control, uncertainty – but rather the sudden injection of unforeseen 
information that can cause the intuitive creative leaps that are the pay-off in 
improvisational risk. This unforeseen information, or ‘otherness’, can come 
from a faulty instrument, unusual acoustics, a restless audience or, perhaps 
most commonly, through the infinite variables involved in playing music 
with another human being. The whole of an improvising group is rarely the 
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sum of its parts. Steven Kellert, writing about chaos theory, explains that 
“the behavior of [a] system is not studied by reducing it to its parts” (Kellert 
in Borgo, 2007, p.4). The sheer number of variables and the variety of levels 
at which such variables interact in musical improvisation make parallels 
with chaos theory particularly appropriate: 
“The edge of chaos is a technical term ... that describes when a 
dynamical system is in a critical region between order and disorder 
... this critical state only occurs in dynamical systems that are 
dissipating internal energy, are open to continual energy fluxes from 
outside the system, and are operating under what are known as ‘far-
from-equilibrium’ conditions” (Borgo, 2007, p.84) 
 
This is a useful formulation of the aspect of improvised music I am 
discussing here. Earl Hines, Evan Parker, Miles Davis and Christian Wolff 
have all explored the creative possibilities of 'far-from-equilibrium' 
conditions. 
 
So far I have focused on the potential benefits or pay-offs of the risks 
involved in improvisation. An important characteristic of improvisation is 
that things do go wrong and not necessarily in a spectacular or interesting or 
dramatic way. In my experience as an improviser and a listener much of 
what is played in the name of improvisation can be heard as compromised 
in some way. But a distinction needs to be made between compromise that 
is the result of creative courage and compromise that is the result of creative 
cowardice or apathy. In The Imperfect Art (1988) jazz critic Ted Gioia 
describes how compromise is a defining feature of creative endeavor in 
improvisation and what this means aesthetically: 
The improviser, if he sincerely attempts to be creative, will push 
himself into areas of expression which his technique may not be able 
to handle. Too often the finished product will show moments of rare 
beauty intermixed with technical mistakes and aimless passages … 
[jazz’s] unpolished beauty may, in fact, stand as a compelling 
argument for viewing art as a spiritual and expressive 
communication between artist and audience and not as a class of 
perfected objects (p.68-111) 
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Gioia is suggesting rethinking aesthetics as the judgment of communicative 
acts rather than the judgment of crafted objects. This distinction between 
action and object is fundamental to my understanding of improvisation and 
helps to contextualise the role of risk. We are responsible for our actions in 
a far more direct and immediate way than we are responsible for our 
objects. An object is, by definition, separate from us physically and 
chronologically and their creators renounce a certain degree of 
responsibility: Beethoven is only one of a number of agents and factors that 
contribute towards the meaning of a performance of his fifth symphony for 
a modern audience. An improviser, on the other hand, is judged 
chronologically in the present and physically in the presence of an audience 
and can be held to account for their actions in a way that Beethoven cannot. 
It is through this accountability that risk can be understood as a symptom of 
the more fundamental improvisational condition of vulnerability. 
 
The Oxford English Dictionary (2011) defines being vulnerable as being 
“open to attack or injury of a non-physical nature; esp., offering an opening 
to the attacks of raillery, criticism, calumny, etc.” There are several ways in 
which this applies to improvisers. The first, as I have mentioned above, is 
chronological and related to the fact that improvisation is an activity rather 
than an object. What would conventionally occur prior to the presentation of 
an art object - reflection, editing, selecting, refining – becomes, in 
improvisation, the sole substance of the activity. Clouzot’s film Le Mystere 
Picasso (1956) uses time-lapse photography to capture a painterly 
improvisation that demonstrates this: 
He starts with the figure of a reclining nude – but then loses interest, 
and the curve of the woman's leg reminds him of a matador's leg as 
he flies through the air after being gored by a bull – so he paints over 
the nude and creates an image of a bull and a matador. But this leads 
him to yet another idea; he paints over the bullfight image and 
begins work on a Mediterranean harbour – with water-skier, bathers 
in bikinis, and a picturesque hilltop village … Five hours later, 
Picasso stops and declares that he will have to discard the canvas … 
‘Now that I begin to see where I'm going with it, I'll take a new 
canvas and start again’ (Picasso in Sawyer, 2000, p.149) 
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This is an example of what I described earlier as subjectivity as structure. 
Each action derives from the previous one in some way. Moment by 
moment Picasso's stream of visual associations and connotations accumulate 
into something like a cause-and-effect structure. The difference with music 
of course is that this process does not culminate in an object. All an 
improviser has is this process of becoming. The improviser can only let 
people into their workshop, exposing themselves at work on something that 
will never be finished and that is therefore forever vulnerable to revision, 
error or accident. 
 
The second source of vulnerability is the physical proximity of the 
improviser to an audience. Being close to another human being enhances the 
social dimension of any communication. This factor is enhanced by the 
intimate venues often used for improvised music. An audience’s 
engagement with improvisation is simultaneously an engagement with the 
improviser and therefore the music is inevitably charged with a personal, 
biographical or social dimension. 
“[in improvisation] immediacy and proximity re-emerge as ethically 
charged features of social interaction” (Gilroy in Fischlin & Heble, 
2004, p.35) 
 
The third potential source of vulnerability is to do with cultural context. In 
the West improvisation takes place in a cultural arena where objects are 
highly valued. Taking their cue from Capitalist economics, cultural critics 
conventionally ascribe value to the utility, unity or perfection of objects. 
Actions and interactions of any kind - let alone compromised ones - are less 
permanent and harder to ascribe a fixed and immutable value to. The cards 
of legitimate cultural value are stacked against improvisers. Engaging in an 
activity that so fervently valourises process in the context of a culture that 
so fervently valourises product is almost an act of political resistance by 
default. 
 
To contextualise these ideas about vulnerability I will briefly discuss Miles 
Davis' 1964 recording of My Funny Valentine. Davis is a paradigmatic 
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example of the risk-taking, vulnerable improviser. Chronologically and 
physically it is significant that this performance was recorded live and is 
presumably unedited (chronologically: in a live performance there is less 
recourse to reflection or selection; physically: the presence of the audience 
gives the performance a social charge that is absent in a studio recording).  
 
After a brief piano introduction Davis paraphrases the theme completely 
solo. Beyond these eight bars the theme is referred to only obliquely and the 
ensuing playing includes a huge array of half-valving, false fingering and lip 
bends with notes cracked, split, smudged, dipped, smeared and de-tuned. 
Davis takes risks throughout this solo, playing at the extremes of his 
instrument's register and dynamic range, using this exposition of technical 
vulnerability to intimate, highly expressive and dramatic effect. Unlike 
Hines, Davis did not boast about his risk-taking. On the contrary, from all 
accounts (including his own (Davis & Troupe, 1990)) he seems to have 
been particularly concerned about being perceived as in control. Davis' risk 
taking was led by the music, despite the opening to criticism that this 
offered in a competitive, judgmental cultural environment. It is easy to lose 
sight of how vehemently Davis was criticised during his lifetime. The 
American jazz establishment was striving for, and achieving, cultural 
legitimacy throughout the 1970's, 80's and 90's and a result of this was an 
emphasis on historical awareness and classicism that obscured and devalued 
the uncertainty and risk that has always defined Davis' work. The eminent 
author, critic and jazz musician James Lincoln Collier wrote: 
Miles Davis is not, in comparison with other men of major influence 
in jazz, a great improviser. His lines are often composed of unrelated 
fragments and generally lack  coherence. His sound is interesting, 
but too often it is weakened by the petulant whine of his half-valving 
(Collier in Walser, 1993, p.344) 
 
The musicologist Robert Walser points out that standard evaluative 
methods, such as transcribing recorded improvisations, “cannot cope with 
the problem of Miles Davis: the missed notes, the charged pauses, the 
technical risk-taking, the whole challenge of explaining how this powerful 
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music works and 'how' it means” (1993, p.359). Walser summarises the 
issues of failure, risk-taking, creativity and vulnerability in Davis' work: 
Despite his dislike of failure, Davis constantly and consistently put 
himself at risk in his trumpet playing by using a loose, flexible 
embouchure that helped him to produce a great variety of tone 
colours and articulations, by striving for dramatic gestures rather 
than consistent demonstration of mastery, and by experimenting with 
unconventional techniques. Ideally, he would always play on the 
edge and never miss; in practice, he played closer to the edge than 
anyone else and simply accepted the inevitable missteps, never 
retreating to a safer, more consistent performing style … the work of 
Miles Davis seems to repudiate conventional notions of aesthetic 
distance and insists that music is less a thing than an activity (1993, 
p.356, 359, 360) 
 
Walser reaffirms the conclusion drawn earlier in this section; that 
improvisation is an act, not an object. Davis' work effectively exemplifies 
and summarises the role of risk and vulnerability in improvised music.  
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1.4 Musicians 
For most people improvisation is about playing with other people 
and some of the greatest opportunities provided by free 
improvisation are in the exploration of the relationships between 
players (Bailey, 1993, p.105) 
 
Improvisation is, as I mentioned earlier, always a dialogue. Whilst this 
dialogue may be with the instrument, the audience or the musician's 
personal vocabulary this section focuses on the most obvious form of 
dialogue in improvisation: playing with other people. Most improvisatory 
traditions have conventions governing the scope of dialogue and interaction 
between musicians. In Hindustani classical music, interaction between the 
soloist and the tabla player normally occurs after the opening alap (an 
expressive exposition of the raga without a regular pulse) and will be based 
on a shared knowledge of typical layakari or rhythmic variations. Similarly 
dialogic interaction in the mainstream jazz tradition is often foregrounded 
near the end of an arrangement in an exchange of two, four or eight bar 
phrases. These frameworks constitute a shared language within which the 
improvisers may converse. In the relatively convention-free practice of free-
improvisation, dialogue and interaction is often the central focus of the 
activity. Bailey describes this process: 
Two musicians, coming together to play a piece of music, I think, 
has to be interesting even if the results are, in themselves, not a great 
piece of music. The way they find to work with each other says 
something about music. So you can hear one musician figuring out 
... how the other musician is matching what he does against what the 
other guy does, even if it’s not working in completed musical terms, 
but the process can be, I think, one of the most interesting listening 
experiences you can get (A Liberating Thing, 1992) 
 
The 'figuring out' and 'matching' that Bailey talks about is described as 
'negotiation' by trumpeter Wynton Marsalis who talks about jazz 
improvisation as an opportunity for "a group of people [to] come together 
and create art ... and negotiate their agendas ... and that negotiation is the 
art" (Supremefactory, 2012). Bailey and Marsalis both clearly value the 
socio-aesthetic dimension of dialogue in improvisation. They both suggest 
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that this interaction can be, and perhaps ought to be, the central focus of the 
activity. 
Bailey was fascinated by these initial musical encounters. The ever-
changing personnel in Bailey's free-improvisation group Company testifies 
to this. A particular incarnation of Company would be formed for a week 
long festival (these festivals were called Company Weeks) before 
disbanding. According to Bailey a week was just long enough to stop the 
ensemble from “turning into some kind of band, and I think at that point, for 
my tastes, a kind of deterioration sets in … that development thing, I don't 
see it as being, from the improvisational point of view, some kind of 
advance or improvement” (Childs et al, 1982/83, p.50). Bailey, known for 
his “monastic vigilance” (Carr in Borgo, 2007, p.23) regarding the habitual 
side of improvising, is making an extreme case for short-lived ensembles 
that has particular currency in free-improvisation. As I mentioned above, 
improvisation that aspires to operate outside of the framework of a tradition 
or established musical language relies more heavily on the dialogic aspect 
of the activity. What was special about Company as opposed to a long-term 
improvising group was the friction, uncertainty, imminent failure, 
immediacy and genuine sense of exploration involved in bringing such a 
diverse range of musicians together for the first time. The music was the 
sound of these players, instruments and styles negotiating their relationships 
and their identity in an unfamiliar context; a manifestation of the belief that 
we reveal ourselves more fully in such unpredictable encounters. 
However unpredictability is not exclusive to this collaborative honeymoon 
period. An established relationship can provide the security necessary to 
take certain risks. Despite the views expressed above Bailey himself was in 
involved in many long-term improvising collaborations such as his duo with 
the drummer John Stevens and various groups with the saxophonist Evan 
Parker. It is to be expected perhaps, that musicians who share similar views 
and work together regularly will express their friendship in their music 
making. The pianist Frederic Rzewski asserted that the music of 
improvising group Musica Elettronica Viva was “based on friendship. This 
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element of friendship is communicated in the music: it cannot be concealed” 
(Rzewski in Lewis, 2004, p.158). However the social and musical aspects of 
a collaborative relationship, while always present, should not be conflated. 
Conceivably one could develop at a different rate or along different lines to 
the other. I have certainly experienced effective musical/aesthetic 
partnerships that are socially dysfunctional. A certain amount of social 
friction or discomfort often serves to avoid creative complacency.  
The problem here is the same as in all areas of improvisation: the Achilles 
heel of this form of music making is the sheer familiarity that comes from 
continually dealing with the same instrument, the same musical vocabulary 
and the same people. The onus is on the improviser to continually find fresh 
ways of avoiding the staleness and complacency that are an almost 
inevitable by-product of the activity. In the previous section I discussed how 
risk taking can bring vitality to the improvised present. This section focuses 
on how the socio-aesthetic realm of collaboration can do the same. 
The example of Miles Davis is, again, instructive here. Davis had more 
highly productive collaborative relationships throughout his career than 
many artists. He engaged in most of these through his role as a band-leader. 
For Davis this meant the “creation and manipulation of a symbolic ‘ritual 
space’” (Smith, 1998, p.262) in which a careful choice of musicians, subtle 
use of visual and sonic cues and the manipulation of power relations 
combined to create a “quality of attentive musical flexibility that would lift 
his players to the level of co-composing interpreters” (1998, p.262). For 
example during the recording of Aida, for his 1981 comeback album The 
Man with the Horn, Miles Davis: 
Told [bassist Marcus] Miller to play an F and G vamp, but when 
Miller stuck resolutely to the chords, Davis stopped the band. ‘Is that 
all you gonna play?’ he asked. ‘I heard you was bad. You ain't 
playin' shit. ‘So Miller filled in his vamp ornately on the next take, 
and Davis stopped the band again. ‘What are you playin'?’ he asked 
Miller. ‘Just play F and G and shut up’ (Chambers, I987, p.303-304) 
Listening to Aida, there is an alertness to Millers playing, a tension between 
restraint and irrepressible virtuosity, that may not have been present in the 
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playing of a young musician with extraordinary technical facility making his 
first recording with the legendary Miles Davis, were it not for Davis’ 
perverse, elliptical direction. Smith notes that Davis “intentionally supplied, 
withheld, and distorted performance information because of a quality of 
attention that such an environment evoked from his players” (1998, p.262).  
There are two points about collaborative work within improvised music that 
help to contextualise the example above. The first is that improvisation 
“calls into question the myths of individual agency and innovation-in-
isolation on which the dominant Western understandings of artistic 
production are based” (Hebdige in Fischlin & Heble, 2004, p.24). This 
discussion is continued in the following section through a critique of the 
idealism of modernism in relation to improvised music. The second point 
reinforces the Vygotskian perspective of the key text in this area, John-
Steiner’s Creative Collaboration (2000), through the words of Bakhtin: 
“I cannot do without the other; I cannot become myself without the 
other; I must find myself in the other, finding the other in me” 
(Bakhtin in John-Steiner, 2000, p.5) 
While I agree with both of these statements their sources either de-
emphasise or ignore the fact that more often than not collaboration involves 
“complex issues of power play” (Fitch & Heyde, 2007, p.72). It is hard to 
disagree with Peters’ observation: 
“Certainly anyone familiar with improvisation either as a spectator 
or participant could not fail to be aware of the fact that free-
improvisation is more about power than it is about freedom” (Peters, 
2009, p.52) 
Davis certainly collaborated with Miller on Aida – the end result could not 
have been achieved without either of their contributions – but Chamber’s 
account of the process does not invoke the conventional collaborative 
associations of equality and friendship. The theatre improvisation teacher 
Keith Johnstone’s work with status transaction is revealing here. 
Johnstone’s observes that humans are “pecking order animals” and that 
“every sound and posture implies a status” (Johnstone, 2007, p.72-73). This 
puts a different slant on Bakhtin’s words: seen through Johnstone’s eyes the 
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process of ‘finding myself in the other, finding himself in me’ becomes a 
negotiation of status. And this is what is happening when Bailey describes 
hearing “one musician figuring out ... how the other musician is matching 
what he does against what the other guy does” (A Liberating Thing, 1992) 
or when Marsalis talks about ‘negotiating agendas’. As the composer 
Fabrice Fitch and cellist Neil Heyde observe, “a successful collaboration 
will not attempt to defuse the difficulties of the situation, which are in any 
case unavoidable, but will harness it’s provocative and questioning aspects” 
(Fitch & Heyde, 2007, p.73). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
1.5 The Familiar 
 
All improvisation takes place in relation to the known whether the 
known is traditional or newly acquired (Bailey, 1993) 
 
I have discussed the way in which a musical instrument is saturated with 
human intention even before it has been played, the web of automatic motor 
skills and physical habits that collectively constitute instrumental ability and 
the dangers of staleness and predictability that can result from repeatedly 
improvising with the same people. Despite all of this, an improviser still 
hopes (and is expected) to make something new, on the hoof, out of this old, 
overused material. Gary Peters dramatizes what he describes as the ‘tragic 
predicament’ of the improviser by re-presenting Walter Benjamin's 
interpretation of Paul Klee's painting Angelus Novus: 
His face is turned towards the past. Where we perceive a chain of 
events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage 
upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like 
to stay, awaken the dead and make whole what has been smashed. 
But a storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings 
with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. The 
storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is 
turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This 
storm is what we call progress” (Benjamin in Peters, 2009, p.18) 
 
The improviser - the angel, advocate, creator of the new - is turned towards 
the past, the known, the familiar. As they are propelled inexorably through 
time they must face the immediate past - in the form of what has just been 
played - as well as the accumulated debris of the longer-term past that 
constitutes the tools of their trade: their instrument, their relationship to their 
instrument, their musical vocabulary, and the musicians they are playing 
with.  
 
Another of Peter’s analogies that helps to set the scene for the coming 
discussion is how the reality-TV-game-show Scrap Heap Challenge reflects 
the predicament of the improviser: 
“The [improvising] artist, like our contestants, is thrown into a 
situation piled high with the discarded waste products of cultural 
history. These are the defunct, clapped-out, disintegrating remnants 
of past times on the edge of an oblivion that promise, at best, a faint 
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but continuing resonance as nostalgia and the cliché or, at worst, as 
universal forgetfulness” (Peters, 2009, p.17) 
 
Scrabbling through the rubble, improvisers salvage what they can from the 
ruins of the once-great edifices of established musical traditions. Peters’ 
Adorno-esque painting of the improviser’s predicament focuses on the 
macro-historical aspect of the situation, the realm of cultural memory. The 
title of this section refers to both the familiarity of this inherited cultural 
(macro) memory as well as the personal level of (micro) memory that 
includes everything from the physical habits of instrumental ability to the 
history of the social relationships between improvising musicians. The 
fundamental point I want to make here is that a musician’s relationship with 
what is familiar to them (whether cultural or personal) is the primary source 
and site of creativity in improvisation. 
 
A reliance on personal memory and physical habits has been the basis of 
much criticism of improvisation. Elliott Carter believed that “a musical 
score is written to keep the performer from playing what he already knows” 
(Cox and Warner, 2008, p.250). Pierre Boulez complains that free 
improvisation is reduced to “extremely banal criteria and clichés” because 
of the inadequacy of human memory (Boulez in Peters, 2009, p.82). 
Theodore Adorno writes of the “stereotypical and standardised formulae” 
(Adorno in Peters, 2009, p.79) of jazz improvisation. Luciano Berio felt that 
improvisation was “a haven of dilettantes” who “normally act on the level 
of instrumental praxis rather than musical thought … [by] musical thought I 
mean above all the discovery of a coherent discourse that unfolds and 
develops simultaneously on different levels” (Berio in Borgo, 2007, p.20). 
Karlheinz Stockhausen takes pains to disassociate what he calls ‘intuitive 
music’ from improvisation: “to me the term ‘improvisation’ no longer 
seems appropriate to describe what we are playing, since improvisation is 
always associated with the idea of underlying schemata, formulas, stylistic 
elements. It thus somehow moves within a musical language [whereas] 
Intuitive Music emerges as pure as possible from the intuition” 
(Stockhausen, 1993, p.12). In the handbook to his graphic score Treatise, 
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Cornelius Cardew warns that “the danger in this kind of work is that many 
readers of the score will relate the musical memories they have already 
acquired to the notation in front of them, and the result will be merely a 
gulash made up of various musical backgrounds of the people involved” 
(Cardew, 1971, p.19). 
 
Carter, Boulez, Adorno, Berio, Stockhausen and Cardew all make the 
assumption that what is familiar is creatively unfertile. Memory is conflated 
with formulae and cliché (and gulash), ‘instrumental praxis’ is considered 
distinct from ‘musical thought’ and it is implied that working within a 
musical language inhibits intuition. There is some validity in these 
criticisms but we must first contextualise what is being said. 
 
The most obvious observation to make about these critics is that, with the 
exception of Adorno, they are all composers. This partly explains their 
comments: having chosen to make music in a certain way, they prioritise 
different aspects of the activity. More relevant however is how their 
comments reveal the power relations between composers and performers in 
the twentieth century. The similarity between the hierarchies in Modernist 
art music and the political/industrial power structures of capitalism has been 
discussed by Cook (2000) and Small (1998). The idea of a musician bearing 
a significant part of the responsibility of the music making was something 
approached with caution by even the most radical Modernists. As seen 
above, both Stockhausen and Cardew offered various misgivings and 
caveats when it came to performances of their pieces that quite deliberately 
drew upon improvisation-related resources (e.g. From the Seven Days 
(1970) and Treatise (1967).  
 
This parsing of creative responsibility into artist (composer) and 
craftsperson (performer) is just one of many symptoms of the apparent 
irreconcilability of Modernism with improvisation. The friction between 
these roles (artist and craftsperson) is a defining feature of improvisation 
and, as we have seen, one of its richest resources. A brief discussion of the 
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incompatibility of Modernism and improvisation will help to expand what I 
mean here. 
 
 Improvisation has suffered at the hands of the Modernist discourses with 
which it became entangled, articulated and shaped throughout the course of 
the twentieth century. For example, when applied to improvisation the 
Modernist focus on innovation and originality emphasises one aspect of the 
activity to the point of distortion. Of course originality is an important 
ingredient in improvised music but what Modernist dialectics were not well-
equipped to recognise or articulate was just how closely bound up with the 
past, the present and the local – the physical and contingent  – the 
originality of improvisation is. Peters points out that:  
“the valorisation of originality, novelty, innovation, and 
unpredictability [in Modernist thought] obscures the fact that within 
an artwork or performance the new is not always powerful and the 
formulaic is not always sterile” (Peters, 2009, p.103) 
 
Peters believes that improvisers are “heirs to a modernist aesthetic (or 
ideology) of innovation and novelty that is often at odds with the real 
predicament of the artist at work” (Peters, 2009, p.1). Improvisation has 
always retained its links to the contingent nature of lived experience (real 
life) and therefore has always, in some respects, been at odds with the 
absolutism and idealism of modernism. 
 
The various forms of modernist ideology to which Carter, Boulez, 
Stockhausen and Cardew subscribed were not designed to accept and work 
with the contingent, compromised nature of ‘the artist at work’. There was a 
utopian emphasis on purity, control, originality, innovation, newness; a 
nostalgic post-romantic valorisation of the ‘other’ (the noble 
savage/proletariat) that inhibited comprehension of the actual nature of 
improvisatory processes. This was one of the most radical things about 
improvisation in the twentieth century; it acknowledged, and even 
celebrated, the imperfect, imprecise, accidental, practically necessary, 
habitual – in short the real rather than the ideal - in music. The medium, the 
source, of this acknowledgement was the instrument. There is a rootedness 
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in reality, a form of humility, provided by the physical presence of an 
instrument. 
 
So in the wake of this contextualisation what is left of Carter, Boulez, 
Stockhausen and Cardew’s criticism? It is certainly true that improvisation 
is characterised by the ‘limits of human memory’ but what Boulez doesn’t 
acknowledge is that the serendipitous unreliability/unpredictability of 
human memory is one of improvisation’s richest resources (and the Achilles 
heel of serialism). Carter, like Miles Davis and Derek Bailey, knew the 
benefits of steering the performer away from ‘playing what he already 
knows’; any experienced improviser is aware of the cul-de-sacs of habit and 
has developed strategies to manage this. But what about Adorno’s 
‘stereotypical and standardised formulae’? It is true that improviser’s use 
formulae. Is it really possible to say something new with the ‘defunct, 
clapped out, disintegrating remnants of past times’? To answer this we must 
turn to Derrida, who agrees that: 
“It’s not easy to improvise. It’s the most difficult thing to do. Even 
when one improvises in front of a camera or microphone, one 
ventriloquizes or leaves another to speak in one’s place the schemas 
and languages that are already there. There are already a great 
number of prescriptions … prescribed in our memory and in our 
culture. All the names are already preprogrammed. It’s already the 
names that inhibit our ability to ever really improvise. One can’t say 
whatever one wants. One is obliged, more or less, to reproduce the 
stereotypical discourse. And so I believe in improvisation and I fight 
for improvisation but always with the belief that it’s impossible” 
(Derrida in Fischlin, 2009, p.5) 
 
From this perspective improvisation “is always circumscribed by the 
already said, by the prescribed, by preprogramming, by stereotypes” 
(Fischlin, 2009, p.5). Elsewhere Derrida complains that improvisation “is 
never absolute, it never has the purity of what one thinks one can require of 
a forced improvisation … a battery of anticipatory and delaying devices, of 
slowing-down procedures are already in place as one opens one’s mouth” 
(Derrida in Peters, 2009, p.169). But as I discussed earlier such absolutism 
misses an important point: the activity of improvisation manages to combine 
an aspirational sense of what is possible with a rootedness in and an 
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acceptance of the contingent limits of reality (“the new is not always 
powerful and the formulaic is not always sterile” (Peters, 2009, p.103)). 
Davis’ directions during the recording of ‘Aida’ didn’t result in a radical 
alteration to Miller’s vocabulary but to a “quality of attentive flexibility” 
(Smith, 1998, p.262), much as Stockhausen’s text pieces, From the Seven 
Days, are designed to cultivate an ‘attunement’ of the musician’s 
sensibilities and Zorn’s game pieces set up certain pregnant relationships 
between the players. Zorn is relevant here because a piece like Cobra was 
specifically designed to harness the “personal languages” of musicians who 
had developed “a very particular way of relating to their instruments” (Zorn 
in Bailey, 1993, pp.75-76). It was the physical habits, the personal clichés 
with which each player was identified, that formed the resource that Zorn 
was tapping into in this piece (Zorn in Maykrantz, 2004). 
 
In these examples the emphasis is not on innovation - on playing something 
beyond what Derrida calls ‘the schemas and languages that are already 
there’ - but on a change in the quality of listening; a change in the way we 
relate to such schemas and language. Such a paradigm shift means that “the 
cliché [the epitome of schema and language] can be recognized, as it is in 
comedy, as a privileged site for the unconcealment of being” (Peters, 2009, 
p.131). Peters suggests that: 
“Derrida has things the wrong way round: it is not the ‘battery of 
anticipatory and delaying devices’ that will ‘protect’ us from 
improvisation but, rather, improvisation that can and should protect 
us from them” (Peters, 2009, p.169) 
 
The implication is that improvisation ‘can and should’ have something 
approaching an ethical dimension; that improvisers are able to model an 
alertness to complacency and a simultaneous awareness of both the 
compromised, contingent nature and the limitless possibility of life that we 
might learn from. 
 
This anticipates the final section of this first chapter. But before I turn to the 
ethical dimension of improvisation I want to return to the subject of the 
familiar. Earlier I made the claim that the familiar is both the source and the 
site of creativity in improvisation. Peters’ example of a stand-up comedian 
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helps to clarify what I mean here. Both improvising musicians and 
comedians draw on a pre-established stock of material (this material is 
often, mainly because of the need for instant recall, stylised or clichéd to 
some degree). But the simple re-presentation of this material does not 
guarantee laughs. The successful comedian must discover, must improvise, 
ways of “de-familiarising the familiar” (Peters, 2005, p.304) that will reveal 
their worn subject matter afresh. To describe this process Peters adapts two 
terms from Heidegger and Levinas respectively: ‘es gibt’ (it gives) and ‘il y 
a’ (there is). The familiar material is what is ‘there’. What distinguishes the 
improvising of the successful from the unsuccessful comedian is their 
sensitivity to how the there gives: 
 What is there for the funny and unfunny comedian alike is more or 
less identical: same mother-in-laws, same genitalia, same racial and 
gender stereotypes … [improvisation in this context] has almost 
nothing to do with the invention of new material on the hoof but, 
rather, with the manner in which the there is given differently. The 
re-novative production of the new out of the old, difference out of 
the same, the absurd out of the obvious, is what makes us laugh … 
but it is important to understand that absurdity is not produced by the 
comedian during flights of comic fantasy but is, rather, something 
recognised or heard calling within the there itself ... It is about 
grasping what is given in the there as it gives and also having the 
necessary (ironic) agility to escape the there once the giving ceases” 
(Peters, 2009, p.126-7) 
 
Deep in the folds of what is most familiar lies the greatest potential 
invention: a creative methodology that involves what Allen Ginsburg 
describes as “settling down in the muck of your own mind” (Ginsberg in 
Hyde, 2007, p.147-148) as a means of making unpredictable, fundamental 
discoveries in real time. Peters’ way of understanding this process has the 
advantage of locating the source of the ‘new’ (the fresh insight into the 
everyday or already-known) in the material rather than the improviser. He 
does this in order to bypass the notions of self-expression, autobiography 
and the individual genius that too often dominate talking/writing about 
improvisation. An improviser’s responsibility is to listen to the ‘call’ of the 
there giving itself differently. Improvisational insights do not come from 
either the improviser or the material but from an improviser’s relationship to 
their material at the time of invention. 
48 
 
 
I want to conclude this section with a more detailed model of what Peters 
refers to as the ‘call from within the there’, given by the musician and 
scholar Ed Sarath (1996). 
 
Sarath presents a technical model of the idea that invention in improvisation 
is about how you relate to the familiar. His theory parses the process of 
improvising into inward and outward phases that make up a ‘cognitive event 
cycle’. An inward movement is when “the conscious mind connects with 
realms of internal imagery in the internal reservoir” (1996, p.8). This is the 
point where an improviser engages with their memory. Outward movement 
is when the material generated by the inward movement is actually played. 
Creation consists in the move from inward to outward, externalising the 
internal, and is mediated by three ‘cognitive tendencies’: actuality, 
possibility and probability.  
The actuality phase is the perception of a musical idea sounding in 
the localized present. Possibilities are the field of implications 
generated from each actuality. Within this field of possibilities exist 
one or more probable successors, which are potential events more 
likely to occur due to tendencies shaped by the background of the 
artist and the musical environment of the moment … "probable" in 
the preceding sentence refers to instances where conception is driven 
by strongly conditioned patterns which bind the awareness in one 
time coordinate to a future coordinate (p.8) 
 
Sarath's 'strongly conditioned patterns' and 'internal imagery in the internal 
reservoir' are the same as Peters' “stockpile of clichés and standardised 
formulas” (Peters, 2009, p.84). According to Sarath's model what is 
currently happening in the music suggests a range of possible ways forward 
and the improviser selects from among these. The selection process involves 
engaging with a vast storehouse of aural, haptic and visual patterns and 
conditioning. These strongly established neural networks are necessary for a 
choice to be instantly accessible and it is here that Sarath locates what he 
calls the creativity-craft paradox: access to these internal resources is 
necessary for the creative act to take place but these same resources inhibit 
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and limit freedom of choice by their nature as formulae. This is why the 
frequency of cognitive event cycles is so important: 
The frequency of such cycles is significant, in that the actuality 
phase is the point in the cycle where awareness can penetrate into 
the internal reservoir, upon which invention and adaptation are 
dependent. Consequently, the more cycles per time frame (by the 
clock) the greater the interactive and creative potential in music 
making (p.8) 
 
The more frequently the improviser chooses or 'checks' what they are doing, 
the greater their freedom of choice. Sarath calls this 'neutralising probability 
tendencies' and it is essentially a model of heightened awareness. Sarath is 
not saying that an improviser should avoid the obvious but that they should 
be as aware of their choices as possible: 
The task of the improviser is neither to embrace nor discard external 
manifestations of inner content, but to neutralise the temporal bonds 
of that content. In so doing, the creativity-craft paradox is resolved 
through the co-existence of freedom-from and access to internal 
creative resources in heightened event-cycle frequency (p.12-14) 
 
Sarath is less cautious than Peters when it comes to discussing the spiritual 
implications of this kind of heightened awareness. 
By deconstructing the temporal associations of such object referral 
patterns, the improviser sheds the bonds which confines awareness 
to localised, ordinary present-consciousness and invokes a self-
referral, heightened conception … Heightened consciousness is 
therefore more a matter of clearing away obstacles – object referral 
attachments which shroud the union of the personal and unbounded 
self – and revealing a relationship that was always there, than it is of 
attaining some abnormal state of functioning through external 
means. The Zen practitioner ruminates over nonsensical ideas, or 
koans, and in so doing shatters the logic patterns which bind 
consciousness to its ordinary state and allows union with the 
unbounded. In much the same way, the improviser shatters the logic 
patterns embodied in temporal associations of ordinary object-
referral consciousness, and in so doing reintegrates the personal self 
with its unbounded source in a state of heightened awareness (p.15) 
 
There is a spiritual dimension to improvisation that resides in this Buddhist-
orientated notion of enhanced awareness as a pre-condition of freedom and 
the belief that, if freed from attachments in this way, the self is naturally 
abundant and compassionate. The arguments in this section can be 
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summarised by Lord Krishna’s advice to the prince Arjuna when he asks 
how to achieve success on the battlefield. Krishna replies that the successful 
warrior achieves spiritual illumination through increased self-awareness, an 
enhanced awareness of the familiar: 
“curving back on my own nature, I create again and again” (Dillbeck 
in Sarath, 1996, p.14). 
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1.6 Ethics 
 
Near the beginning of this chapter I called improvisation a ‘parasitic 
activity’ and claimed that ‘a practice that feeds on dismantling established 
codes will eventually devour the context of its birth’. I want to start this 
final section by explaining what I meant by this.  
 
There is a link between Sarath’s theory of cognitive event cycles outlined in 
the previous section and Cobussen’s claim that “tacit rules and existing 
codes are re-investigated, re-form(ulat)ed, re-used and thereby abandoned, 
mutilated, deterritorialised … in the act of improvising” (2005, p.33). For 
Sarath an improviser’s “internal repository of concepts, techniques and 
tendencies” (1996, p.7) are the main resource from which they draw. As 
discussed earlier, the crucial factor is the frequency of ‘cognitive event 
cycles’. The lower the frequency of these cycles the more an improviser’s 
behaviour is dictated by their ‘internal repository’. The higher the frequency 
of cycles the less an improviser’s behaviour will be simply a projection of 
their storehouse of aural, haptic and visual conditioning. I want to draw a 
parallel between Sarath’s ‘internal repository’ and Cobussen’s ‘existing 
codes’. An improviser aims to ‘re-investigate, re-formulate, re-use’ 
(Cobussen, 2005), re-novate and re-vivify (Peters, 2005, 2009) the pre-
existing physical and mental structures that allow them to improvise. This is 
what I mean when I say that improvisation is about dismantling established 
codes. In order to make something new using something old (pre-existing 
physical and mental structures) an improviser must abandon, mutilate, 
deterritorialise (Cobussen, 2005), disrupt, trouble (Fischlin & Heble, 2004), 
violate, rework (Badiou, 2001), interrogate, critique and resist the very 
structures that enable them to act. And it is through this process that 
improvisation gains its social and ethical charge: 
The social force of improvised music resides, at least in part, in its 
capacity to disrupt institutionally sanctioned economies of 
production, to trouble the assumptions (and the expectations of 
fixity) fostered by dominant systems of knowledge production 
(Fischlin & Heble, 2004, p.22) 
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This claim is substantiated through Alain Badiou’s ideas about ethics. For 
Badiou an ethical truth is all about dismantling established codes. An ethical 
truth is a radical event that ruptures the established ‘situation’ in which it 
occurs. A ‘situation’ is characterised by conservatism: it consists of 
institutionalised knowledge and established power relations that, by their 
very nature, contain a ‘void’. This void consists of whatever cannot be 
conceived of from within the context of the situation. An event is something 
that grants access to this void; a glimpse of what was previous unknowable. 
The role of ethics in all of this concerns a person’s fidelity and on-going 
commitment to the truth generated by an event. 
 
Badiou points to the birth of the classical style in music as an example. The 
Baroque style was a well-established set of musical practices yet at its heart 
“lay the absence ... of a genuine conception of musical architectonics” 
(2001, p.68). This was the void in the situation. It was the event of Haydn 
and his fidelity to the truth of a new architectural and thematic way of 
composing music that ruptured the situation of Baroque music. 
 A truth punches a hole in knowledges ... but it is also the sole known 
source of new knowledges ... it is by violating established 
knowledges that a truth returns to the immediacy of the situation, or 
reworks that sort of portable encyclopaedia from which opinion, 
communication and sociality draw their meaning (p.70) 
 
This view of ethics as a singular act, derived from the context/situation in 
which it occurs but not deducible from (or reducible to) a ten-
commandments-style set of abstracted injunctions, that ‘reworks’ pre-
existing structures in such a way as to provide an unforeseeable insight into 
those same structures, shares much with the view of improvisation that has 
been put forward in this chapter. Badiou’s ‘portable encyclopaedia’ 
(mentioned above) sounds similar to Stockhausen’s ‘automatic brain 
processes’ (1974), Cobussen’s ‘existing codes’ (2005), Peters' ‘stockpile of 
clichés’ (2009), Adorno’s ‘stereotypical and standardised formulae’ (Adorno 
in Peters, 2009), Derrida’s ‘schemas and languages that are already there’ 
(Derrida in Fischlin, 2009) and Sarath’s ‘internal repository’ (1996). These 
are the pre-existing structures, the scaffolding that is necessary for 
improvisation to take place. The improvising musician, like the stand-up 
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comedian, monitors how these structures are present in their playing, 
listening for the there giving itself differently (Peters, 2009), ‘neutralizing 
the temporal bonds’ of these structures (Sarath, 1996) so that they will “be 
freer, will expect things differently, will anticipate and know something 
different is coming down” (Davis & Troupe, 1990). In the present an 
improviser searches for something that is not available a priori, hoping to 
catch, out of the corner of their eye, a glimpse of the void in their material – 
some undiscovered and un-mined shaft of creative fecundity, a patch of light 
where they suddenly confront a truth. This is the “unheard music” that Eliot 
writes of in the Four Quartets: 
“Sudden in a shaft of sunlight/Even while the dust moves/There rises 
the hidden laughter/Of children in the foliage/ Quick now, here, now, 
always” (Eliot, 1974, p.195) 
 
These new truths will eventually become encrusted through use and go on to 
become the established knowledges, situations and physical/mental habits 
that will, in their turn, be interrogated by future improvisers. 
 
An important aspect of Badiou’s theory is his insistence on the singularity of 
ethical truths. He argues against liberal humanism, pointing out that the 
conventional human rights-style of ethics defines what is good negatively. 
Human rights are generally freedoms-from, “rights to non-evil” (2001, p.9). 
This propagates the notion that “evil is that from which good is derived” 
(p.10) which “encourages us to think that the definition of a human subject 
is ‘the being who is capable of recognising himself as a victim’” (p.10). This 
is the idea (also present in some forms of capitalism) that humans are evil 
by default and it is the role of ethics to protect us from our nature. “If our 
only agenda is an ethical engagement against an evil we recognise a priori, 
how are we to envisage any transformation of the way things are?” (p.13-
14). Badiou’s ethic of truths is, like improvisation, an attempt to envisage 
such a transformation, to envisage something that is not visible from within 
the current situation. But this is not just a simplistic binary of pessimism and 
optimism; it is to do with time and presence.  
Thanks to its negative and a priori determination of evil, ethics 
prevents itself from thinking the singularity of situations as such, 
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which is the obligatory starting point of all properly human action … 
All humanity has its root in the identification in thought of singular 
situations. There is no ethics in general (p.14-16) 
 
And this is where Badiou’s argument becomes particularly relevant to 
improvisation. For Badiou ethics, like improvisation, consists of human 
action rather than abstract injunctions. It occurs (and only exists) in a 
specific time and place and between specific people; an ethical truth comes 
into existence at the point of action. In other words ethics is the process of 
translating the “abstract, statistical generality” (p.14) of principles into 
action, the rediscovery of the ethical force of such principles through their 
application: 
It is not possible to derive concrete norms one must follow in a 
specific situation from ethics itself – which means that the subject 
has to assume the responsibility of ‘translating’ the abstract 
injunctions of ethics into a series of concrete obligations, the 
subjects own contingent act of performatively assuming an ethic 
(Cobussen, 2005, p.39) 
 
The abstract injunctions of ethics, whose relevance is reinvestigated and 
reinvented every time they see practical use, are equivalent to the pre-
existing structures that constitute what is there for an improviser. Just as a 
stand-up comedian uses improvisation to transform hackneyed truisms 
about mother-in-laws into laughter (the laughter that recognises a truth 
afresh) so a moral agent improvises from abstract imperatives to singular 
action. The performative, enactive nature of improvisation – the way in 
which knowledge is constituted through doing – is why it is appropriate to 
think of ethical behaviour as a form of improvisation. 
 
Is the reverse true? Is it appropriate to think of improvisation as a form of 
ethical behaviour? It is certainly true that “improvisatory performance 
practices can model different ways of being in the world” (Fischlin & Heble, 
2004, p.11, my italics). This belief is fundamental to the practice of such 
diverse improvising communities as music therapists, the musicians in John 
Zorn’s game pieces and the $4 million research project Improvisation, 
Community and Social Practice (based at the University of Guelph, 
Canada). It was this belief, so radical in the England of the 1960’s and 70s, 
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which inspired and sustained the work of Cornelius Cardew and John 
Stevens. The Scratch Orchestra, formed by Cornelius Cardew, Michael 
Parsons and Howard Skempton in 1969, was a collective of musicians, 
artists, poets and other creatively minded individuals formed as a result of 
an article/advert placed in the Musical Times entitled ‘A Scratch Orchestra: 
draft constitution’ (Prevost, 2008). John Steven’s improvisation workshops 
in South London in the 1970’s and 80’s - open to all comers regardless of 
experience or ability - led to the development of the practice known as 
Community Music (Stevens was the co-founder and musical director of 
Community Music Ltd in 1983). His exercises are collected in a workshop 
handbook called Search and Reflect. 
 
Both the Scratch Orchestra and Stevens’ workshops were practical 
embodiments of (or empirical experiments towards) a philosophy of music 
and, by extension, a moral and political philosophy. In the preface to Search 
and Reflect, Maggie Nicols recalls that Stevens “believed that in making 
community music, we were ‘practicing an alternate society’” (Nicols in 
Stevens, 2007, memoir two). Cardew was more explicit about the ethical 
implications of improvised music making. His thoughts during this period 
were collected in the essay ‘Towards an Ethic of Improvisation’ (1971) in 
which he outlines seven “kinds of virtue or strength that can be developed 
by the musician” (p.17): simplicity, integrity, selflessness, forbearance, 
preparedness, identification with nature and acceptance of death. 
 
The Scratch Orchestra “posited music-making as a truly life-enhancing, life-
fulfilling activity which freed and enabled ordinary people ... the Scratch 
Orchestra was an expression of the universality of art” (Tilbury, 2008, 
p.363-441). In their own ways both Stevens and Cardew focussed on the 
“moral dimension of music as an expression of human relations” (Tilbury, 
2008, p.372) or what Small, in the foreword to ‘Search and Reflect’, calls 
the “universal need to affirm oneself in relation with others” (Small in 
Stevens, 2007, p.V). The language used here suggests that Stevens’ work 
was more orientated towards modeling ideal ways of being in the world 
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(‘practicing’ rather than building an alternate society) while the Scratch 
Orchestra aspired to actually living differently. But music was only one of 
many activities that the Scratch Orchestra engaged in and it’s aspirational 
nature led to the group taking on an increasingly political dimension. The 
fact that the legacy of Stevens’ work has in some ways outlasted that of the 
Scratch Orchestra may be, significantly, because it focused on the most 
profound connection between musical and social communication: listening. 
It is through listening that music can cross the fine line from modeling 
ethical behavior to actually being fundamentally ethical: 
Listening is voluntary because it entails active restraint from 
habitual, involuntary reactions; and it is selective because it seeks 
out that which is subtle or obscure, at the fringes of awareness … 
listening must be deliberately cultivated at this very moment, 
however difficult, rather than as a special framed activity done in 
ideal conditions (Biswas, 2011, p.103) 
 
[improvisation] succeeds as music only to the extent that listening 
achieves equal status with playing … if free improvisation has 
anything emancipatory or ‘anticipatory’ about it, then this kind of 
proleptic vision is contained within the act of listening, not in the 
sounds themselves (Stanyek in Borgo, 2007, p.28) 
 
The kind of listening cultivated in Stevens’ exercises is valuable from both a 
musical and a social perspective; in fact they deliberately conflate these two 
perspectives. They bring to the surface the social dimension that exists in all 
music making. The fact that the focus of the exercises is on developing 
certain ideal kinds of listening, as opposed to ways of playing or specific 
musical material, is what connects the resulting music making with social 
(and therefore ethical) practice. The piece/exercise Ghost is a good example 
of this. Ghost involves each member of the group taking turns at being an 
improvising soloist while the rest of the ensemble ‘ghosts’ them, “imitating 
as closely as possible the rhythms and pitches of the solo, as it is being 
played, until the soloist has finished” (Stevens, 2007, p.88, Stevens’ 
emphasis). Effective ghosting demands a kind of listening that gives itself 
completely to the soloist. Stevens instructs the group to shut their eyes and 
to “be on guard against anticipating what the soloist might do next, always 
subordinating their individual reactions to the all-important ghosting” 
(p.90). The ghosting must “be careful to maintain a sound balance that 
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allows an aural distance between the soloist and the accompanying 
collective” (p.89). If a ghosting instrument is having difficultly playing 
quieter than the soloist they must “invent new ways of making sound on 
their instruments” (p.90). A good way of testing the listening in this piece is 
to check if the group stops precisely with the soloist: “the group must be so 
aware of the soloist’s every sound, that whenever there is the slightest pause 
in the solo, there should be no ‘overlapping’ by the ensemble” (p.90). 
Everything about this piece intensifies and focuses the listening of the 
collective to the individual. Ghost has an enormous impact on group 
cohesion and how the individual relates to and is related to by the group. 
Almost every group of humans contains some kind of tension between 
dominant or passive personalities. Ghost directs the group’s awareness 
towards each personality in turn, ensuring that they are listened to with 
greater sensitivity and greater attentiveness than they would normally 
receive socially.  Despite the non-verbal nature of this communication the 
listening of the ‘ghosters’ retains a powerful social resonance, it is an 
interaction between people and as such it has an intimacy to it, the sheer 
attentiveness and sensitivity of such listening can be an intimate act of 
generosity. The musicking of Ghost can certainly be experienced, heard and 
thought of as a form of ethical behavior.  
 
The distinction between modelling and actually embodying ethical 
behaviour is a fragile and not hugely significant one. I contend that all 
improvisation has some degree of ethical charge if only by dint of its social 
currency (music is always a communicative interaction between humans). 
To continue to discuss what is unique about the relationship between 
improvising and ethics some connections must be made between these ideas 
and my overarching argument that improvisation involves a return to, or a 
reinvention from within, what is familiar.  
 
As I mentioned earlier in relation to Badiou’s ethical philosophy the abstract 
injunctions that form the basis of many ethical systems share something 
with an improvisers ‘pre-existing structures’. The philosopher Daniel Groll 
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points out that an improvising musician (or a moral agent) doesn’t consult a 
“set of rules or principles” (2006, p.9) before acting. Instead, the flow of 
improvisation is the result of extensive preparation. This preparation doesn’t 
involve “considering every case [they] might encounter” (p.9) but instead 
consists of attuning themselves to certain kinds of situations. 
Improvising well takes tremendous preparation even if no particular 
instance need involve serious preparation. We might think of the 
preparation needed as involving the formation of character such that 
individual decisions, individual instances of improvisation, flow out 
of the character in a seemingly unproblematic way … Improvisation, 
then, will involve a lack of what we might call explicit systemisation 
of the deliberative process. It would also seem strange to think that a 
complex chain of practical reasoning is going on ‘implicitly’ or in 
the background in these instances (p.3-15) 
 
For Groll a good musical, or moral, action has the appearance of being 
natural or instinctive, free from complex reasoning, yet this simplicity is 
achievable only through extensive preparation and on-going cultivation and 
correction. Cardew makes a similar point in his definition of the 
improvisational virtue of simplicity: “where everything becomes simple is 
the most desirable place to be. But … you have to remember how you got 
there” (Cardew, 1971, p.20). But how does an improviser work towards 
such simplicity when “improvisation cannot be rehearsed” (p.17)? Cardew 
goes on to say that “training is substituted for rehearsal, and a certain moral 
discipline is an essential part of this training” (p.17). What exactly are Groll 
and Cardew talking about when they refer to an improviser’s moral 
discipline, training, preparation or attunement? 
 
Imagine that an improviser is a lens. The light shining into the lens is the 
past. An improviser’s past is made up of a vast array of biological facts, 
technological inheritance, enculturation, physical habits and muscle 
memory, cultural tropes and a degree of personal volition. The past is 
refracted though the lens of the improvising present to create music; there is 
a sense in which improvisation is a projection of the past. Because of the 
contingency of creating in real-time an improviser has limited powers with 
which to prevent their enculturation from shaping the majority of their 
actions. A biologically finite capacity for sensorimotor processing, the 
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unpredictability of playing with other musicians, the powerful social 
dynamics of most performing contexts, what Parker refers to as “the precise 
emotional, acoustic, psychological and other less tangible atmospheric 
conditions in effect at the time the music is played” (Parker in Bailey, 1993, 
p.81); all combine to potentially inhibit the amount of conscious control an 
improviser has over the situation. An improviser’s lack of control over this 
projected past is what leads to Peters’ “endless regurgitation of a stockpile 
of clichés and standardised formulas” (Peters, 2009, p.84). This is what 
Cage was referring to when he said that improvisation “does not lead you 
into a new experience, but into something with which you’re already 
familiar” (Cage in Darter, 1982, p.21). This was the basis of the criticism in 
the previous section from Boulez, Berio, Carter et al: that improvisation is a 
mere projection of enculturation or a kind of musical Rorschach test, with 
the conscientious musician leaping about in vain trying to filter, censor, 
refine or rationalise the vast ray of unconscious, redundant information 
shining through them. 
 
There are two things to say in response to this view of improvisation. The 
first is that it is precisely an improviser’s inability to fully consciously 
control what they are doing that gives improvisation it’s power and depth 
(this unconscious, irrational dimension is another important level on which 
improvised music making challenged Western art music in the Twentieth 
Century; the shockwaves of this cultural confrontation are only now being 
absorbed as academia becomes more receptive to improvised practices). The 
second point to make is about habits. Essentially what I mean by 
enculturation is that an improviser, as a matter of necessity, relies on their 
habits. When John Cage asked “how can we find ways of improvising that 
release us from our habits” (Cage & Retallack, 1996, p.274) the implication 
was, of course, that habits are something we need to be released from. I 
have argued that habits are both a necessary precursor to the act of 
improvisation and it’s main source of creativity. Release from them is 
neither possible nor desirable. Instead, an improviser’s responsibility is to 
ensure that their habits are good (Davidson, no date). 
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This is what Cardew and Groll mean by ‘training’, ‘preparation’ and 
‘cultivation’. An improviser is responsible for their past; held to account, in 
the improvising present, for previous ways of being and doing. The 
musician and educationalist Wayne Bowman observes that: 
We are what we do and do repeatedly. Music’s ritualistic actions and 
the dispositions that undergird them are fundamental to the 
formation of character, both collective and individual. More strongly 
still, music plays a fundamental role in the social production and 
regulation of identity. If music is an important part of the machinery 
by which people’s individual and collective identities are 
constructed, reconstructed, maintained, and regulated, music 
education becomes something dramatically more momentous and 
problematic than an act of overseeing the development of musical 
skills, musicianship, or ‘aesthetic sensibilities’. The view on which 
this claim is based is performative, one that sees identities not as 
natural facts, but cultural performances (Bowman in Barrett, 2006, 
p.186) 
 
Bowman emphasises the responsibility of music teachers towards the 
enculturation of their students, highlighting the ethical dimension of this 
responsibility. A similar ethical responsibility rests with an improviser in 
relation to their own enculturation; they oversee the ‘construction, 
reconstruction, maintenance and regulation’ of the pre-existing structures 
that form the basis of their actions. Bowman’s idea of identity as a cultural 
performance, echoing Cobussen’s earlier observation about the shared 
performativity of ethics and improvisation, makes it clear that the 
improvised, performed present is an expression of (or result of) our 
behaviour in the past. 
 
Enculturation has a physical dimension that is particularly relevant to 
improvised music. Culture leaves its mark on our bodies and especially on 
how we relate to our bodies. The improvising pianist and scholar Vijay Iyer, 
whose concept of ‘embodied cognition’ was introduced in section 1.2, sees 
music as “an embodied, situated activity … [that] depends crucially on the 
structure of our bodies, and also on the environment and culture in which 
our musical awareness emerges” (Iyer, 2008, p.273). An improviser’s 
enculturation is encoded in their body, conditioning how and what they can 
do. Improvising violinist Bennett Hogg suggests that: 
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Our bodies and personal histories can be figured as a form of 
‘physical “notation” or “score”’. This suggests that music is 
culturally and experientially inscribed within us, as it were – an 
internalisation of musical experience that also organises it (Hogg, 
2011, p.89) 
 
For improvising musicians their experience of culture is always already 
there, in their bodies, physical habits, ritual gestures, posture, sense of 
balance and the instruments with which they have shaped their bodies. 
Whereas Hogg talks about our bodies as ‘scores’ Cardew points outwards, 
seeing music as ‘culturally and experientially inscribed’ in the natural 
world: 
The natural context provides a score which the players are 
unconsciously interpreting in their playing ... thus it is that the 
natural environment is itself giving birth to something, which you 
then carry as a burden; you are the medium of the music” (Cardew, 
1971, p.18) 
 
Whilst Hogg’s Foucaultian post-modernism might jar with Cardew’s more 
poetic turn of phrase the connection between them lies in the notion that 
improvisation is already encoded to some degree in both our bodies and the 
‘natural environment’. I mention Cardew here because he hints at the ethical 
responsibility involved in this transformation of the commonplace into 
music, where “the subtlest interplay on the physical level can throw into 
high relief some of the mystery of being alive” (Cardew, 1971, p.17). As 
‘the medium of the music’ an improviser bears the burden of what Badiou 
would call fidelity to a truth, modelling this as a possibility for others. 
 
If the concept of enculturation can be extended to our bodies how might 
prior cultural conditioning affect our perceptions and our receptivity to 
sensory information? While Bowman believes that identities are cultural 
performances, some cognitive scientists and Enactivist philosophers have 
described our construction of reality as a kind of performance. The 
cognitive scientists Varela, Thompson and Rosch draw the conclusion that: 
Cognition is not the representation of a pre-given world by a pre-
given mind but is rather the enactment of a world and a mind on the 
basis of a history of the variety of actions that a being in the world 
performs (Varela, Thompson & Rosch in Hogg, 2011, p.86) 
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Our understanding of reality is a product of our actions and interactions with 
the world combined with the culturally conditioned and biologically 
determined features of our perceptual apparatus. Sensory information is not 
objective data but is extracted from the world selectively and interpreted 
according to previous experience. Merleau-Ponty uses the analogy of a 
keyboard to describe this: 
The organism cannot properly be compared to a keyboard on which 
the external stimuli would play and which their proper form would 
be delineated for the simple reason that the organism contributes to 
the constitution of that form … the properties of the object and the 
intentions of the subject … are not only intermingled; they also 
constitute a new whole … This would be a keyboard which moves 
itself in such a way as to offer – and according to variable rhythms – 
such or such of its keys to the in itself monotonous action of an 
external hammer (Merleau-Ponty in Varela et al, 1993, p.174) 
 
As Hogg says, “consciousness, then, is something we do rather than 
something we have” (Hogg, 2011, p.86). The enculturation involved in 
improvising is also something we do rather than have. As the light of the 
past meets the lens of the improvised present there is the possibility of 
transformation as the improviser performs, enacts, constructs and 
reconstitutes their history. 
 
It is in this fleeting present that an improviser glimpses the chance to 
reinvent their past in such a way as to give themselves a future; re-situating 
or re-contextualising the familiar to reveal fresh material, work yet to be 
done. Nietzsche, in his ‘Uses and Disadvantages of History’ makes this 
point powerfully: 
The best we can do is to confront our inherited nature with our 
knowledge of it, and, through a new, stern discipline combat our 
inborn heritage and implant in ourselves a new habit, a new instinct, 
a second nature, so that our first nature withers away. It is an attempt 
to give oneself, as it were a posteriori, a past in which one would 
like to originate in opposition to that in which one did originate 
(Nietzsche in Peters, 2009, p.134) 
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Nietzsche’s ‘stern discipline’ echoes Cardew’s call for ‘moral discipline’ in 
preparation for improvisation. An improviser must live into the future they 
want to come to pass. This is what Peters’ describes as the “resolution to 
produce each moment as a new origin of a past to come” (2009, p.136). 
They must embody in their life those qualities they would like to find in 
their improvising: “If you don’t live it, it won’t come out of your horn” 
(Charlie Parker in Lewis, 2004, p.158).  
 
I want to finish this section by returning to Alain Badiou’s ethic of truths. 
Like Cobussen, I find Badiou’s three principles of an ethic of truths a useful 
way of highlighting and summarising the ethical aspects of improvising 
music. These three principles are: discernment, courage and moderation. 
Discernment is to do with the “recognition of the void” of the situation. 
Being “open for something to happen ‘instead of being satisfied with what 
there is’” (Badiou in Cobussen, 2005, p.39). This ties in with Cardew’s 
notion of preparedness (or awakeness) and Peters’ depiction of the 
improviser listening for the “there giving itself differently” (Peters, 2009, 
p.127). Discernment is related to the heightened awareness brought about by 
a high frequency of Sarath’s ‘cognitive event cycles’. By courage Badiou 
means an improviser should “not give up any possible encounter with a void 
[or] relapse into the known of a situation (Badiou calls this a betrayal) at the 
expense of a leap into the unknown” (Cobussen, 2005, p.39). This reprises 
the overarching theme of the familiar, the pre-existing structures that both 
enable and inhibit an improviser’s ability to create. It clearly takes courage 
to take the necessary risks to chase the possible encounters with the 
unknown. This was described in section 1.3 as vulnerability. Courage 
requires vulnerability because there must be a real chance of failure for an 
act to be courageous. Moderation is related to singularity. “The Good is 
Good only to the extent that it does not aspire to render the world good. Its 
sole being lies in the situated advent of a singular truth” (Badiou in 
Cobussen, 2005, p.39). Badiou’s principle of moderation refers, in my mind, 
to the humility of improvisation, being aware of the limits, the transience, 
the contingent nature of the activity, the humility of being instrumentally 
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connected to physical reality. It is an activity that normally doesn’t leave an 
object or a legacy behind and is engaged in for its own sake; it is an end 
rather than a means, an act rather from an object. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 
2.1 - The Quartet 
 
This commentary explores issues around recording and improvisation 
through my work with a jazz group called The Quartet. Being the only 
project in this thesis to involve studio recordings, my work with The Quartet 
provides a good opportunity to discuss the philosophically rich field of 
improvisation and recording. The Quartet is also the most composition-
orientated project in this thesis, providing an opportunity to discuss the 
relationship between improvisation and composition and how this relates to 
recording, agency and collaboration. 
 
The Quartet is a contemporary jazz group that was, until recently, co-led by 
composer/guitarist Jack Hues and myself. This ensemble was formed in 
2002 and has existed in various forms with me and Jack being the core 
members. Most of the music played by the band is written by Jack. The 
Quartet has released two albums on Helium Records. Before I discuss the 
music on these albums I want to contextualise the uneasy relationship 
between recording and improvisation.  
 
Recording and improvising 
 
Documents such as tape recordings of improvisation are essentially 
empty, as they preserve chiefly the form that something took and 
give at best an indistinct hint as to the feeling and cannot convey any 
sense of time and place (Cardew, 1971, p.27) 
 
The whole culture of listening to records I don’t understand. Where 
do you look? Do you stare at a wall when you listen to records? 
Normally, what do record buyers do? Do they buy the record, take it 
home, put it on for the next … I mean, they can last for 74 minutes! 
Do they sit there for 74 minutes, they don’t do the dishes, just sit and 
look at something, or close their eyes? (Bailey in Cox & Warner, 
2008, p.111) 
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I have a terrible fear of making a record of a Beethoven sonata and 
someday, somewhere, someone is going to listen to it while eating a 
liverwurst sandwich (Schnabel in Hamilton, 2003, p.346) 
 
This PhD relies heavily on audio recordings. They provide the evidence for 
the majority of the practice element of my research. However, as Andy 
Hamilton points out, “the recorded image, like the photographic image, is 
always crafted” (Hamilton, 2003, p.351). The medium of recording is not 
transparent and can be unreliable as a document; a recording is an artifact 
and has an ambiguous relationship with the ephemeral, action-orientated 
nature of performance. Piccini highlights this tension when she observes 
that: 
“Performance frames time and space as singular and unrecoverable 
whilst time and space are constructed as fixed and repeatable within 
recording practices” (Piccini, 2002) 
 
This distinction between performance and recording is blurred by the further 
distinction between live and studio recording (the latter is discussed later in 
this commentary). Phillip Auslander points out that the concept of ‘live 
recording’ is something of an oxymoron: 
In the case of live recording the audience shares neither a temporal 
frame nor a physical location with the performance but experiences 
the performance later and usually in a different place than it first 
occurred. The liveness of the experience of listening to or watching 
the recording is primarily affective. Live recordings allow the 
listener a sense of participating in a specific performance in a 
vicarious relationship to the audience for that performance not 
accessible through studio production (Auslander, 2011) 
 
If the liveness of a ‘live recording’ is a vicarious, virtual experience then 
where does this leave improvisation - a way of making music defined by 
liveness? An activity defined by singularity and transience is fundamentally 
altered when captured in the medusa’s gaze of reproductive technology and 
turned into an object defined by repetition. Jed Rasula notes how “recording 
tends to reify improvisation, converting the extemporaneous into scripture” 
(Rasula in Jarrett, 2004, p.321). In other words recorded improvisation 
becomes something like a ‘text’. It endures, accumulating meaning both on 
an individual level (where through repeated listening listeners can become 
familiar with details they missed the first time around), and a wider cultural 
67 
 
level (through layers of historically-specific criticism, evaluation and 
analysis). A recorded improvisation can be compared with similar ‘texts’, 
and objectified to a degree that would be impossible with ‘live’ 
improvisations (this objectification invariably involves further text-based 
interpretation such as talking, writing or notated transcriptions). 
 
These ‘text-like’ qualities are one of the factors that have led to recordings 
playing such an important role in jazz historiography. The use of recording 
technology in jazz throws into relief the peculiar double-think that arises 
from the tension between singularity and repetition inherent in recorded 
improvisation: 
Critics and historians have always used jazz records as primary 
sources, while pretending that what they are really talking about is 
something else, some putative essence of a ‘living tradition’ that 
cannot be captured by the ‘blatant artifice’ of technology (Rasula in 
Jarrett, 2004, p.321) 
 
There is a tension in jazz between the perceived authenticity of live 
performance and the ‘artifice’ of recording. Hamilton terms this an 
imperfectionist aesthetic: 
“For imperfectionists ... live performance is privileged and recording 
has at best documentary status” (Hamilton, 2003, p.347) 
 
This aesthetic is shared by many of the producers who make jazz 
recordings. Tom Dowd, famous for his work with John Coltrane, Charlie 
Parker and Ornette Coleman (amongst many others), likens the role of the 
jazz producer to “a sports photographer” (Dowd in Jarrett, 2004, p.324) 
while Michael Cuscuna (producer for the Blue Note record label) feels that 
“as a producer, you should really be as invisible as possible … you really 
should be wallpaper if you possibly can” (Cuscuna in Jarrett, 2004, p.325).  
 
The Quartet’s approach to studio recording contrasts strongly with the 
aesthetic perspective sketched above. The bandleader and main composer 
for The Quartet is a guitarist and singer called Jack Hues who studied 
composition at post-graduate level at the Royal College of Music before 
embarking on a successful career as a pop musician and later as a producer. 
He had several top ten hits in the US in the 1980's. The Quartet’s two studio 
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albums have been made with the producer Chris Hughes who also worked 
on Jack’s hit records in the eighties. Chris has produced albums for Tears 
for Fears, Paul McCartney, Robert Plant, Peter Gabriel and Jon Bon Jovi 
amongst many others. Needless to say Chris and Jack’s approach towards 
recording is very different to Tom Dowd’s or Michael Cuscuna’s. The 
following example is the opening of the first track, Magonia Hieghts, from 
The Quartet’s first studio album, Illuminated: 
 
Audio example 1 - opening of Magonia Heights 
 
In the light of the purist ‘imperfectionist’ aesthetic sketched above this is a 
bold opening for a jazz album that makes a statement about the music to 
come. The instrumental trailing off after the first segment is enhanced and 
extended by reverb and delay effects which morph into something like a 
reverse delay effect, which is in turn underscored by the acoustic piano. 
Brian Eno’s description of ‘the studio as [a] compositional tool’ (Eno, 2008, 
p.127) seems too crude to express the way post-production techniques are 
used here to amplify the aims of the composition and project the agency and 
intention of the musicians. What I mean by this is that it is the intention of 
the musicians to play the written figure with a strong sense of groove and 
rhythmic propulsion before improvisationally elaborating the increasingly 
shorter pauses. The way in which the production ‘amplifies’ these intentions 
is through the mixing and mastering. The rich punch of the bass sound, for 
example, enhances the sense of groove and the stereo imaging enhances the 
sense of space in the pauses. The intentions of the musicians are extended 
by the reverb/delay effects, stretching their improvisational filigree out into 
an imaginary sonic space where the fading electronic traces of their activity 
regain momentum with a distant Reichian afterglow. There is also an 
improvisational element to the production here. Whilst editing and mixing 
this recording I found myself tapping along on a woodblock that was lying 
around. Chris suggested I get back in the live room and record what I was 
doing and this is what you can hear for a couple of seconds before the track 
starts (it can also be heard during the piano solo later in the track). This 
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example confirms, at least in this instance, the producer Wayne Horvitz’s 
view: 
One of the myths of producing is that you have a strong image ahead 
of time. Production is a very improvised art (Horvitz in Jarrett, 2004, 
p.324) 
 
There is a collaborative diffusion of individual agency in this way of 
working in the studio that undermines the notion of a single composer or 
author. 
 
The liner notes for many jazz recordings include such curious statements as:  
 No use is made of multi-tracking, overdubbing, or tape-speeding on 
any session (Tristano, 1962) 
 
There is no compression, homogenisation, eq-ing, post-recording 
splicing, mixing or electronic fiddling with the performance (Paul 
Lytton Quartet, 1996) 
 
There are no edits or overdubs on this record (The Bad Plus, 2003) 
 
Reading like the labels you find on sugary drinks that claim ‘this product 
contains no additives or preservatives’, such statements can sound like 
puritanical boasts but they are also symptomatic of a deeper concern about 
the perception of human agency in improvisation. If a recording that was 
presented as a two-minute improvisation were known to contain sixty edits 
from ten different takes would this change the way it was heard? If the 
editor was sensitive to the improvisers musical personality and managed to 
retain something of an improvisational flow – in other words if it was edited 
in such a way as to project an image of agency – then I contend that 
knowledge of the construction of the recording shouldn’t impact 
significantly on the way it was heard. Knowing that a two-minute scene 
took a week to shoot might be of interest to aficionados, but I don’t believe 
that such knowledge significantly enhances or detracts from the enjoyment 
of a film: it is simply how films are made. The pianist Glenn Gould makes a 
similar point in relation to classical music: 
One should be free to ‘shoot’ a Beethoven sonata or a Bach fugue in 
or out of sequence, intercut [and] apply post-production techniques 
as required (Gould in Hamilton, 2003, p.354) 
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I realise that this may not be a widely held view. It may be argued that 
recordings are more like photographs than films: that they make more of a 
claim towards documenting an event but, as I pointed out at the beginning 
of this commentary, “the recorded image, like the photographic image, is 
always crafted” (Hamilton, 2003, p.351). 
 
Let’s change the previous question and imagine that a recording of an 
improvisation is a complete take; is this any more ‘authentic’ than the edited 
example mentioned earlier? This improvisation may have been recorded 
separately from the rest of the piece, it may be the twenty-eighth take, the 
piano might be close mic’d and sound very different than it would ‘live’, 
perhaps even the bass and drum accompaniment were recorded earlier. 
Where is the line of ‘acceptable’ artifice drawn? It is unlikely that those 
improvisations recorded with ‘no overdubs or edits’ were achieved on the 
first take and even if they were, afterwards the musicians could have a 
break, listen back to the recording and start rehearsing the next piece to be 
recorded. This hardly replicates the conditions of ‘live’ performance. The 
notion of authenticity has little meaning in the context of studio-recorded 
improvising. While it could be argued that most audio recording involves 
creating (or creating with) the illusion of human agency, this has particular 
relevance in improvised music. The meaning and mode of engagement of 
this form of music making is uniquely dependent on the intimacy and 
singularity that Walter Benjamin describes as the ‘aura’ of aesthetic 
experience (Benjamin, 1968). 
[Jazz] producers work hard to enable and to record sounds that, 
when we hear them, will give every impression of having escaped 
the clutches of production and the constraints of recording 
technologies. Wherever and whenever this effect of ‘having escaped’ 
is created, it is called improvisation (Jarrett, 2004, p.323) 
 
Never mind that the process of recording inherently involves 
significant sound manipulation; the point is that the aesthetic of jazz 
is such that recordings are engineered to create a simulation of live 
sound, to present the impression of ‘being there’. (Solis, 2004, 
p.341) 
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Interestingly recorded improvisations almost always are produced, edited 
and mixed in such a way as to create the illusion of agency. The only 
example I have come across of a recorded improvisation being edited in an 
un-improvisational way - in a way that draws attention to the process - is 
Phil Manzanera’s guitar solo on China my China from Brain Eno’s album 
Taking Tiger Mountain (By Strategy) (1974). Here there are several edits 
per second and the manic Dadaist result is enhanced by a simultaneous 
typewriter solo sounding like a laconic, Burroughs-style-cut-up critique of 
70’s rock guitar tropes. 
 
This discussion has been leading to the next audio example. Taken from the 
same piece as the previous clip, this is the piano solo from Magonia 
Heights. 
 
Audio example 2 – piano solo from Magonia Heights 
 
An anecdote best serves to introduce a discussion of this example. After this 
piano solo had been edited and mixed I asked the producer, Chris Hughes, 
where the edits were. He replied ‘why do you want to know? I’ll tell you if 
you’re interested creatively but not if it’s a matter of personal pride’ 
(paraphrased). Tellingly I cannot identify with certainty where the edits are. 
I suspect that there may be two main edits (0.20 and 1.46) but these 
moments of musical contrast are equally convincing as acts of human 
agency. If the sense of release, contrast and climax at 1.46 is the work of the 
engineer/producer then it was made with the same musical logic that might 
guide an improviser. It might be argued that the editor/producer has more 
time to think about such decisions but in the studio I had the improvisational 
equivalent of ‘time to think’. The bass/percussion/guitar accompaniment 
was ‘built’ first and I then played many takes, sometimes going back into 
the control room to listen through, before identifying takes and sections that 
I liked. Finally, Chris encouraged me (again I was just doodling along with 
the playback) to improvise along with my solo on melodica. Sections of this 
were used and provide an interesting level of intertextuality, with myself 
commenting and elaborating on my own improvisation. This process could 
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not be much further from a ‘live’ improvisation and is perhaps best thought 
of as a fruitful fusion of composition and improvisation, although in many 
ways this way of working is successful precisely because it steers clear of 
such conventional distinctions. Whatever you call it (it is revealing that 
there is no established theoretical vocabulary that adequately describes such 
processes) this is clearly an example of creative, collaborative music 
making where the authorship of the final product is unclear. 
 
To conclude this section I want to return to those curious claims to 
authenticity found on some jazz CDs. It is indeed impressive and admirable 
that these studio recordings were made without edits or overdubs (although 
there is no mention of how many takes it took to achieve this) but it is 
impressive in the way that virtuosity is impressive. Technique should, 
ideally, be a means to an end rather than an end in itself. If the musicians on 
these records were musical and creative enough to make a great jazz record 
with no overdubs or editing, what might they have achieved if they had fully 
engaged with the creative possibilities of the medium with which they were 
working? 
 
Composition and improvisation in The Quartet 
 
I do not hope to deal exhaustively with the subject of composition and 
improvisation here, only to discuss it relation to my work with The Quartet 
and the collaborative diffusion of agency that I have been discussing in 
relation to creative studio work. 
 
When improvisation is involved the nature of composition changes. For a 
start the conventional Western boundaries between composer and performer 
become blurred. In jazz this re-distribution of compositional and creative 
authority is often represented in the role of the band leader. As Solis argues, 
much of what a bandleader does can be thought of as compositional: 
[Thelonious Monk] had to pick sidemen who shared his vision of 
how to approach the material, and then work together with them to 
achieve a level with which he was happy. I contend that this 
approach itself should be seen as part of expressing an authorial 
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voice in jazz, as much as should writing and arranging songs (Solis, 
2004, p.337) 
 
Solis’ point is that ‘picking sidemen’ and rehearsing with them has, 
arguably, just as much (if not more) creative impact in an improvisational 
context than notation. Monk’s work with his quartet is part of a rich 
tradition of band-leading-as-composition in jazz which has already been 
discussed in 1.4. But it is important to note that even when a bandleader 
communicates their intentions though conventional notation this notation is 
charged with, and interpreted in relation to, the social dynamics, aesthetic 
values and power relations that constitute the ‘semiotic environment’ or 
‘symbolic interpretive space’ created within that band. In this way even the 
writing and interpretation of notation becomes part of the collaborative web 
of agency in an improvising ensemble. 
 
The example to which I will now turn is the piano solo from a piece called 
Canterbury Tales. This piece, composed by Jack Hues, contains four 
contrasting improvisation sections, one for each member of the band. Each 
of these sections is a ‘tale’ in that they frame and project each musician’s 
improvising style. The sense that this piece consists of a series of stories is 
reinforced by the track divisions and titles on the album on which this piece 
first appears. Although the piece runs continuously for 13.53 the album 
track listing divides it into six separate tracks (an opening composed 
section, four separate improvisation sections and a final composed section): 
1 Prologue 
2 The chav’s tale 
3 The check-out girl’s tale 
4 The deacon’s tale 
5 The wife of the councillor’s tale 
6 Canterbury bells, Saturday 5.20pm 
 
As well as hinting at a dimension of character and narrative in the music, 
the title of this piece acknowledges the influence of the ‘Canterbury sound’ 
from the late 60’s and early 70’s and is intended to suggest parallels with 
Canterbury’s current music scene. 
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This piece belongs to a long tradition of jazz compositions written to 
harness the improvisational personalities of specific players. Composer-
bandleaders such as Jelly Roll Morton, Duke Ellington and Charles Mingus 
were known for their ability to create improvisational contexts that drew the 
best playing from specific musicians at the same time as effectively 
deploying this playing within a compositional framework. 
 
The piano solo section in Canterbury Tales is essentially one long crescendo 
and it is the dramatic centrepiece of the composition. But the structure of the 
piano solo is not just about loud and soft. The 
compositional/improvisational arc here is about contrast on a number of 
levels: solo to ensemble, spacious to busy, dissonant to consonant, tentative 
to confident, from the openness of stylistic freedom to the satisfying 
comfort of stylistic derivation. The role of improvisation in this structure is 
to provide the detail and the energy necessary to articulate the 
compositional arc. This structure is a supporting scaffold for the 
improvisation but it also makes demands of the soloist: they must leave 
enough space at the beginning to create the necessary atmosphere of 
anticipation and possibility and then generate enough energy to ‘justify’ the 
climactic final section. It is in this way that the composition and 
improvisation can be heard to rely on, and interact with, each other. 
 
Audio example 3 – piano solo from Canterbury Tales (studio) 
 
(A transcription of this solo is available in the appendix) 
 
The collaboration here between soloist and composer, soloist and ensemble 
and performance and production is another example of the web of agency 
and authorship that characterises much music making that involves 
improvising, particularly when it happens in the studio. A close examination 
of the opening of this piano solo provides evidence of at least three separate 
layers of agency/authorship (audio example 4, and the transcription that 
follows it, focuses on this opening section). 
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Bars 1-5 (in the notated example below) effect a smooth transition from 
composition to improvisation. The figure in b.1 plays an important 
structural role in the overall piece, framing and linking various sections. 
Here it is gradually removed from the picture, leaving just the final rising 
major second repeating as the meter slackens, changing from 5/4 to 6/4 
(b.4). This repetitive and increasingly spacious beginning to the piano solo 
is entirely composed; the piano plays exactly what is written and yet it 
sounds improvised or at least it doesn’t draw attention to itself as 
‘composed’. It feels as if the guiding, ordering hand of composition is 
gradually being withdrawn. At the same time the gradual reduction of the 
compositional material to just two notes is a strong suggestion for the 
improviser to begin their solo with this same material, as happens in this 
recording (in fact the piano remains attached to this two note motive for the 
first 1.22 of the solo). The transition from composed to improvised material 
is effected by the composition becoming more improvisatory and the 
improvisation beginning in a compositional manner. 
 
The delay on the piano in bars 3-10 enhances the effect of leaving the 
moorings of compositional material and drifting into a wider, pensive space. 
Whilst continuing the repetition of the two note cell, the echoes, and their 
spiraling vapour trails (achieved by altering the delay speed), create a sense 
of (cosmic) reverb that contributes to the expansive anticipatory atmosphere 
at the beginning of the improvisation. In other words, this post-production 
decision (which may have simply originated in an attempt to fill in the gaps, 
as an antidote to too much space) supports and expands upon both the 
compositional intentions and improvisational agency in the music. 
 
A final layer of collaboration can be heard in the improvised interactions 
between the piano soloist and the guitarist (who is also the composer). In 
b.8 the piano plays the first fragment of improvised material, an inversion of 
the two-note motive heard immediately before. The piano is then silent for 
three long, empty bars (bear in mind the delay effects were not present at 
the time of performance). Concerned that the pianist may have frozen, lost 
for words, the guitarist plays another two notes as a prompt (b.11). The 
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piano appears to acknowledge this support by extending these same two 
notes into a longer phrase (b.12-13). The interaction here is a ‘live’, real-
time instance of composer and performer collaboratively extending 
compositional material and nudging a tentative improvisation into existence. 
 
Audio example 4 – opening of piano solo from Canterbury Tales 
(studio) 
Opening of piano solo from Canterbury Tales (studio recording): 
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I hope that my close reading of the first forty seconds of this piano solo has 
gone some way towards revealing the dense web of agency and authorship 
that occurs on a moment-by-moment basis in this kind of music making. 
Before leaving this example I want to look at how this diffusion of 
authorship can also be seen at the macro-level. 
 
The two piano solos I have discussed in this commentary are related. The 
piano solo in Magonia Heights (audio example 2) is announced by a sudden 
absence of the propulsive rhythmic figure that recurs throughout the piece. 
The harmony and meter (although not the pulse) fall away leaving the piano 
exposed and open, the improvisational equivalent of a blank slate. This 
situation was arrived at collaboratively through rehearsal and discussion. It 
was decided that the openness and freedom here was a risk worth taking: 
this unfamiliar musical situation proved an effective creative catalyst for 
this particular soloist (the guitar solo took a different approach). The studio 
recording and the subsequent performances of this piece confirmed that this 
was a fruitful way of presenting the piano improvisation. The experience of 
participating in these subsequent performances, alongside a general 
familiarity with the pianist’s creative personality, fed into the composition 
of Canterbury Tales. Compositionally the piano solo in Canterbury Tales is 
very similar to the piano solo in Magonia Heights (with the addition of a 
structure that gradually builds towards a dramatic climax). The first part of 
the piano solo in Canterbury Tales is a deliberate compositional deployment 
of the improvisational strengths exhibited in the piano solo of Magonia 
Heights. The second half of the solo deliberately puts the pianist in another 
unfamiliar situation: generating and sustaining intensity towards a rock-
influenced climax. I would speculate that this was an intuitive 
compositional gamble that charges the solo with the drama of rising to this 
challenge. I believe you can hear, in the tentative character of the beginning 
of the solo, full of aborted ideas and pensive space, this sense of risk and 
uncertainty. In the studio neither composer nor improviser knew exactly 
what was going to happen (the fact that this piece had not been rehearsed 
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with a full band prior to the recording session added to the apprehension). 
Why take such a risk? 
 
The structure of the piano solo in Canterbury Tales, like Monk forcing his 
sidemen to learn his compositions by ear on the bandstand or Davis’ 
destabilising directions to Marcus Miller whilst recording Aida, is a way of 
shaking an improviser out of their habitual relationship to the familiar and 
lifting them “to the level of co-composing interpreter” (Smith, 1998, p.262). 
This kind of risk, and the potential creative pay off, is only available to 
composers who regularly work with improvisers; it hinges on both a social 
and musical understanding of a particular musician. 
 
Live and studio recordings of improvisation 
 
I mentioned earlier how recording transforms the act of improvising into an 
object. What is interesting is how these recorded objects can go on to affect 
subsequent improvised acts. This can be heard by comparing the studio 
recording of the piano solo from Canterbury Tales with a live recording of 
the same piece. Live recording, unlike studio recording, does have a certain 
claim to documentary status. Even though the live recording in question 
here has been mixed and mastered (with the result that the recorded sound 
differs from what the audience heard at this particular performance) it is 
unedited and is close enough to being a document of what actually 
happened for my purposes here. 
 
Before comparing these two recordings it is important to contextualise the 
phenomenon of improvisation recorded in the studio affecting subsequent 
performances of the same material. In 1978 a performance by the pianist 
Ray Bryant was reviewed in the American jazz magazine Downbeat: 
 “Tonight, Bryant played ‘After Hours’ in a note-for-note copy of 
the way he played it on the Dizzy, Rollins and Stitt album on Verve 
some fifteen years ago. Was it written then? Or worse. Has he 
transcribed and memorised his own solo, as if it were an 
archaeological classic? It was fine blues piano indeed, but it was odd 
to hear it petrified in this way” (Hollenberg in Gioia, 1988, p.55) 
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As mentioned earlier the perception of creative human agency – the notion 
that someone is inventing in real time – is a vital part of what it is to hear 
something as an improvisation. Significantly the two possible ‘crimes’ cited 
by the critic above (composing improvisations in advance and performing 
transcriptions of improvisations) affect the way the music is heard rather 
than what is actually heard. Bryant’s performance is still described as ‘fine 
blues piano’. What the critic objects to is the fact that he believed Bryant to 
be improvising when he wasn’t. It is unlikely that Bryant intended to 
willfully deceive his audience. It is more likely that he felt that the audience 
had come to see him on the strength of his best-known recordings and that it 
was respectful to give them a little of what they wanted (this situation 
perhaps says more about the discrepancy between the American critical 
establishment’s romantic notion of authenticity in jazz and the reality of 
making a living as a black jazz musician in America in the 1970’s than it 
does about improvised practice in general). 
 
What Bryant’s example does demonstrate is that studio recordings often 
exert influence over subsequent live performances of the same material 
because of their nature as musical objects or commodities. Promotion in the 
music industry is generally product-led. It is hard to organise a tour, review 
or interview without something to sell. It is in this way that both musicians 
and audiences become familiar with studio-recorded products, often before 
they have played or attended a live performance. The commodity value of a 
studio recording grants it an authoritative status in a capitalist economy (of 
course live recordings are commercially released but they rarely lead an 
artist’s career, they tend to be aimed at cashing in on potential sales of 
already-established artists). All of these things combine to create a situation 
where, through repeated listening, a studio recording gradually accumulates 
familiarity, meaning and authority to the point where it can affect 
subsequent performances of the same material. Another example of this is 
Dud Bascomb’s trumpet solo on the Erskine Hawkins Orchestra’s recording 
of Tuxedo Junction (1939). This was Hawkins’ most successful recording 
and audiences/dancers at subsequent performances of this piece expected to 
hear the ‘original’ or recorded improvisation played note for note. This was 
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perpetuated in subsequent written arrangements of Tuxedo Junction where 
Bascomb’s solo was notated as part of the arrangement; it had become 
absorbed into the composition. 
 
Of course the situation was a little different with the piano solo on 
Canterbury Tales. The Quartet albums have not achieved great commercial 
success but they were made in the same way that commercially successful 
recordings are made. This process involves a great deal of repeated listening 
over a long period of time. The original recording session took five days and 
there were several subsequent visits to the studio over the following months 
for overdubs, mixing and mastering purposes. Listening to music is a 
meaning-making process and it is normally the case that repeated listening 
results in an accumulation of meaning. 
 
A specific example of this can be heard by comparing the beginning of the 
studio and live recordings of the piano solo in Canterbury Tales. 
 
Audio example 5 – opening of piano solo from Canterbury Tales (live) 
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Opening of piano solo from Canterbury Tales (live recording): 
 
I have already discussed the beginning of the studio recording. What is 
interesting here is that the live piano solo starts in a very similar way. The 
falling major second in b.3 of the studio recording is heard in b.2 of the live 
recording. But where the guitarist seems to prompt the pianist in b.6 of the 
studio recording (with the notes F and E), this is now played by the pianist 
in b.4 of the live recording. What was originally an improvised response by 
the guitarist on the studio recording has become absorbed into the fabric of 
the piano solo. 
 
In terms of an overall comparison the main difference between these two 
improvisations is that the studio recording has more space. This can be seen 
in the transcription of the two beginnings. There are five bars where the 
piano doesn’t play anything in the studio recording (studio transcription: 
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b.6-7 and b.9-11) and three of those are in succession. In the live version 
there are only three separate bars where the piano remains silent (live 
transcription: b.6, 8 and 10). This increased use of space is part of the 
tentative character of the studio recording that contrasts with the bolder, 
faster pace of the live improvisation. Further evidence of this can be heard 
in the amount of time each improvisation takes to reach a point where there 
is some kind of continuous activity. At b.79 (refer to full transcription in the 
appendix, p.155) in the studio recording a continuous line emerges with a 
restlessly shifting metric orientation. This is where the intensity of the 
improvisation shifts up a gear in preparation for the climatic final section. In 
the live recording a similarly restless line begins as early as b.26, initiating 
almost continuous activity for the rest of the solo. As a result the live 
improvisation has to find other ways of intensifying the music as it heads 
towards the final climax. One of the ways it does this is through the urgent 
bursts of semi-quavers that occur at b.56 and b.65. Perhaps the broadest 
evidence that the recorded improvisation leaves more space/takes more time 
is that it is a minute longer than the live improvisation (the studio solo lasts 
for 3.52 whereas the live solo lasts for 2.52). 
 
Before drawing any conclusions about this it is useful to look at the final 
sections of both improvisations. Here the durations and harmonies are 
identical (unlike the earlier part of the solo) and a more direct comparison 
between the two recordings is possible. 
 
Audio example 6 – full piano solo from Canterbury Tales (live) 
Audio example 7 – end of piano solo from Canterbury Tales (studio) 
 
The improvising on the studio recording is more laid-back, poised and 
sparing whereas on the live recording it is more intense, leaves less space, is 
more rhythmically predictable and uses octaves, tremelo and two-handed 
textures to generate volume. 
 
This section of the studio solo was recorded several months later than the 
main body of the solo and was overdubbed over a previously recorded 
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double bass, drum and guitar accompaniment. I was alone in the live room 
playing multiple takes of this improvisation. I remember the producer 
telling me ‘you’re there now, you don’t have to try’. The intensity of this 
improvisation was provided by the previously recorded accompaniment, I 
just had to ride on top of this and the volume of my playing would be 
appropriately mixed. In the live recording however I was competing for 
volume, on an acoustic piano, against an amplified double bass, amplified 
guitar and a drummer playing with great intensity. Also, having brought the 
band to this level of intensity through the course of my improvisation I was 
also excited and physically involved in a way that was not possible in the 
comparatively dispassionate environment of the studio. The playing on the 
live recording is entirely appropriate for the context in which it occurs – in 
fact it is generated by this context - but it would sound somewhat gauche 
and heavy-handed on the studio recording. This point is reiterated by the 
pianist Claudio Arrau: 
Things that work in performance are sometimes not good on records 
and vice versa. Recording has its own laws (Arrau in Bajalica & 
Lockett, 2009, p.232) 
The tentative character of the studio recording may have been related to the 
fact that we had not played the piece before nor had we even met the bass 
player and drummer prior to the recording session. The slightly nervous 
intensity of the live performance may have been because we had not played 
the piece in front of an audience before. It had been pieced together in the 
studio and none of us were sure if we could pull it off. 
 
Comparing the studio and live recordings of the piano solo from Canterbury 
Tales reveals a lot about the impact that differences of context have on 
improvisation. 
 
Copyright 
 
To conclude I want to look at the real-life manifestation of the question of 
authorship I have been discussing - in the form of copyright law - and use 
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this as way of reprising, from a different angle, some of the themes from 
this commentary. 
 
Despite the collaborative nature of the music I have been discussing Jack 
Hues owns most of the publishing rights to both Magonia Heights and 
Canterbury Tales. This is less to do with any inequality within the band and 
more to do with legal structures that are ill-equipped to deal with the 
complex issues of authorship that surround improvised music making. 
Whilst the collaborative aspect of The-Quartet's music-making might be 
catered for, if a little crudely, by having multiple copyright holders (with 
creative rights being divided into different percentages) the related issue of 
authorship in composition and improvisation is more complex. 
 
UK copyright law protects two types of musical work: recordings and 
scores. The law states that: 
It is an offence to perform any of the following acts without the 
consent of the owner: 
Copy the work. 
Rent, lend or issue copies of the work to the public. 
Perform, broadcast or show the work in public. 
Adapt the work. (UK Copyright Service (UKCS), 2009) 
 
In a conventional jazz situation an improvisation is normally considered to 
be a ‘derivative work’: 
A derivative work is a work that is based on (derived from) another 
work; for example a painting based on a photograph, a collage, a 
musical work based on an existing piece or samples, a screenplay 
based on a book. (UKCS, 2009) 
An improviser should therefore seek authorisation from the copyright holder 
before making a derivative work. If this is granted the improviser is then 
able to copyright their “new content”, but only if they can demonstrate that 
their work is “significantly different to the original work” and is “itself … 
an original work of skill, labour and judgment” (UKCS, 2009). It is 
interesting that the creator of the original work is not required to similarly 
demonstrate the ‘skill, labour or judgment’ involved in their creation. When 
Nettl describes how improvisation is often viewed by the musical 
85 
 
establishment as “a kind of third world of music” (1998, p.7) it brings to 
mind the difficulties of claiming asylum in a first world nation. Asylum 
seekers must support their claim for asylum by demonstrating what value 
they might offer the country to which they are applying,  just as 
improvisation has to prove it’s ‘skill, labour or judgment’ to be considered, 
and granted the rights of, a musical ‘work’. Indigenous Westerners, like 
musical ‘works’, are not required to demonstrate their value. 
 
In practice very few improvisers seek authorisation from the original 
copyright holder. In the US there is a compulsory licensing scheme which, 
for a one off royalty payment, allows musicians to use many compositions 
without having to negotiate with the copyright holder. This conveys the 
right to record but does not allow an improviser to copyright their ‘new 
content’. This still requires the consent of the original copyright holder, 
which in practice is rarely asked for. This leads, in the US, to the situation 
described by the former head of Capitol Records, Alan, W. Livingston: 
[A] glaring example of inequity involves the highly talented jazz 
musician whose... skilled performance and creative improvisations 
on what may be an extremely simple  theme go unpaid when the jazz 
musician's record is broadcast; only the writer and  publisher of the 
original theme receive payment when the record is performed. 
(Livingstone in Harvard Law Review, 2005, p.1957) 
 
So why does improvisation get such a raw deal? I contend that it is because 
it is an act and not an object. Copyright law is a sub-category of intellectual 
property law which is explicitly concerned with objects: 
Intellectual property (or IP) refers to creative work which can be 
treated as an asset or physical property (UKCS, 2009) 
 
Perhaps it is not surprising that, in a culture obsessed with objects, 
improvisation should be poorly served by the legal system. What is 
surprising is that, in the ninety-four years since the first jazz recording (The 
Original Dixieland Jazz Band, 1917), we are only just starting to get a 
clearer philosophical and musicological picture of what improvisation is and 
how it might be valuable to us. 
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I want to discuss the notion of improvisation as a derivative work. If one 
accepts Small’s claim that “music is first and foremost action” (Small, 1998, 
p.9) then it is possible to liken a composer’s claim to a segment of this vast 
continuum of musical activity to an explorer planting a flag in ‘virgin’ soil. 
Both legal and cultural notions of originality share this sense of an origin-
ary first claim. Anything that then occurs within this metaphorical musical 
property is, of course, owned by the composer. This imperialist metaphor is 
one way of interpreting the power relations implicit in the concept of a 
‘derivative work’. Another approach is to acknowledge that improvisation is 
always derivative in some sense. The philosopher Bruce Ellis Benson 
observes that: 
One never begins with nothing, for even improvising without a chart 
or chord structure still requires that one be situated within a 
discursive practice (Benson, 2006, p.463) 
 
An improviser always improvises on/with something. If the improvisation is 
not based on a specific melody or harmonic progression then it might be 
based on a timbre, the acoustics of the performing space, a physical pattern 
or interaction with other musicians. An improviser works with what is to 
hand; as Derek Bailey says “having to make do seems to me an important 
part of improvisation” (Childs, B. et al, 1982/83, p.50). Invention is 
compromised by necessity: 
 [The] improviser is situated precisely between these points: an 
imitatio that can never be wholly imitative and an inventio that can 
never be wholly inventive. Or we might say, following Claude Levi-
Strauss and Derrida, that the improviser is always a bricoleur, 
borrowing from and working with what is at hand. (Benson, 2006, 
p.464) 
 
It is not surprising that the creations of Benson’s ‘bricoleur’, so reminiscent 
of Peters’ improvising contestants on Scrap Heap Challenge, are derivative. 
This is a defining feature of their mode and context of construction. But 
how is this different to the composer’s situation? Surely a composer is 
neither wholly imitative nor wholly inventive, surely they too make use of 
what is ‘to hand’ - what else could they use? Composition is derivative too, 
that is part of what it means to be situated within a language: 
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The composer is exactly like you, constantly on the horns of the 
same dilemma, caught in the same dialectic – the great models and 
an unknown future. He cannot take off into the unknown. (Boulez in 
Benson, 2003, p.43) 
  
Composers never create ex nihilo, but instead “improvise”: 
sometimes on tunes that already exist, but more frequently and 
importantly in the tradition in which they work … improvisation is 
not something that precedes composition or stands outside or 
opposed to composition. Instead I think that the activities that we 
call 'composing' and 'performing' are essentially improvisatory in 
nature. (Benson, 2003, p.2-25) 
 
As I observed whilst looking at the intertwining, co-dependent authorship of 
the piano solo in Magonia Heights and Canterbury Tales, both 
improvisation and composition (and performance) are ongoing forms of 
creative musical activity. Perhaps the difference is that composition plots, 
refines and preserves points along this developmental continuum whereas 
an improvised performance (and all performances are improvised to some 
extent) simply mark where the improviser is at that time. The old 
distinctions - composer, improviser, performer – have long been losing 
currency in musical practice and it is hopefully only a matter of time before 
copyright law catches up: 
Copyright's inability to fully comprehend and incorporate its own 
sine qua non - originality - lies at the heart of all of these problems. 
(Harvard Law Review, 2005, p.1941) 
 
 
For the practical component of this project I have chosen to submit The 
Quartet’s two studio albums, Illuminated and Shattering. Information about 
the release dates and personnel on these recordings can be found on the 
sleeve. Illuminated received four star reviews in Mojo, The Guardian, and 
Jazzwise and was album of the week in the Independent. Shattering was 
favourably reviewed in The Times, Jazz UK, The Independent on Sunday, 
Jazzwise, BBC Music magazine and the Guardian (see www.the-
quartet.co.uk for more details). 
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2.2 – Spock 
 
 
This commentary explores issues around what I have called the familiar in 
improvisation through my work with an improvising ensemble called 
Spock. The music making in Spock provides an opportunity to discuss how 
clichés and tropes relate to creative possibility in improvisation. I will trace 
the course of the band’s development looking at various strategies of 
intervention that I have employed as a bandleader, composer and 
improviser. It is important to note that Spock is a project that, in my 
opinion, has shown great potential but has not yet realised that potential in a 
sustained way. This provides a fertile area for discussion. 
 
Spock was formed in March 2008 as a trio with Liran Donin (bass guitar) 
and Mark Holub (drums). The first Spock gig came about through my work 
as a jazz promoter. I had helped to organise several performances and a 
workshop for a group called Led Bib that Mark and Liran played in. In fact 
Mark was the leader, drummer and main composer for the band (Led Bib 
were nominated for 'best album of the year' in the Barclaycard Mercury 
Music Prize 2009 and have appeared on BBC2 and Channel 4). This 
information is relevant because Spock originally consisted of two 
experienced and confident young musicians with a well-established social 
and musical relationship being ‘led’ by me at a time when I was only just 
starting to explore more open forms of improvising. Spock’s development 
as a band runs parallel with my own exploration of my identity an 
improviser. 
 
The unequal balance of power and experience in the group coupled with the 
exploratory uncertainty of my playing at this time meant that Spock’s early 
performances were strongly influenced by the rock-inspired playing of the 
more established bass and drums duo. As in Led Bib there was a tendency 
for the music to become loud and heavy-rock influenced which, to me, 
seemed to reduce both the possibilities for invention and for my 
participation in the music. Even though I found this kind of playing 
exhilarating in Led Bib performances, I found it unconvincing, even 
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embarrassing, in Spock. The aesthetic of the group in its early performances 
can be heard in this section of a piece called Neighborhood Spock (by Liran 
Donin): 
 
Audio example 1 – Neighborhood Spock 
 
Although I sometimes enjoyed these cathartic thrashes (like a guilty 
pleasure) I craved a quieter music where close listening and subtle 
interaction played a greater role. Faced with what I perceived to be a 
limiting aesthetic approach with an immature reliance on stylistic tropes, I 
tried a number of different ways of changing the music making in the group. 
The first and most direct way of affecting the course of the music was, of 
course, through my own playing. However my ability to influence the music 
was often limited by the volume of the piano (in comparison to the drum kit 
and amplified bass guitar) and the role of the bass guitar in this ensemble. 
Without a pre-composed harmonic structure the bass guitar effectively 
controlled the harmony and had considerable power over establishing and 
changing grooves. The role of the piano became primarily textural. The 
scope for melodic playing in this context was limited by a combination of 
the lack of sustaining power of the instrument and the issue of volume. 
 
The following audio example demonstrates the harmonic and rhythmic 
power of the bass guitar and how the piano reacts to this. The example 
begins at the end of a bass guitar solo. As a signal that the solo has ended 
the bass plays a simple riff in 10ths with a stronger sense of pulse and meter 
than before. The drums respond first by confirming the time-feel of the bass 
with a fill and then the piano enters playing quiet partially-chromatic 
segments of semi-quavers.  
 
Audio example 2 – Liran’s d minor riff and my response 
 
The empty space and repetition of this bass-line invites participation. The 
stable harmony, simple rhythm, loud volume and slightly aggressive edge to 
the tone of the tenths imply a certain kind of response, perhaps equally loud, 
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rhythmically assertive and harmonically static. The piano deliberately 
counters this, attempting to subvert the expectations set up by the bass-line 
in several ways. The piano plays quietly (something the bass quickly 
responds to, reducing its volume at 0.24), in a contrasting register, using 
asymmetric semi-quavers runs. The chromatic piano lines acknowledge the 
underlying harmony of d minor, mainly at the ends of phrases, but are 
primarily concerned with dissonance. Although these tactics were intended 
to destabilise the bass riff the overall affect is complementary, with the 
piano providing the complexity lacking in the bass whilst the bass provides 
the space and stability necessary to contain and offset the complexity of the 
piano. In this example the tension between the different aspirations and 
intentions of the group members results in an effective balance of stability 
and (mildly) disorientating complexity. 
 
Other forms of intervention come under the broad category of band-leading. 
The most significant of these was the addition, in March 2009, of Matthew 
Wright to the band. There were several reasons behind this. Firstly I hoped 
that Matthew’s instruments (turntables and laptop) would bring a new focus 
on timbre that might lead the group away from a rock-influenced aesthetic 
and encourage a more open form of improvising. Secondly this new 
member brought a different level of compositional/conceptual sophistication 
and maturity to the group. Thirdly, I had an established duo with Matthew 
that meant we had a level of musical and social understanding equivalent to 
that of Mark and Liran (thus evening out the balance of power in the group). 
 
Another band-leading decision that had a significant impact on the music 
was my request that Liran play double bass rather than bass guitar. This 
helped to defuse the rock influences in the music and led Liran to find a 
different role in the band. This oblique strategy was both a demand to 
change and an opportunity for the bass player to creatively re-negotiate his 
role within the ensemble; he found his own way of making the changes that 
I felt were necessary. 
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The following example demonstrates how these two factors (the addition of 
Matthew Wright to the band and Liran switching to double bass) affected 
the improvising in Spock. For the beginning of our second gig at the Vortex 
jazz club in London the decision was made, collectively, to abandon the 
short ‘head’ compositions that Spock had used in earlier performances. 
Instead I repeated the lowest note on the piano slowly and loudly for a few 
minutes before bowing the same string with a hank of cello bow hair. This 
functioned as a kind of call to prayer that boldly announced the beginning of 
the performance and encouraged a more timbre-focussed and open 
improvisational approach: 
 
Audio example 3 – low A 
 
This approach led to improvising that explored entirely different aesthetic 
territory to previous Spock performances. The bowed piano strings provided 
common timbral ground across the whole band: Matthew’s turntables and 
samples, Liran’s bowed bass and Mark’s bowed cymbals and glockenspiel 
were able to participate equally and with less stylistic baggage in this sound-
world. There are moments when it is hard to distinguish who is playing 
what. For the first time with this ensemble the sense of individual 
boundaries became blurred. 
 
Composition is another mode of intervening in and influencing the 
improvisational processes of a band. Most of my compositions for Spock 
respond in some way to issues related to the group’s improvising. Shortly 
after Matthew Wright joined the band I observed that most of the musicians 
were playing most of the time in Spock improvisations.  Listening back to 
recordings I noticed that there were occasional solo sections but very few 
extended duets. There was also a tendency, possibly more social than 
musical, for the band to feel divided into two duos (me and Matt/Liran and 
Mark). Way of the Exploding Fist was a piece designed to exploit all the 
potential duo combinations in the group. Similar to John Zorn’s Archery, 
this piece consisted of a list of the six different duo combinations, a brief 
pentatonic fragment (the name and this melody were taken from a martial 
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arts based computer game made by Melbourne House in 1985) and the 
instruction that each musician should bow to their ‘opponent’ before starting 
their duet. The purpose of this was to stylise and satirise, and thereby 
hopefully defuse, the occasionally antagonistic relationships in the 
ensemble. This theatrical element rarely worked however (although a few 
laughs from the audience can be heard on the recordings) because the 
musicians either forgot to bow or felt awkward doing it. This is the closest 
thing to a score that existed for this piece: 
1 LD – MH  4 SB - LD 
2 MH – MW 5 LD - MW 
3 MW – SB  6 MH – SB 
 
This piece resulted in some unexpected and inventive improvisation. For 
example the duet between Matthew and Liran, who had been arguing fairly 
heatedly in the rehearsal immediately before the first performance of this 
piece, was quiet, fragile and sparse; maybe even reconciliatory. Equally 
unexpected was the violence at the beginning of the duet between Matthew 
and myself. Simple though it is, Way of the Exploding Fist encouraged a 
level of detail in the improvised interaction in Spock that would not have 
occurred otherwise. Most importantly it identified and mined an area where 
there was work yet to be done. One of the ingredients in successful 
improvisation is this sense of construction or becoming, the sense that work 
is being done in performance. If there are avenues that have not yet been 
explored, either on a group level (e.g. new instrumental combinations or 
roles) or an individual level (e.g. un-mined areas of technique or timbre), 
then the performance has the potential to be an arena for discovery. This is 
what Cobussen means when he writes that: 
[T]he process of art production is itself investigative. Knowledge is 
gained through the creative act ... reflection and theorising are done 
neither before nor after the work has been composed; rather they are 
an inextricable part of the process of making (Cobussen, 2005, p.32) 
 
 
Despite the new focus on timbre and the related exploration of the duo 
combinations within the group, Spock still continued to gravitate towards 
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loud rock grooves. One of the intentions of my composition Roscoe’s Ritual 
(lead-sheet included in appendix) was to channel this tendency in a way that 
retained the energy and power of this playing but within more ambiguous 
rhythmic and stylistic parameters. Another aim was to integrate the 
turntables into the group sound. This piece begins with a sample from the 
title track of the album Sound by the Roscoe Mitchell Sextet (1966). The 
cymbal roll on the sample is taken up by the live drummer and the piano 
plays a melody that slowly builds in intensity. 
 
Audio example 4 – Roscoe’s Ritual 
 
The skittering arrhythmic turntables-and-drums duet that accompanies the 
second time through the melody is designed to create a context where the 
turntables can contribute texturally and rhythmically on an equal level with 
the drums.  It is also important that the turntables begin the improvisation 
section. After the terrifying intensity of the climax the sudden bare fluttering 
of the turntables is charged with a genuine sense of drama and anticipation 
in this performance. The purpose of this compositionally is to stimulate 
improvisation that accommodates and reacts to the turntables rather than the 
other way round (the usual situation was that the turntables/laptop had to 
find a way of integrating into the already established and complete sound 
world of the jazz piano trio). 
 
It is interesting that the violence and power of the playing in this 
performance of Roscoe’s Ritual is more intense than any of Spock’s heavy-
rock influenced improvisation. The album from which the initial sample is 
taken was a landmark recording in the 1960’s because of its focus on timbre 
and space rather than the fire and energy that had preoccupied freer forms of 
jazz in the early 1960’s. Spock’s performance of this piece touches both 
ends of the spectrum of free jazz intensity. With no regular pulse and a 
slowly building melody the intensity of the final section has a 
feverish/cathartic spiritual quality reminiscent of seminal free-jazz albums 
such as Spiritual Unity (1965) or Ascension (1966). But while it may be 
argued that I was simply exchanging the existing stylistic references within 
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the band for ones of my own, this piece did generate music making with an 
intensity and emotional depth that was not present in previous Spock 
performances. 
 
As I become more assured as an improviser I started using certain pieces, 
exercises and ways of playing in a variety of different contexts. My work 
with CCCU Scratch Orchestra (see section 2.3) had demonstrated the value 
of John Steven’s pieces/exercises in Search and Reflect and I decided to use 
Dot Piece (2007, p.87) to further stimulate alert listening and restraint in 
Spock. Dot Piece is an exercise in which the musicians play the shortest 
possible sound on their instrument. Stevens’ likens the piece to placing a dot 
on a blank canvas or attempting to cover the surface of a flowing river with 
paper darts. 
 
The recording of Spock rehearsing Dot Piece contains examples of the 
group’s tendency towards subversion and humour. Previously I had not 
fully recognised this tendency towards subversion and humour as a valuable 
resource. It was a strong characteristic in our early performances but it was 
overlooked, and in some cases actively discouraged in some of the pieces 
and improvisational strategies discussed above. 
 
In the following discussion I refer to what is said by the musicians during 
the rehearsal process as well as what they play. My reason for doing this is 
to provide a sense of the playful subversion that pervaded much of the 
social and the musical activity in this band. The implication here is that the 
social and musical dynamics of an improvising ensemble are often 
inseparable: an understanding of one is necessary for an understanding of 
the other.  
 
I started by asking the band to play the shortest sound possible on their 
instruments: “you’ve got to be really trying hard to make them short; 
they’ve got to be the shortest sounds you can make”. Mark spends some 
time trying to get the shortest sound on his drum kit. When it is Liran’s turn 
he finds a short sound on his bass more quickly and Mark complains: “are 
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you saying his is shorter than mine?” Next it is my turn to play and Mark 
immediately retorts “that’s not that short”.  A little later the piece begins and 
the very first ‘dot’ is played by Mark (the drummer) leaning over and hitting 
Liran’s bass with a drum stick. I take the bait and accuse him of cheating. 
“Is it cheating?” Mark replies, “You didn't say anything about how I could 
make a quiet sound!” 
 
My manner (I was accustomed to directing this exercise with students) and 
Mark’s mood undoubtedly contributed to the playfully subversive tone of 
this exchange. Also at work was a clash of values that lies at the heart of 
much of the work discussed in this commentary. Mark and Liran were 
professional musicians with a shared and well-grounded aesthetic 
orientation – rock and jazz. It is likely that they also shared a mild suspicion 
of academia and sensed that they were occasionally being coerced towards 
an aesthetic perspective that they did not necessarily share. At several points 
in the band’s development Mark and Liran requested that we just 'play' 
rather than follow the 'rules' of various improvisational strategies. It would 
have been hard for them not to have felt criticised as I continued to impose 
such strategies. In the light of this there is a generosity to Mark’s humour 
and creative response to the restrictions of Dot Piece. It is also important to 
note that I was attempting to recast a well-established musical relationship. 
Mark was used to playing in more free contexts but not with Liran. Their 
playing as a duo had developed over many years in the same band together 
and it is unsurprising, given Spock’s intermittent performing activity, that 
this shared understanding and aesthetic approach should be resistant to 
change. 
 
Returning to the rehearsal, in the light of the prevailing subversive tone I 
felt compelled to add a ‘rule’ to Dot Piece. After explaining that “you can 
play whenever you like but not at the same time as someone else” I added 
“if you do play at the same time as someone else then you’ve got to stop 
playing for a little while”. “What, like as a punishment?” asked Mark, 
poking fun at my increasing exasperation. I was keen for silence to play an 
important role in this improvisation, as it had done when Scratch Orchestra 
97 
 
played Dot Piece. Based on my previous experience with Spock and the 
eagerness to play, bordering on impatience, that I felt in the room at the time 
(we had spent about an hour setting recording levels and trying to get 
Matthew’s turntables and laptop to come through the PA) I judged that an 
extra measure was necessary to achieve the restraint and alert listening that I 
wanted in the music.  This rule was made clearer, through discussion, by 
imposing a ten-second period of silence if two musical events overlapped or 
occurred simultaneously. In practice this rule was dropped after a few 
minutes, by which time it had served its purpose, encouraging improvisation 
in which close listening and an alert restraint/silence played an important 
role. 
 
Audio example 5 – Dot Piece 
 
Spock could be very creative when it came to subversion. An example of 
this is the way the 'rule' mentioned above was interpreted and exploited in 
the improvisation. Rather than avoid simultaneous playing (what the rule 
was designed to do) the musicians soon worked out that if you deliberately 
played at the same time as someone else you could 'knock them out'. If two 
players were knocked out in this way then the remaining players had an 
opportunity to play unfettered for at least 10 seconds. This can be heard in 
the next example. The piano is interrupted by the turntables meaning that 
both have to wait for 10 seconds before playing again. The double bass 
takes the opportunity to play a repetitive figure in 7/8 (this is where the 
audio example begins). The obstinate repetition here suggests to me a child 
deliberately stepping into an area they have just been forbidden to enter, the 
hammer-on at the end of the figure even hints at a finger-waving snoot. As 
soon as the piano is 'allowed' to re-enter it deliberately plays at the same 
time as the double bass in order to shut it up (this is not speculation – I 
remember clearly that this was my intention). The intricate pile up of 
turntables, drums and piano that occurs immediately afterwards might be 
heard as a smug, victorious gesture aimed at the 'defeated' bass. 
 
Audio example 6 – Dot Piece (Liran’s subversion) 
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Dot Piece was the catalyst for some fruitful improvising but this success 
owes as much to Spock’s subversive, playful creativity as it does to John 
Stevens’ piece. Despite the sparse, restrained aesthetic encouraged by Dot 
Piece, Spock’s resourceful ways of interpreting the limitations imposed by 
the piece meant the playful character of the ensemble remained intact. I 
mentioned earlier how Spock’s development ran parallel to my own creative 
development. This group provided me with ongoing opportunities to test out 
a range of different ways of stimulating and influencing improvisation. It is 
a testament to the openness and creativity of the musicians in Spock that 
they not only tolerated and accommodated this continuous and varied series 
of interventions but also artistically engaged with them in such a way that 
their own musical identity was not compromised. 
 
The practice I have chosen to submit for this project is a recording of the 
most recent Spock performance. This performance took place on 22
nd
 
March 2012 as part of the Free Range series of events in Canterbury (see 
conclusion for more details about the Free Range events). There were two 
fifteen-minute sets in this perfromance, the first of which is presented here. 
 
Several of the areas of concern highlighted in this commentary are resolved 
in this performance. There is a better balance in terms of volume. There is a 
wide variety of duet combinations (drums and turntables, piano and drums, 
bass and turntables, piano and bass). There is much more space in the music 
than in previous Spock performances (by which I mean restraint is 
exercised; there are only a few moments where the whole ensemble is 
playing for a sustained period). The double bassist is particularly sensitive 
to his previous tendency to dominate certain aspects of Spock’s music 
making. One example of this is the fact that for large parts of this recording 
he refrains from playing. Although there are stylistic references they do not 
inhibit or strongly condition the direction of the music. Rather than 
‘references’, which suggests a kind of conscious stylistic name-dropping, 
moments such as the In a Silent Way-style boogaloo groove at 11.00 or the 
ECM/Azimuth-style piano texture and harmony at 13.10 are better 
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described as allusions. Certainly the sound world and the sensitivity to 
textural density in this set allow more scope for the turntables to participate 
in the improvising than in previous performances (rock or jazz tropes had 
inhibited such participation in past performances). Moments in the music 
are given the time to establish themselves and develop. This is combined 
with a collective sense of when a section is coming to an end and where the 
music will go next. This is evidenced in the well-judged transition from a 
turntables and drums duet to a turntables and bass duet at 5.50-6.00 or the 
confident transition from an inchoate drums, piano and turntables section to 
a more focussed drums, bass and turntables groove at 10.50-11.00. 
 
Perhaps the most significant aspect of this performance, at least for myself, 
is an acceptance of the way the different members of the band play. Spock’s 
previous performances had been characterized by a restless discontent on 
my part that manifested itself in the various forms of interventions described 
in this commentary. In this audio example there are no attempts to control 
the situation from the outside (through composition or band-leading). There 
is also a shift in the way that I engage with the situation from the inside 
(through my playing). Whereas in earlier performances I played against the 
music (e.g. audio example 2) here I am playing with it. An example of what 
I mean by this can be heard at 2.20 or 11.50. The improvising here seems to 
show an acceptance that the role of the piano within this ensemble is often 
textural and that harmonic, rhythmic or melodic contributions are best made 
from this textural perspective (such as the repeated notes at 2.20 or the 
tremolo at 11.50). 
 
It seems to me that this acceptance is symptomatic of a greater confidence 
and sense of creative identity in my own playing that has allowed me to step 
back from Spock. One of the consequences of this is that this ensemble is 
finally free to develop it’s own identity, something which I believe can be 
heard in this audio example. 
 
 
Audio example 7 – Spock at Free Range 
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Recorded at the Veg Box Café, Canterbury on 22
nd
 March 2012. 
 
Musicians: Piano  - Sam Bailey 
  Turntables - Matthew Wright 
  Double Bass - Liran Donin 
  Drums  - Mark Holub 
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2.3 Canterbury Scratch Orchestra 
 
This commentary focuses on my work with an undergraduate student 
ensemble at Canterbury Christ Church University called Canterbury Scratch 
Orchestra. The first part explores links between aesthetics and ethics in 
relation to John Steven’s piece Ghost while the second part examines a 
piece inspired by Stevens’ work called Shops. 
 
The nature of my involvement with this ensemble differed from my work 
with the other projects presented in the thesis. As the director of a student 
ensemble my responsibility was as an educator. While I certainly consider 
my educational work to be an extension of my creative practice it is beyond 
the scope of this thesis to present my work with the Scratch Orchestra in a 
substantially different way to the other projects here. What I can do usefully 
is look at some of the issues raised through the practical application of John 
Stevens’ pieces and review some of the work that has followed on from this. 
 
Scratch Orchestra was formed, almost by accident, in September 2008. I 
was asked to give an improvisation workshop to the new first year 
undergraduates with a view to presenting a piece in a concert at the end of 
the week. Having given the workshop and organized a group of willing 
students the concert was cancelled and I asked the students if they wanted to 
get together and play anyway. This group was interested in rehearing on a 
weekly basis and they chose the name of the ensemble. Named after the 
Scratch Orchestra formed in 1968 by Cornelius Cardew, Michael Parsons 
and Howard Skempton, it was felt that the playful experimental character of 
the Scratch music sketchbooks, the openness to anyone who was interested 
in participating regardless of experience or ability and the notion that they 
were starting ‘from scratch’ related to how the students felt about what they 
were doing. None of them had any experience in improvising and I had very 
little experience of running a student ensemble and no vision of what the 
ensemble would be beyond wanting to try out some exercises. Everyone in 
the ensemble was starting from scratch, including me. As one of the 
students put it: 
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When we started off, the pieces, they weren’t really normal for 
anybody, like the Stockhausen poem [Set Sail for the Sun] ... nobody 
really does that normally so we all had to get away from our default 
style and then we all had to find a style that we could merge with, 
which was why it worked, and that’s why we had a feeling of 
identity and cohesion (Osborne, 2010) 
 
In the handbook that accompanies his graphic score Treatise, Cardew wrote 
that “ideally such music should be played by a collection of musical 
innocents” (Cardew, 1971, p.19). Whilst we were far from being musically 
innocent – we were all trained musicians working within the context of a 
music degree – we were naïve and ignorant enough for our encounters with 
pieces like Treatise (Cardew, 1967) and From the Seven Days 
(Stockhausen, 1970) to seem like genuine discoveries. 
 
In the intervening four years the number of students in the group has varied 
from five to twenty five and we have performed a diverse range of 
improvised music such as Raga Shivranjani, Treatise (Cardew, 1967), 
Cobra (Zorn, 1984), In a Sentimental Mood, Fado de Defesa (Calem & 
Sabrosa, 2003) and Lonely Woman. In the last two years however the 
ensemble has played less pre-composed ‘repertoire’ and focused more on 
improvised exercises, pieces composed by members of the group and 
collaborations with film makers, singer-songwriters and curators. However, 
one thing that has remained a consistent feature of the group’s activities, in 
both performances and rehearsals, is the use of John Stevens’ exercises from 
Search and Reflect (2007). 
 
In 1.6 I discussed the ethical implications of Stevens’ piece Ghost (score 
available in appendix). I talked about how this piece demands a kind of 
listening that gives itself completely to the soloist and I pointed to the social 
and ethical dimensions of this kind of listening. Here I will look at the 
issues that have arisen through playing Ghost in Scratch Orchestra with the 
aim of strengthening my claim that both the work of this ensemble and 
Stevens’ pieces highlight connections between aesthetics and ethics. 
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Normally the first obstacle to overcome when playing Ghost is the idea that 
you have to accurately imitate the soloist. This is a particular problem for 
conventionally trained musicians (such as the members of Scratch 
Orchestra). This point is reiterated in the foreword to Search and Reflect 
where Small observes that Stevens’ exercises are often “easier for the 
untrained than for the trained performer” (Small in Stevens, 2007, IV). 
Stevens’ demand to imitate “as closely as possible the rhythms and pitches 
of the solo, as it is being played”  (Stevens, 2007, p.88, Stevens’ emphasis) 
can easily be misinterpreted as a demand to accurately imitate the rhythms 
and pitches of the solo but this is not what he is asking for. This point is 
illustrated in the following audio example where a ghost (me) becomes 
momentarily preoccupied with ‘getting it right’, shifting their listening away 
from the soloist to focus on the accuracy of their own playing. The extract 
begins with the violin soloist playing a trill. The pianist ghosts the trill but 
not at the same pitch. As the violin continues to trill (for almost 7 seconds), 
the pianist searches for the ‘correct’ pitch. After about 5 seconds the piano 
finds the right notes. The violin then moves on to play a double stopped 
chord but the pianist doesn’t ghost this, their listening has shifted away from 
the soloist and it is another 7 or 8 seconds before the pianist is effectively 
ghosting again. 
 
Audio example 1 – ghost (getting it right) 
 
This extract highlights the distinction between the kind of listening required 
to ‘ghost’ effectively and the kind of listening required to accurately 
reproduce specific pitches. Of course they are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive but participation in the activity of ghosting is granted first and 
foremost through attentiveness; accurate aural ability may well aid or be the 
result of sustained, cultivated attentiveness but it is not a prerequisite. 
Attentiveness is achievable by anyone (who can hear) regardless of musical 
experience or ability. This is one of the extraordinary features of the pieces 
in Search and Reflect; both non-musicians and musicians can fully and 
fruitfully engage with the processes in each exercise. Part of the process of 
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Ghost involves letting go of the egotistical urge to ‘get it right’ and 
cultivating a non-judgmental attentiveness regardless of the outcome. 
 
The ‘score’ for Ghost asks that: 
Everyone must keep their eyes closed, as they should be listening for 
the soloist, rather than watching them. This is an aural exercise 
(Stevens, 2007, p.90) 
 
This is a feature common to many of Stevens’ exercises and is central to the 
conception of listening that underpins his musical philosophy. It might seem 
redundant to point to such a simple and obvious way of focusing listening 
were it not for the fact that so much musical training and ability relies on 
visual data. From reading notation to subtle unconscious cues of body 
language to the spectacle of live performance, what Lawrence Kramer calls 
the ‘listening gaze’ (Kramer, 2002, p.77) is integral to our perception of 
music. The implication in Stevens’ work is that our habitual multi-sensory 
mode of musical engagement dilutes and compromises the intensity of our 
listening. 
 
This point can be explored by comparing two recordings of the same viola 
soloist being ghosted, the first with eyes open and the second with eyes shut 
(the ghosts consist of piano and two violins). 
 
Audio example 2 – ghost (eyes open) 
Audio example 3 – ghost (eyes shut) 
 
In the first example the two violins match the pitch of the viola accurately 
but the ghosting does not finish precisely when the soloist stops (Stevens’ 
warns against this in the score: “whenever there is the slightest pause in a 
solo, there should be no ‘overlapping’ by the ensemble” (Stevens, 2007, 
p.90)). One of the violinists pointed out during this recording session that 
they were able to not only visually anticipate when the violist would play 
but also anticipate which pitch they would play by watching the position of 
their hand on the fingerboard.  
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In the second example the time delay between the soloist’s entry and the 
ghosting remained similar (despite being unable to see the gestures of the 
soloist). What changed noticeably was the precision of the phrase endings: 
the three ghosts stop almost exactly when the soloist stops. This is related to 
the fact that the ghosting is quieter on the second take. Presumably this was 
out of necessity: without visual stimulus there was a greater need to hear the 
soloist clearly. Predictably the pitch matching of the two violins is less 
accurate. I consider the result of this to be far more interesting than the more 
accurately pitched first take. The light of the soloist is refracted through the 
ghosting to form a shifting sonic shadow, a kind of naturally occurring 
harmony. This is an important point: when Stevens’ pieces are played 
‘correctly’ the ethical and aesthetic aspects of the activity are inseparable 
and mutually reinforcing. The aural sensitivity in the best performances of 
Ghost is compelling, even the silences are charged (see following example) 
and the natural inability to ghost pitches accurately produces an often 
beautiful harmonic shadow that is the sum total of the attentive listening and 
aural ability of the group.  
 
Stevens’ statement that “we celebrate mistakes because they highlight 
innocent human failings” (Stevens, 2007, p.2) recalls Cardew’s views on the 
‘wonderful configurations’ and insights revealed by failure: 
Failure exists in relation to goals: nature has no goals and so can’t 
fail, humans have goals and so they have to fail. Often the wonderful 
configurations produced by failure reveal the pettiness of the goals. 
Of course we have to go on striving for success; otherwise we could 
not genuinely fail (BBC documentary on Cornelius Cardew, 2001) 
 
One of the most profound ways in which Ghost fuses the ethical and 
aesthetic is the way in which it sensitises and focuses the listening of a 
group to an individual. The soloist in the next audio example is very shy 
during group rehearsals. They rarely contribute verbally in rehearsals and 
when directly invited to contribute they blush and appear unwilling to speak 
(this is the only current group member who acts this way). However as a 
soloist in Ghost this member of the group is eloquent and expressive and 
will play for several minutes without prompting. In the example (taken from 
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a lunchtime concert on 2
nd
 November 2011 in the St Gregory’s Centre for 
Music at CCCU) this clarinet soloist can be heard playing with and testing 
the attentiveness of the ghosts using a variety of sudden short notes, longer 
notes with a crescendo, melodic fragments and trills (the ghosts here are 
flute, clarinet, melodica, voice and tuba). 
 
Audio example 4 - ghost (group listening) 
 
The soloist’s sudden silences seem intended to check the attentiveness of 
the group’s listening as if, in a game of Grandmother’s footsteps, they are 
spinning round to try and catch the ghosts off guard. The loud ascending 
two-note fragment at 0.07, answered by a quieter descending fragment at 
0.10, uses dynamic variation to further gauge the group’s responsiveness. 
From around 0.30 there is the sense that the soloist, having tested the 
attentiveness of the listening to their satisfaction, starts to focus more on the 
musical features that have arisen so far. The long note with a crescendo 
alternates with the clipped two-note fragment as the material is repeated and 
developed. I contend that the listening of the ghosts draws out or leaves 
space for such intuitive musical logic from the soloist. In a discussion of 
listening in a psychotherapeutic context, Bion uses the metaphor of a light 
to evoke the revealing power of the space created by such listening: 
Instead of trying to bring a brilliant, intelligent, knowledgeable light 
to bear on obscure problems, I suggest we bring to bear a 
‘diminution’ of the light – a penetrating beam of darkness; a 
reciprocal of the searchlight ... The darkness would be so absolute 
that it would achieve a luminous, absolute vacuum. So that, if any 
object existed, however faint, it would show up very clearly. Thus a 
very faint light would become visible in maximum conditions of 
darkness” (Bion in Casement, 2005, p.222-223) 
 
The alert silence of the listening in Ghost is similar to Bion’s ‘absolute 
vacuum’. The musical personality of this clarinetist - their playful 
eloquence, expressiveness and intuitive musical logic - shows up clearly in 
this vacuum. 
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This quote from the psychotherapeutic tradition makes a deliberate 
connection between ideals of listening in psychotherapy and John Stevens’ 
exercises. In the second of the two memoirs that preface Stevens’ book 
Maggie Nicols speaks of her experience of participating in Stevens’ 
workshops: 
John often spoke about working at the pace of the most vulnerable 
person in a group … when people feel valued they gain confidence 
and give more of themselves. The whole group is strengthened 
(Nicols in Stevens, 2007, memoir two) 
 
This echoes the fundamental tenet of the humanist psychologist Carl Rogers 
who believed that “humans require acceptance and, given acceptance, they 
move towards self-‘actualisation’” (Kramer in Rogers, 1995, xi-xii). The 
means of this acceptance - what Rogers also calls ‘unconditional positive 
regard’ - is “attentive listening [that] is in the service of both the individual 
and the grand question, what it means to become a person” (Kramer in 
Rogers, 1995, xiv). Roger’s ideas about ‘self-actualisation’ and personal 
growth have become common cultural assumptions but it is important to 
mention them here in order to state explicitly what is often only implied: 
that listening in an aesthetic context shares the ethical charge of listening in 
a social or therapeutic context. The peculiar character and richness of 
Stevens’ exercises lies in their ability to combine an educationalist’s 
humanistic idealism with a rather austere Modernist-influenced aesthetic 
sensibility that grounds and deepens the left-wing political and ethical 
assumptions of the former. The Webern-like pointillism of Dot, for 
example, reveals something simultaneously profound yet utterly familiar 
about the timing and gestures of social interaction. And this insight is 
facilitated by the unlikely symbiosis of a Modernist aesthetic with a 
politically aware ideal of shared group music making focused on inclusion 
and fun. 
 
I want to turn now to look at how Stevens’ pieces have influenced my work 
with Scratch Orchestra. The ensemble has generated over twenty 
compositions/exercises (from both students and staff) ranging from fully 
notated works to a series of instructions explaining how to use a DVD of a 
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Grand Prix race as a score. One of the more enduring of these is my musical 
version of the memory game ‘I went to the shops and I brought…’ called 
Shops. Originally conceived as an exercise for solo performer (to fill the 
need for structured personal practice of improvisational skills), Shops works 
best in groups of about three to six players. Here is how it works in a group 
of three players: 
 
Round 1:  Player 1 plays a fragment of music (A) 
Round 2:  Player 1 plays (A) again, player 2 adds (B) 
Round 3:  Player 1 plays (A), player 2 plays (B), player 3 adds (C) 
Round 4:  Player 1 plays (A), player 2 plays (B), player 3 plays (C), player 1 adds (D) 
Round 5:  Player 1 plays (A), player 2 plays (B), player 3 plays (C), player 1 plays (D), 
player 2 adds (E) 
Round 6: etc. 
 
In each round a player adds an idea to the list. Normally the list grows until 
each player has three or four musical fragments, depending on the size of 
the ensemble (although some of my piano students have managed to 
remember up to thirty-five fragments in duet performances of Shops). From 
here you can either continue adding to the list until the players start to make 
mistakes and the resulting uncertainty and confusion forces the musicians to 
improvise or you can set a limit to the amount of fragments each musician 
must remember and cycle through this finite set of musical ideas, expanding 
and elaborating each one a little more each time round. Both routes 
eventually result in improvisation that is made more coherent through the 
musician’s (and audiences) familiarity with a series of short musical 
fragments.  
 
Shops has mainly taken the form of verbal direction during rehearsals but I 
did once, with a view to setting it as homework for the Scratch Orchestra, 
put a version for solo performer into written form: 
 
Score for solo performance of Shops: 
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Play something. 
Play the same thing followed by a new thing. 
Play the same two things followed by a new thing. 
Play the same three things followed by a new thing. 
Repeat this process until you start to make mistakes. 
Whilst still attempting to play your list of musical events accurately and in 
the right order let improvisation creep in. 
Gradually relinquish control and improvise freely with the material that has 
been generated. 
 
Tips for playing Shops: 
‐ Each idea must be memorable and repeatable. Because of this they 
will probably take the form of short and distinctive fragments. Single 
notes are fine, more than four notes is probably too complicated. 
‐ Leave a gap before each return to the first idea. 
‐ Try and make music with the gaps between your ideas. 
‐ Gradually extend each idea with a view to discovering its character 
and potential. Take your time doing this. 
‐ After a while start to merge, develop or superimpose your ideas. 
‐ Error, accident and failure are crucial ingredients of this piece. Let 
them contribute. 
‐ Don't worry about whether what you're doing is good or has any 
point to it. Just focus on playing on the piece and try to notice and 
enjoy the friction between discipline, failure and invention. 
 
The most obvious function of Shops is developing the fundamental 
improvisational skill of being able to remember and reproduce previously 
improvised phrases. On a deeper level, Shops also addresses issues 
concerning the management and creative exploitation of failure, helping to 
inhibit the habitual associations of an improviser’s vocabulary and 
generating improvisation with a high degree of coherence. 
 
The following discussion of Shops prepares for the presentation of a nine-
minute recording of a rehearsal with an accompanying transcription 
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followed by a separate six-minute recording of a live performance. The 
transcription includes labels highlighting relevant points. Consequently 
short audio examples are not used to illustrate the points made in the 
following text. 
 
What Cardew described above as ‘the wonderful configurations produced 
by failure’ play an important role in Shops. The clearest form of this comes 
when the ‘musical shopping list’ starts to contain more information than can 
be remembered accurately. At this point the musician(s) must negotiate the 
transition from highly structured to open improvisation. In my first chapter 
Schieffelin described how such an “experience of inconclusiveness and 
imbalance gives people little choice but to make their own moves of 
creative imagination if they are to make sense of the performance and arrive 
at a meaningful account of what is happening. In so doing ... they complete 
the construction of its reality” (Schieffelin in Smith, 1998, p.263). The 
uncertainty at this point in Shops forces improvisers to act independently, 
provoking their creative participation and cultivating their courage. 
Knowing that you will fail and learning to creatively capitalise on and enjoy 
this fact is an important lesson for a student improviser (with clear ethical 
implications). 
 
Another important feature of Shops is the way it changes how a musician 
relates to their improvisational vocabulary. Imagine an improviser’s 
vocabulary as a neural network in which each node is connected, to a 
greater or lesser degree, to every other node. Activating one node 
immediately suggests a variety of potential ways forward, with the most 
frequently used being presented first. Shops intervenes in this process in 
several ways. The brevity and repetition of the fragments, although 
ostensibly to aid memorization, pares away any musical context or 
association that the material might have had for the improviser. Vocabulary 
is, conventionally, given meaning by the context in which it functions; 
words are only comprehensible within the context of a language. The 
concision and repetition of the fragments in Shops helps to strip away layers 
of association until, like Mondrian’s trees, the material is completely 
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abstracted from its original context. Although impossible, the fragments 
aspire to being blank ciphers that will allow maximum freedom when used 
in improvisation. 
 
This severing of the connections between the nodes of an improvisational 
vocabulary is reinforced by the turn taking in Shops. Whilst a musician is 
waiting to play, their attention is focused on following the sequence of turns 
around the other players. The opportunity for preparing what to play in 
advance is limited by this outward directing of the attention and by the 
difficulty of predicting what the person before you will do. In practice there 
often is a feeling of being suddenly put on the spot that leads to a kind of 
immediate, knee-jerk response. The immediacy of this response coupled 
with the unpredictable juxtaposition of other fragments subverts the 
suggestion of ‘potential ways forward’ offered by an improviser’s 
vocabulary resulting in greater spontaneity and less habitual playing. 
 
Subverting the conventional processes of an improvisational vocabulary is 
also one of the functions of the repetition in Shops. While the repetition at 
the beginning of Shops may seem mechanical (perhaps especially so when 
heard on a recording) the clarity/readability of the process can be engaging 
for an audience. It serves to familiarise both the musicians and the audience 
with the material that will be used in the following freer improvisation. This 
process of familiarisation is interesting. Upon repetition the fragments, that 
may initially have seemed to follow one another arbitrarily, start to seem 
connected. Each time the same bare fragments are heard again they 
accumulate another layer of meaning as a range of similarities, contrasts, 
parallels and other patterns are perceived. Brian Eno observes a similar 
phenomenon: 
The interesting thing about improvisations is that they become more 
interesting as you listen to them more times. What seemed like an 
almost arbitrary collision of events comes to seem very meaningful 
on re-listening (Eno, 2008, p.127-128) 
 
However Eno makes no mention of the original intentions of the 
improvisers and what role they might play in this production of meaning. 
112 
 
The implication is that the accumulated meaning has little relationship 
(‘almost arbitrary’) to the original intentions of the improvisers. I disagree 
with this. I find, in Shops at least, that the repetition amplifies and brings to 
the surface latent musical features that were, on some level, intended by the 
improvisers. There are several ways in which the design of Shops 
encourages the presence of these latent features. 
 
As the ideas are generated it is almost impossible for improvisers not to 
respond to the fragment before them. The adjacent ideas in the following 
audio examples are connected in many ways, some more overtly than 
others. Also the meaning of the earlier fragments is subtly altered as each 
new idea is added to the list, given new implications through the subtle 
change in context. Added to this is the increased technical facility gained 
through repetition that can lead to clusters of fragments following one 
another in rapid volleys. Finally, the meaning of the fragments is affected as 
the gaps between them start to be used to make music, exploring and 
amplifying latent connections or discontinuities. 
 
All of these features – the fragments that, as an aide memoir, contain pithy 
material that lends itself well to being unpacked and developed; the semi-
conscious connections between these fragments; the inhibition of the 
conventional processes of an improvisational vocabulary; the accumulation 
of meaning and increased technical facility that results from repetition – 
result in a level of coherence in the improvisation in the latter part of Shops 
that would not otherwise be present.  
 
An example of this can be heard in the first audio example below (audio 
example 5 – Shops in rehearsal). This is a recording where Shops was first 
presented to a small group of Scratch Orchestra players (two violinists and a 
violist). Consequently there are occasional verbal interjections during the 
first three minutes. The reasoning behind presenting this example is that the 
process of the piece is particularly clear and the repetition (and the resulting 
familiarisation with the material) helps the listener to appreciate the extent 
of the motivic relatedness that characterises the final three minutes. Here is 
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a table of the twelve fragments generated in this performance of Shops (the 
letter stands for the musician’s name, e.g. P2 = Phillip’s second fragment): 
 
Fragments from Shops (audio example 5) 
 
These motives are labeled throughout the transcription of this recording. 
The more freely improvised section (where the turn-taking collapses into 
improvisation) in this performance starts at 7.12. The listener is asked to pay 
particular attention to the motivic connectedness in the final three minutes 
of this extract. 
 
The second audio example (audio example 6 – Shops in performance) is a 
recording of a live performance of Shops given by the same musicians that 
took place four months after the previous recording. The purpose of 
including this is comparative. In this performance, for example, there was 
no opportunity to stop and discuss tactics after a certain amount of 
fragments had been generated. The more freely improvised section starts 
around 2.20 and constitutes around sixty four percent of the performance (as 
opposed to approximately twenty two percent in the first recording). The 
motivic connectedness is perhaps a little more superficial and self-conscious 
but is still a strong feature of the performance. 
 
As I mentioned at the beginning of this commentary the educational impact 
of the work here is beyond the scope of this thesis. However for a full 
understanding of the music making here it is important to bear in mind that 
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the musicians on these recordings were undergraduate music students with 
little prior experience of improvisation.  
 
Audio example 5 – Shops in rehearsal 
 
Recorded in the St Gregory’s Centre for Music, Canterbury Christ Church 
University on 25
th
 September 2010. 
 
Musicians: Piano - Sam Bailey 
  Violin - Phillip Osborne 
  Violin - Benjamin King 
  Viola - Matthew Brown 
 
Audio example 6 – Shops in performance 
 
Recorded in the St Gregory’s Centre for Music, Canterbury Christ Church 
University on 26th January 2011 with the same musicians. 
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2.4 Duo with Matthew Wright 
 
This commentary focuses on my collaboration with composer, turntablist 
and laptop artist Matthew Wright. Since meeting in October 2007 we have 
performed seventeen times together, often co-composing semi-improvised 
structures and continually searching and re-searching for points of contact 
between our different instruments and musical histories. I will look at a 
part-composed part-improvised project called Prelude that is documented in 
four different recordings. The first of these recordings is of a rehearsal in 
which we initially experimented with the idea of using Chopin’s prelude 
no.2 in A minor from Preludes Op.28 (1993) as the source material for 
improvising (the original score for this piece is included in the appendix). 
This idea formed the basis for a commission from the Sounds New Festival 
that was performed a year later. This performance was successful enough to 
generate another performance the following year and a final re-worked 
performance followed a few months later. These recordings/performances 
will be referred to in the text as: 
 
Rehearsal 23
rd
 January 2008 
Prelude 1 26
th
 April 2009 at Orange Street Music Club, Sounds New Festival 
Prelude 2 10
th
 July 2010 at The Old Synagogue, Sounds New Festival project 
Preludes 21
st
 October 2010 at the St Gregory’s Centre, Canterbury Festival 
 
(Prelude 1 and Prelude 2 are both performances/recordings of the same 
work that will be referred to as Prelude when discussed independently of a 
particular recording) 
 
In its broadest sense the Prelude project is about the piano, a practical 
manifestation of Lacy’s words that prefaced section 1.1: “the instrument - 
that's the matter - the stuff - your subject" (Lacy in Bailey, 1993, p.99)). 
One of the aims of the project was to reassess or re-discover the sound of 
the piano, to de-familiarise this ubiquitous timbre in the hope of ‘re-
vivifying’ or ‘re-novating’ the way it is heard. An important part of this 
process was engaging with the sound world most readily associated with the 
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piano: the style of romantic pianism, and in particular the notion of 
virtuosity. As improvisation was the main tool with which we intended to 
realise our aims it seemed logical to focus on pieces that represented the 
crystallisation of, or perhaps even an epitaph to, an established improvising 
tradition, namely Frederic Chopin’s Preludes op.28. 
 
Perhaps the most famous description of Chopin’s Preludes op.28 is 
Schumann’s depiction of them as “sketches, beginnings of Etudes or, so to 
speak, ruins, solitary eagle’s wings, a wild and colourful motley of pieces” 
(Schumann in Goertzen, 1996, p.330). The notion of the Preludes being 
‘ruins’; crumbling, incomplete monuments to a fading tradition of 
improvisation (Wangermee described op.28 as the “stylisation of an ideal of 
improvisation which had already effectively ceased to be practiced” 
(Wangermee in Temperley, 2009, p.334)), resonates with Gary Peter’s 
description of the improviser’s predicament previously mentioned in 1.5: 
[The improviser] is thrown into a situation piled high with the 
discarded waste products of cultural history These are the defunct, 
clapped-out, disintegrating remnants of past times on the edge of an 
oblivion that promise, at best, a faint but continuing resonance as 
nostalgia and the cliché or, at worst, as universal forgetfulness” 
(Peters, 2009, p.17) 
 
Alfred Cortot’s 1945 vinyl recoding of Chopin’s Preludes (1977), which 
plays an important role in the Prelude project, is certainly a ‘remnant of past 
times’; a monument to a fading tradition of pianistic interpretation. Cutler 
describes the process of sampling, manipulating and improvising with these 
old vinyl recordings as the creative re-appropriation of “fragments of 
cultural debris”. He adds that this practice, known as plunderphonics, 
implicitly critiques and explores such Western assumptions as “ownership, 
originality, copyright, skill and cultural exhaustion” (Cutler, 2008, p.138). A 
final layer of memory in this project is my personal history with both my 
instrument and this repertoire. Preparing the piano was a means of putting 
some aesthetic distance between the instrument and the musician in this 
performance; widening the ‘gap’ mentioned in 1.2 to create a new space in 
which the music might grow. 
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The first rehearsals for Prelude 1 were focussed on preparing the piano in 
ways that were new to both Matthew and myself. We used e-bows, dental 
floss, tambourines, hand fans, cello bow hair, pencils, pens, singing bowls, 
wind chimes, shakers and other percussion instruments. These were placed, 
scraped or dropped on the piano strings. As we explored these sounds in 
rehearsal we realised that this is what we wanted the performance to consist 
of: exploration and discovery. The preparations not only created new and 
unfamiliar sounds but they responded in unpredictable ways that meant we 
could not fully anticipate the result of a particular preparation. We 
deliberately used imprecise preparations and we deliberately did not explore 
or test them exhaustively. This ensured that there would be moments in the 
performance where the music would literally be the sound of discovering 
the possibilities of a particular instance of a preparation. This haphazard, 
serendipitous approach was a conscious and deliberate methodology that, 
like the examples of Christian Wolff or Miles Davis mentioned in 1.5, was 
“a technical means of producing and giving the sounds a particular quality.” 
(Wolff, 2007, p.13). 
 
A specific example of this process at work can be heard in the following 
audio example (from Preludes). At 0.13 the LH of the piano plays the 
harmony from b.13 of the original prelude. At 0.17 The RH crosses over 
and plays a low note which, due to the preparation, (probably a tambourine 
laid on the strings) has an unexpectedly complex, percussive resonance. The 
piano then explores whether other nearby pitches share this resonance. In 
fact the piano becomes obsessed with this note/timbre and plays with it for 
almost a minute (0.17 – 1.13). Matt notices this and responds astutely by 
slowly removing the preparation. From around 0.56 the note is no longer 
triggering the preparation. The piano responds to this by fading in volume 
and, at 1.13, playing the melody from b.14 of the original prelude as a signal 
to move on to the next harmony of the original piece (b.14-15). The 
reference to the melody is a sign that this moment of the music is over, a 
recognition that the ‘giving’ had ceased. 
 
Audio example 1 – Preludes (low note resonance) 
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Chopin’s prelude no.2 in A minor (b.13-16) 
 
The idea of preparing the piano as a means of reassessing and rediscovering 
aspects of its familiar timbre was part of a larger structural plan. The 
structure of both Prelude 1 and Prelude 2 was designed around the idea of 
the sound starting inside the instrument, making its way onto the keyboard 
and then being extended out into the performing space. Contained in this 
structural plan was a chronological sense of the means of sound production, 
with the various ways of preparing (or sounding) the piano growing in 
technological complexity and dominance. For example both performances 
open with harmonies from the first of Chopin’s preludes, no.1 in C major, 
being sounded sympathetically (the keys are silently depressed and the un-
dampened strings are vibrated by the striking of a loud staccato note). This 
way of producing the sound was related to the fact that the harmony in the 
first bar of this prelude is loosely related to the harmonic series (echoing the 
first prelude from J.S. Bach’s The Well-Tempered Clavier (1994) and 
Chopin’s own first study op.10 no.1 (1994), both also in C major) and 
would therefore be particularly resonant when the fundamental was struck. 
This created a jarring, alien opening to the piece where both performers and 
audience gradually start to focus their listening in-between the violent 
staccato notes on the near-silent ghostly resonance of harmonies that have 
not been ‘played’. Straining to hear meaning in the unfolding of this 
indistinct, timbrally distorted yet familiar tonal harmonic progression can be 
likened to listening to a distant memory. 
 
Audio example 2 – Prelude 1 (opening) 
 
In retrospect the performance of this section (from Prelude 1) does not seem 
to allow enough time in-between the staccato notes for the listeners to focus 
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on the resonance. Ideally the resonance should die away to silence before 
the next note is struck, creating a sense of uncertainty as to whether it can 
still be heard or whether we are left with the just the memory of having 
heard it. In Prelude 2 the sympathetic resonance was amplified with added 
reverb creating something of a sugar-coated version of this effect. The third 
performance (Preludes) did not include this section so these ideas have not 
been satisfactorily realised to date. 
 
Before discussing the other end of this structural/technological spectrum – 
where the means of sound production extend out into the performing space 
through speakers and ultimately drown out the acoustic sound – I want to 
look at the significance of the various forms of technology used in the 
Prelude project. 
 
Prelude makes use of three different forms of technology that were 
designed to archive sonic events: printed scores, vinyl records and digital 
sampling. As well as representing different forms of memory, different 
ways of capturing the past and reconstituting it as the familiar, each of these 
technologies have their own emphases and cultural connotations. Printed 
scores and audio recordings, for example, represent competing forms of 
authority in the cultural hierarchy or economy that provides the scaffolding 
for the canon of musical works from which Preludes op.28 comes. 
Interestingly Chopin’s preludes do not fit neatly into this canon. A leading 
Chopin scholar, Jean-Jacques Eigeldinger, claims that the preludes are not 
introductory pieces but a unified cycle connected by a three note motif that 
he traces in an elaborate variety of transpositions and inversions throughout 
the work (Eigeldinger in Temperley, 2009, p.324). However, Kallberg 
describes Eigeldinger’s theory as “willfully anachronistic” (Kallberg, 1992, 
p.136), an attempt to place this “wild and colourful motley of pieces” 
(Schumann in Goertzen, 1996, p.330) on a par with the large-scale formal 
unity of Bach or Beethoven. This is not just an academic theory; this 
Teutonic bias, that undervalues improvisation and the small form, has 
contributed to it being standard practice to perform or record Preludes op.28 
as a set. This convention ignores the improvisatory tradition in which these 
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pieces took shape as well as their poetic and utilitarian nature as 
‘beginnings’ or introductions. In this way the Prelude project can be 
understood as a form of critical commentary on the interpretative tradition 
that relies so heavily on the authority embodied in the printed score. It 
interrogates a performance practice that ignores both the function and the 
improvisatory nature of the preluding tradition that formed the subject 
matter of Chopin’s Preludes op.28 (Chopin’s preludes themselves were 
‘signifying’ on this context). The role of audio recording in this 
interrogation lies in the juxtaposition of alternative authoritative voices. 
Which represents the most ‘authoritative’ or ‘authentic’ embodiment of 
Preludes op.28: the unrealised instructions of the printed score, Alfred 
Cortot’s feted 1942 recording (1977) or the live improvisation that engages 
with both? These issues are manifest in Prelude most powerfully in a key 
moment in when the piano comes to the end of a semi-improvised 
exploration of prelude no.2 in A minor and a recording of Alfred Cortot 
playing the same piece is played and then used as material for further 
improvisation. 
 
Before listening to this moment in the music it is important to consider the 
performance setting of these pieces. With Prelude 1 the venue’s white baby 
grand piano was moved to the centre of the room (an old ballroom with a 
high ceiling) and put on an old carpet with an antique lamp beside the 
keyboard (the image of these theatrical tropes alongside a macbook, a 
mixing desk and a pair of turntables visually highlights the juxtaposition of 
performance practices in this piece). The venue was a music club with a 
busy bar. We had requested that no-one approach the bar during the 
performance and that all the drinks fridges were turned off before we 
started. This venue had never been so quiet or so intimately set up for a 
performance. During the section based around prelude no.2 in A minor 
(from which the following extract is taken) Matt was moving slowly around 
and inside the piano manipulating the various preparations. This was 
visually intriguing for the audience that were seated at tables all around us 
and it undoubtedly focussed their listening on the prepared effects. When 
listening to the recording of Prelude 1 the rate of change can seem very 
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slow and the durations excessive. However, the focus of the playing and the 
intimate, involving setting would have gone a long way towards mitigating 
this impression for the audience present at the live performance. 
 
Audio example 3 – Prelude 1 (into turntables playing prelude no.2 in A 
minor) 
 
There is lot packed into this moment. When the piano stops and the record 
takes over, the effect is like looking back at a black and white photograph of 
the original prelude. This verges on the sentimental but there is a 
disconcerting sense of both distance and intimate fragility to the sound that 
is due to the vinyl recording and the intense introspection of Cortot’s 
performance. Coupled with the oddness of the ‘real’ piano playing along 
with the recording (starting at 2.03) and the gradual introduction of variable 
speed turntable effects and digital sound processing, this is enough to dispel 
the impression of mere nostalgia. Mixed in with the aesthetic effect of this 
moment are a rich range of conceptual resonances. The audience can see the 
pianist stop playing: technology takes over but not with something new but 
something older and possibly more authentic. This is an inversion of Walter 
Benjamin’s proclamation: “that which withers in the age of mechanical 
reproduction is the aura of a work of art” (Benjamin, 1968, p.221). Here 
Cortot’s recording rises up, in the presence of the still, silent live performer, 
like the ghost of the original piece. Benjamin’s mourned ‘aura’ haunts the 
corporeal performance as the spectre of author-ity or authenticity whose rest 
is disturbed by what composer Edwin Roxburgh allegedly and disdainfully 
described as ‘mucking about with Chopin’ (overheard after the performance 
of Prelude 2). 
 
The next audio example is from the end of Prelude 1. Alongside the 
structural plan based on an increasing sophistication of piano preparation 
there is also a basic crescendo throughout the whole 45-minute 
performance. The most prominent form that this takes is density of texture; 
samples of earlier sections are retained and accumulate as the piece 
progress. In this extract, samples of earlier moments in the piece, where 
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piano strings were sounded by e-bows, hand fans and dental floss, form a 
kind of sonic swamp of memories. The preparations that had been removed 
from the piano, after the version of prelude no.2 in A minor, are here 
replaced, adding to this sense of accumulation. Pencils, rulers and a 
tambourine are among some of the things bouncing around inside the piano 
at this point in the music. 
 
There are, again, some important aspects of the performance that are not 
conveyed through the recording. Four speakers were placed around the 
perimeter of the performance space. Ideally we would have used a surround 
sound system but, in the absence of the necessary equipment, we used 
panning with two pairs of stereo speakers in an attempt to provide the most 
dramatic spatialisation possible (given the means at our disposal). As I 
mentioned earlier it was part of our structural plan that the sound would 
appear to originate deep inside the piano – the ghostly near-silent resonance 
of the opening – and gradually move outward, eventually enveloping the 
audience in a swirling mass. 
  
Audio example 4 – Prelude 1 (final section of prelude no.24 in d minor) 
 
This is a dramatic moment. The pianist is playing a version of prelude no.24 
in D minor. The occasional fragmentary re-take or wrong note is initially 
due to the perceptual confusion and physical effort involved in competing 
with the density and volume of the amplified sound (the piano is louder on 
the recording than it was in the performance). This moment of the piece 
dramatises the virtuosity of romantic pianism as a struggle against 
mechanical reproduction. There is a shrillness, almost an hysterical edge, to 
the virtuosity here; it is a physical symptom of the desperation of the lone 
performer in the face of such a barrage of sound. And of course the machine 
can play so much faster and louder: instrumental virtuosity, that most 
revered (and maligned) of romantic tropes, is exposed as simply a less 
efficient, outdated form of reproductive musical technology. 
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When the final perfect cadence of the original prelude resolves (at 01.01) an 
interesting thing occurs. The piano starts to behave more like the samples, 
repeating the same musical gesture, skipping back a few seconds as if 
flicking a needle back over the surface of a record or like the stammering of 
a cd glitch (interestingly anyone who has heard pianists practice will be 
familiar with this obsessive arrhythmic repetition of difficult passages). It is 
possible to hear this moment as the pianist having finally been coerced into 
adopting the repetition-based techniques of the machine. After several 
minutes of frantic physical effort that has had considerably more visual than 
aural impact, the final repeated D’s of Chopin’s original prelude signal the 
pianists exhausted defeat. In the presence of the silenced virtuoso the 
samples echo on as repetitive traces of human activity. 
 
These themes were revisited a year later in Preludes. The symbiosis 
between the piano and turntables at the end of Prelude 1 led to further 
exploration of ways of linking and juxtaposing these two instruments. 
Although both instruments were popular means of democratising music - 
bringing it into the home and providing the means of reconstituting the 
mass-produced musical blueprints of printed scores and vinyl records - they 
have highly contrasting cultural associations. Put crudely the piano is the 
ultimate romantic/modernist instrument whereas turntables-as-instrument is 
a quintessentially post-modern invention (there is a long list of binaries 
along similar lines: high vs low culture, an interface where great care has 
been taken to filter out ‘noise’ and standardise pitch steps vs an interface 
that delights in noise and specialises in glissandi, the ‘masterworks’ of the 
piano repertoire vs the Duchampian ‘readymade’ or found object, the 
instrument of choice for the ‘cult of genius’ vs the deconstructive death of 
the author). 
 
For Preludes a Trigger Finger USB/MIDI control surface and a laptop were 
used to play samples. This interface enabled the samples to be triggered 
quickly and intuitively thus increasing the potential for intricate, rapid-fire 
reactive interplay between the two instruments. The concert started and 
finished with performances of Shops, the piece/exercise discussed in 2.3 that 
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was designed to facilitate the generation and memorisation of material 
conducive to improvisation. In place of the overarching structure of Prelude 
1 and Prelude 2 we used a pallindromic structure built around Chopin’s 
prelude no.2 in A minor: 
 
Shops 
Electronics solo     
Duo       
Chopin Prelude no.2 in a minor  
Duo       
Piano solo      
Shops 
 
The samples used in both versions of Shops were pre-recorded fragments of 
me playing the same piece in rehearsal. This process was an extension of the 
intertextuality contained in Prelude 1: the pianist in Preludes was 
improvising responses to someone improvising responses using samples of 
the same pianist improvising responses. This disorientating intertextuality is 
highlighted when used in the turn-taking additive material-generating 
context of Shops. 
 
Audio example 5 – Preludes (opening version of Shops) 
 
There are moments, particularly in the tangles of rapid-fire interactions, 
where it is difficult to tell which instrument is producing which sound. This 
sense of equivalence is played out in the improvising as the two instruments 
imitate their respective idiomatic effects. The articulation of the first note of 
the performance is an example of this. The pianist plays this note with a 
short, mechanical staccato in an attempt to sound like an edited sample. 
Another example occurs at 3.00. After a quickly rising piano arpeggio the 
samples begin a rapid repetitive texture, recalling the glitches of a skipping 
cd, which the piano quickly starts to imitate. A more unusual reversal of 
roles occurs at 2.40 when pitch-shifted samples play something approaching 
a melody over a fragmented piano accompaniment. The gestures used to 
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activate the samples (via the trigger finger) bring a responsive physicality to 
the electronics. This performance expands upon the moment at the end of 
Prelude 1, where the piano is coerced into adopting the repetitive techniques 
of the machine. Here the piano starts to adopt the musical behavior of the 
electronics at the same time as the samples start to behave more like an 
acoustic instrumentalist. 
 
Questions of virtuosity and agency are again raised by this: if the trigger 
finger can produce an intricate arpeggio at the touch of a button how does 
this impact on the way the audience perceives what the pianist is doing, 
what Lawrence Kramer calls the ‘listening gaze’ (Kramer, 2002, p.77)? 
Many audience members are familiar with the peculiarly mundane 
experience of watching a laptop performer at work. That we might 
experience this lack of correlation between sounds and gestures as 
incongruous or frustrating reveals much about our expectations of live 
performance. A reviewer of a recent series of laptop performances noted 
that “with computer generated … performances we must release our hold on 
the aura of the original gesture” (Parkinson, 2011). Once again we return to 
Benjamin’s concept of the aura of authenticity, this time in the context of 
the physical gestures, rituals and other social constructs that surround the 
concept of live performance. The ubiquity of ‘mechanical reproduction’ has 
led to an increasing investment of cultural capital in the authenticity of the 
live event. In fact, as Phillip Auslander observes, the concept of ‘liveness’ 
depends on such technology: 
Historically, the live is an effect of mediatisation, not the other way 
around. It was the development of recording technologies that made it 
possible to perceive existing representations as ‘live’ … [the category 
of live performance] only has meaning in relation to the existence of 
an opposing possibility. (Auslander, 2011) 
 
The Prelude project has been a means of de-familiarising and re-novating 
the piano and, by extension, the concept of live performance and the 
interpretative tradition that the piano represents. These are the ‘established 
codes’, mentioned in 1.6, that are ‘interrogated’, ‘deterritorialised’, 
reworked and critiqued through improvisation in this project. This process is 
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partly a product of the juxtaposition of piano, laptop and turntables. The 
contrasting cultural associations of these instruments and the different ways 
that they deal with memory, presence and authenticity provide the ideal 
means of de-familiarising the familiar. 
 
 
The practice that I have chosen to submit in relation to this project is the 
first performance/recording of the Prelude project. Prelude 1 was performed 
at Orange Street Music Club, Canterbury on April 26
th
 2009 as part of the 
Sounds New festival. 
 
Audio example 6 – Prelude 1 in full 
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Conclusion 
 
Improvisation is a basic instinct, an essential force in sustaining life 
(Bailey, 1993, p.140) 
 
My attitude is that the musical and the real worlds are one. 
Musicality is a dimension of perfectly ordinary reality. (Cardew, 
1971, p.20) 
 
Improvising extended the scope and relevance of music making until 
the artificial boundary between life and art disintegrated 
(Nachmanovitch, 1990, p.6) 
 
Music is your own experiences, your thoughts, your wisdom. If you 
don’t live it, it won’t come out of your horn (Parker in Lewis, 2004, 
p.158) 
 
Derek Bailey, Cornelius Cardew, Steven Nachmanovitch and Charlie Parker 
agree that “how improvisers play inevitably interacts with how they live” 
(Reason in Fischlin & Heble, 2004, p.78). If there is an over-arching theme 
running through this thesis then this is it. While observations about the 
relationship between life and art are commonplace (Cameron, 1995; 
Kaprow, 2003) what is unique here is the transience of improvisation; it’s 
action-orientated singularity and ephemerality. However before I go further 
with this discussion I want to reprise some of the themes of the practical 
projects that have hopefully grounded and focused the more philosophical 
tone of the first chapter. 
 
I talked about the ‘collaborative diffusion of individual agency’ that 
characterized The Quartet’s studio recording process. Although this might 
not be the most complete example of Cardew’s improvisational virtue of 
‘selflessness’ this aspect of The Quartet’s working method can be heard as a 
situation where individual authorial contributions start to lose currency (as 
evidenced by the inadequacy of copyright law to accurately reflect creative 
responsibility in such situations).  
The recordings of Spock provide examples of improvised music making that 
involved an ongoing ‘negotiation of agendas’. My repeated attempts to 
change the group’s improvising (through band leading, composing and 
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through improvising itself) can be heard as various forms of negotiation; 
proof that the social and musical aspects of a collaborative relationship are 
related (but should not be conflated) and that a certain amount of friction or 
discomfort often serves to avoid creative complacency. 
Amongst other things the work of the Canterbury Scratch Orchestra 
underlines the observation that listening in an aesthetic context has a similar 
ethical charge (and therefore responsibility) to listening in a social or 
therapeutic situation. 
The Prelude project with Matt Wright interrogated and reworked the 
‘established codes’ of Romantic pianism, the distinction between live and 
prerecorded performance and the timbre of the piano; ‘de-familiarising the 
familiar’ as a means of revealing fresh insights into worn subject matter. 
 
The collaborative diffusion of individual agency, the musical/social 
negotiation of agendas, the thinly veiled ethical charge of ‘aesthetic’ 
listening and the performance of de-familiarising the familiar; these are 
some of the findings from my practice that flesh out the notion that 
improvisation is a ‘lived’ activity rather than a “class of perfected objects” 
(Gioia, 1988, p.111). Cardew explores the implications of this in his final 
improvisational virtue, ‘acceptance of death’: 
From a certain point of view improvisation is the highest mode of 
musical activity, for it is based on music’s fatal weakness and 
essential and most beautiful characteristic – its transience. 
 
The desire always to be right is an ignoble taskmaster, as is the 
desire for immortality. The performance of any vital action brings us 
closer to death: if it didn’t it would lack vitality. Life is a force to be 
used and if necessary used up. ‘Death is the virtue in us going to its 
destination’ (Lieh Tzu) (Cardew, 1971, p.20) 
 
Before discussing this it is relevant to compare Cardew’s views with 
Bailey’s: 
Improvisation, unconcerned with any preparatory or residual 
document, is completely at one with the non-documentary nature of 
musical performance and their shared ephemerality gives them a 
unique compatibility. So it might be claimed that improvisation is 
best pursued through its practice in music. And that the practice of 
music is best pursued through improvisation (Bailey, 1993, p.142) 
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Despite their difference in tone these two musicians, both key references in 
this thesis, say essentially the same thing. Transience and ephemerality are 
defining features of music and are particularly attenuated in the case of 
improvisation making it a paradigmatic, ideal form of music making. 
Bailey’s emphasis on improvisation’s ‘non-documentary nature’ and 
Cardew’s characterisation of it as a ‘vital action’ both reprise a distinction 
made earlier in this thesis (in section 1.3) between actions and objects. 
When he mentions the ‘desire to always be right’ and the ‘desire for 
immortality’ Cardew is alluding to composition. The construction of 
enduring musical objects is pitted against the mortality of improvised ‘vital 
action’. Cardew’s ‘ignoble taskmaster’ brings to mind Faust’s 
Mephistopheles; in particular the Adorno-like incarnation of Satan that 
taunts Thomas Mann’s Adrian Leverkuhn (Mann, 1999). It is 
improvisation’s transient nature as an activity that has been primarily 
responsible for situating it against Western political, economic and cultural 
norms. Our culture is as obsessed with objects as our economy is with 
commodities. What we fetishise in objects is their permanence – the present 
of lived experience is overlooked as fear of our death fixes our gaze on the 
future. 
 
And it is to this present that improvisation binds us, drawing our attention to 
the experience of being alive. It is relevant that Cardew’s virtues can be read 
in two ways. When he says “I am trying to think of the various different 
kinds of strength or virtue that can be developed by the musician” (1971, 
p.17) it is not clear whether these seven virtues are recommended as means 
of enhancing improvisation of whether they are ends to be achieved through 
the means of improvisation. To consider the latter is to understand 
improvisation as a profoundly appropriate means of cultivating the virtues 
of simplicity, integrity, selflessness, forbearance, preparedness/awakeness, 
identification with nature and acceptance of death. ‘Towards an ethic of 
Improvisation’ (1971) was written during Cardew’s formative improvising 
experiences with AMM, experiences that contributed to a radical change in 
his aesthetic and political views in the years that followed. Improvisation 
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was certainly a means, at least for the musicians in AMM, of opening up 
and exploring aesthetic, ethical and political alternatives: 
It is no exaggeration, I believe, to say that with AMM Cardew 
rediscovered himself. As an improvising musician he discovered 
modes of expression which symbolised new spheres of psychic and 
social experience; within AMM music he recognised a dimension of 
an ethical reality which embraced freedom from egocentricity, a 
sensitivity to the (musical) needs of others, and which validated the 
dichotomous relation of the individual to the collective. AMM was 
for Cardew a moral force and he came to recognise the profound 
social and philosophical implications of what it was doing, the 
consequences of which were to surface and consume him several 
years later (Tilbury, 2008, p.294) 
 
At the beginning of this thesis the multi-disciplinary musician, artist and 
academic Ansuman Biswas described how “the most appropriate 
appreciation of a musical instrument is to use it to sensitise the mind to the 
music of what happens” (2011, p.101): 
Music is a perfect laboratory for the examination of what David 
Chalmers (1996) has called the ‘hard problem’ [of consciousness]. It 
allows the observer to discern fine physical and emotional details, 
allows experimental manipulation of states of mind, creates a forum 
for the comparison and verification of otherwise private, subjective 
experience, and has begun to establish a literature and methodology 
for just such activity … Of all musical forms, however, 
improvisation seems particularly suited for opening up awareness to 
the dynamic, irrational, embodied mind. It offers a set of practices 
for training the attention and directing it to examine the constantly 
changing, emotional substrate of conscious experience. And 
emerging from this introverted phase, music also offers a means of 
sharing and communicating the insights gained (Biswas, 2011, 
p.107-109) 
 
For Biswas improvisation can be understood (and heard) as a form of 
meditation: a research methodology for increasing understanding and 
awareness of the experience of consciousness. On a micro-processual level 
improvisation can be a way of engaging with, and thus diffusing (or fusing) 
the distinctions between mind and body, subject and object, art and craft; it 
challenges musicians to continually re-negotiate their relationship to what is 
habitual and familiar to them, it cultivates awareness of the functioning of 
memory; it provides interaction with other musicians that involves a unique 
interplay of power and vulnerability; it can provide a space in which to 
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explore, grow and establish different aesthetic, ethical or political 
possibilities. 
 
This can be illustrated through Marcel Cobussen’s description of Evan 
Parker’s improvising: 
 Seeking out the unnameable, permanently resisting, going against 
the current: this requires of a musician an enduring alertness, a 
continuous (musical) thinking in order to exceed his knowledge, his 
achievements, his own being ... it is a matter of showing how the 
space of the possible is larger than the one we are assigned 
(Cobussen, 2005, p.41) 
 
Many art forms have the capacity to model ways of doing or perceiving. 
What this description of Parker’s playing suggests is that “improvisatory 
performance practices can model different ways of being in the world” 
(Fischlin & Heble, 2004, p.11, my italics). But I want to go further than this. 
In Parker’s music you are not hearing a pattern designed to give the 
impression of resistance and alertness (or a trace of the resistance involved 
in a prior process); you are listening to Parker resisting, you are bearing 
witness to “a lived, enacted performance of being differently in the world” 
(Fischlin & Heble, 2004, p.11, my italics). 
 
It is this taste of ‘being differently in the world’, if only whilst playing 
music, which helps to explain improvisation’s connection with liberatory 
politics. The composer and pianist Frederic Rzewski expands on this: 
 [Improvised music] has to do with being present. It also has to do 
with democratic forms and equality, at least in a group situation. It 
can function as a kind of abstract laboratory in which experimental 
forms of communication can be tried without risk of damage to 
persons. The great improvised music of the twentieth century may be 
remembered by future generations as an early abstract model in 
which new social forms were first dimly conceived. (Rzewski, 2008, 
p.271) 
 
This utopianism that is associated with some improvised music might be 
thought to be incompatible with a reliance on memory, habits and the 
familiar. Lock, in his book Blutopia (2004), makes a similar distinction 
between “a utopian impulse, evident in the creation of imagined places 
132 
 
(Promised Lands), and the impulse to remember, to bear witness” (p.2). But 
he also makes the point that improvisation is unique in its ability to bring 
these two things together: 
These impulses can fuse, forming a crossroads in the creative 
consciousness where visions of the future and revisions of the past 
become part of the same process, a ‘politics of transfiguration’, in 
which accepted notions of language, history, the real, and the 
possible are thrown open to questioning and found wanting (p.2) 
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I want to finish this thesis by providing a context for the live performance 
that will complete the practice element of my PhD submission. One of the 
results of my research has been to establish a weekly series of improvised 
and experimental music, film and poetry events called Free Range (see free-
range.co) Loosely modelled on London’s Little Theatre Club - the venue 
that provided a creative laboratory for the first generation of British free 
improvisers in the late 1960’s and early 70’s – the main purpose of this 
series of events was to gather together and galvanise the various loose 
threads of artistic activity happening in Canterbury and the surrounding 
area. Significantly Evan Parker gave the first performance in the series. 
 
One of the most important results of this series of events, in terms of my 
improvised practice, has been opportunity for the development of a solo 
piano vocabulary. I set myself the task of playing an opening solo piano set 
before each Free Range event. Five months of notated sketches and 
recordings of both rehearsals and performances document the development 
of an improvisational vocabulary focused around a particular intervallic 
structure. I became fascinated with the possibilities contained within a chord 
or series built from expanding intervals (C, Db, Eb, Gb, Bb, Eb, A, E, C 
etc.). While the details of this development fall outside the scope of this 
thesis this fledgling improvisational vocabulary forms the backdrop to the 
live performance that will be presented as the conclusion of my research 
here. 
 
The aim of the final performance is to use this solo improvisational 
vocabulary in the context of a duo performance with electronic musician 
and composer Matthew Wright. The performance will draw upon the 
existing archive of recordings that document the development of this 
language; both musicians will share the same pool of ‘memories’. It is 
hoped that the contrasting modes of retrieval and implementation of this 
shared information - via the piano on one hand and the laptop and turntables 
on the other – will yield fresh insights into the material, the instruments and 
the musicians. Care will be taken to leave certain questions unanswered 
134 
 
(and unasked) so that the performance will consist of genuine searching, 
researching and discovery. 
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